## Why
Stale saved grants or malformed rules can cause valid network denials to be discarded. A failed rule write can also leave the in-memory policy inconsistent with native enforcement.
## What changed
- Add a helper to derive MCP network policy from controller and environment policies, permission profiles, approval settings, and saved rules. Preserve managed restrictions and conservatively deny traffic that requires review, request hooks, or DNS checks the metadata cannot express.
- Retain valid saved denials when grants violate managed constraints or a rule batch is malformed.
- Serialize runtime updates and persistence, publishing denials before the write so they remain effective if saving fails. Publish saved grants after a successful write.
- Extract validation of listener settings for running proxy updates.
## Testing
Add coverage for policy composition, mixed-executor local binding, native proxy denial parity, stale grants, malformed denials, failed persistence, and compatibility with trusted MCP servers without policy negotiation support.
GitOrigin-RevId: ef00632acb48a51fc582f18d20a3e713f953a191
## What changed
- Expose `aws_sigv4` actions in version 2 MITM permissions configuration and the config schema, rejecting multiple signing actions per hook.
- Give local managed commands placeholder AWS credentials for the selected signing pair, and mask configured credentials in environment values and protected shell snapshots.
- Set `AWS_CA_BUNDLE` to the managed proxy CA bundle when unset, and require `features.credential_masking` for local AWS signing hooks.
- Validate placeholders against every configured signing pair to prevent overlap with real credentials.
## Testing
Extend configuration, signing, and TLS forwarding tests to cover action resolution, invalid signing configuration, credential masking, CA trust, snapshot protection, and exclusion of local AWS defaults from remote environments.
GitOrigin-RevId: 81dfdea30ebde74829882b38891ea41e9737058a
## Why
Remote credential masking previously fell back to unmasked execution whenever custom credential providers were configured.
## What changed
- Transport configured provider rules to the executor-local network proxy, where credential values and destination context are resolved.
- Advertise `credentialMaskingCustomProviders` and negotiate masking support. Keep the warning and unmasked fallback for executors that support only built-in providers.
- Discard provider rules when masking is disabled and omit their contents from debug output.
## Testing
Extend coverage for capability compatibility, provider configuration round trips, and fallback on older executors. Exercise configured-provider masking in remote request history and verify that masked placeholders are restored to real credentials in upstream request headers.
GitOrigin-RevId: b036f56900b343ddccc17b5293c82bc1f3426237
## Why
Remote credential masking previously supported only Bash commands without login startup or shell snapshots, leaving Zsh commands with unmasked credentials.
## What changed
- Enable masking for Zsh login commands using shell snapshots on Linux and macOS.
- Capture trusted startup profiles per launch, bind the credential broker to the resulting environment, and replace credentials and supported aliases with placeholders before snapshot replay.
- Preserve explicit environment overrides, credential unsets, and launcher-managed proxy settings during replay.
- Warn and fall back to unmasked startup when a snapshot cannot safely replay credentials; stop execution if protected snapshot restoration fails.
## Testing
Extend remote execution tests for inherited and profile-defined credentials, overrides, destination changes, and unsupported-profile fallback. Add a Zsh scenario snapshot showing a credential placeholder in command output.
GitOrigin-RevId: 83193d6cbc05f3deb0d6d0b9ae80974b353ce900
## What changed
Negotiate executor support for `credential_masking` and enable built-in credential brokerage in executor-local network proxies. Supported non-login Bash commands on Linux and macOS receive credential placeholders, with real credentials injected by the proxy for matching destinations.
Retain credential mappings across process launches within the same executor session, scoped by environment, conversation, and broker configuration. Keep credentials and destination context on the executor.
Fall back to unmasked execution for unsupported shells or shell startup, and for configured credential providers. Emit warnings when masking is unavailable, preserving shell profiles and snapshots.
## Testing
Add coverage for capability negotiation, fallback behavior, mapping reuse and isolation, proxy credential injection, and keeping executor credentials out of model-visible request history. Test warning, removal, and rejection modes for credentials left unmasked during preparation.
GitOrigin-RevId: f64e916a5de8350fa0d289d3440ec29761accd75
## Why
Resolving unapproved hostnames discloses them to DNS even when the proxy ultimately rejects the request. Allowing local binding in a managed macOS sandbox also granted direct outbound access to port `53`.
## What changed
- Require an allowlist match or policy approval before resolving a hostname for address checks.
- Recheck baseline restrictions after local and remote policy approval so approval cannot bypass explicit denies or local/private address restrictions.
- Preserve DNS checks for inner HTTPS requests after an approved CONNECT, including hosts without a persisted allowlist entry.
- Remove the Seatbelt allowance for external DNS while retaining local binding and loopback proxy access.
## Testing
Add regression tests for zero DNS lookups on unapproved hosts, private-address rejection after approval, local and remote approval ordering, and DNS checks after approved CONNECT requests. Add a macOS Seatbelt child test that verifies external UDP and TCP port `53` access is denied while local binding and proxy connectivity remain available.
GitOrigin-RevId: 490790462c51928e831dd8375ac098bc3a257bac
## Why
Treating an omitted `allow_local_binding` setting as `false` prevents environment policies from inheriting local-binding permissions.
## What changed
Keep `allow_local_binding` optional when composing controller and environment policies. Preserve explicit denials from either policy and resolve executor defaults after composition. Without a controller, default to denying local binding unless the environment explicitly allows it.
## Testing
Add coverage for omitted, allowed, and denied settings, managed constraints, executor defaults, and remote launch rejection when local-binding restrictions cannot be enforced. Extend remote network approval tests with loopback requests to verify controller and environment policy composition.
GitOrigin-RevId: aa0d15e8be87a2741255cd3a5a2cabffa03214ac
## What changed
- Add optional `network.mitm_ca` configuration with `certificate_file` and
`private_key_file` for trusted proxy configuration. Require MITM to be enabled
and retain the generated CA when no external CA is configured.
- Validate absolute paths, regular files, file sizes, certificate/key matching,
and Unix private-key permissions. Reject symlinks on Unix, private keys embedded
in certificate files, and external private keys on non-Unix platforms.
- Store derived external-CA trust bundles in the proxy artifact directory,
include only certificates, and skip inherited generated bundles to avoid
retaining stale roots.
- Preserve MITM for external CAs when disabling credential brokerage. Reject
external CA configuration for remote execution, even when the proxy is disabled,
and reject unknown fields in `NetworkProxyConfig`.
- Default the upstream request version adapter to HTTP/1.1 and remove the request
URI from upstream request failure context.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for external CA configuration, mismatched keys, embedded
private keys, non-Unix rejection, trust-bundle placement and contents, stale-root
exclusion, credential-broker toggling, and remote configuration rejection.
GitOrigin-RevId: cb209295c19fbe53a9fa0194f11ff06acccabef6
## Why
Allow the network policy proxy to run without a full Codex permissions profile.
## What changed
- Add `codex-network-proxy --config <PATH>` to load a standalone JSON file containing a `network` object and run the proxy independently of Codex.
- Require `network.enabled = true`, limit configuration size to 1 MiB, and reject unknown fields, including nested MITM hook fields, and trailing JSON values.
- Enable HTTPS MITM automatically for limited mode or configured `mitm_hooks`, while supporting explicit `mitm` configuration.
- Document the standalone configuration and invocation.
## Testing
Add tests for MITM defaults, dynamic policy keys, unknown fields, and trailing JSON values. Add a regression test that verifies `wait()` promptly returns an error when either the HTTP or SOCKS listener fails.
GitOrigin-RevId: ba20b9c3022b16abaa5597f473c418cfc06c18ee
## Why
MXC's native host-loopback access is bidirectional, so it cannot enforce `allow_local_binding = false`. Treating an omitted setting as `false` prevents managed networking from working with the default configuration.
## What changed
- Preserve an omitted `allow_local_binding` until the executor's sandbox policy is known. Default to `true` for Windows MXC and `false` elsewhere, including remote execution.
- Reject an effective `false` for MXC managed networking after applying policy restrictions, without enabling disabled networking.
- Use the executor's resolved value for remote network approval decisions while preserving explicit controller restrictions.
- Document that local binding permits local servers and direct host-loopback connections and skips additional private-network destination checks; proxy domain rules still apply.
## Testing
Add coverage for per-executor defaults, explicit values, MXC rejection of `false`, and remote network review cleanup with the resolved policy.
GitOrigin-RevId: 0fa7c1eaec68bebada2b8f7af45688315eea70a9
## What changed
- Add `Platform` to `codex-utils-path-uri` with metadata parsing, native platform detection, and path convention mapping. Preserve missing or unrecognized metadata as `Unknown`.
- Replace `NetworkProxyExecutorOs` with the shared type and keep executor-specific socket path validation in the network proxy.
- Extract `effective_sandbox_mode` with explicit platform and Windows sandbox level inputs, preserving the native Windows fallback from `workspace-write` to `read-only` when the sandbox is disabled.
## Testing
Add unit tests for platform metadata, path conventions, native platform detection, and sandbox mode selection across platforms and Windows sandbox levels.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4fe0972e3a91040e35f2a6dfa5bcdf6c9a29be88
## Why
A controller and its executor can run different operating systems. Validating socket paths against the controller's OS can reject absolute paths that are valid on the executor, such as Windows paths on a Linux controller.
## What changed
- Thread `NetworkProxyExecutorOs` through network policy validation, proxy construction, and policy updates.
- Require allowed socket paths to be NUL-free and absolute for the executor OS, while preserving deny entries unchanged.
- Accept either Unix or Windows absolute syntax when executor metadata omits the OS, then validate against the executor's own OS at launch.
- Keep native path normalization and socket support checks at execution time.
## Testing
Add coverage for cross-platform absolute path syntax, invalid allow entries, preserved deny entries, and remote policy round trips that retain executor semantics through domain edits and proxy construction.
GitOrigin-RevId: 1ebc09cbce7138f60ec5fd62875591a3df52d067
## Why
An omitted controller socket policy was treated as an explicit denial, preventing execution environments from supplying their own Unix socket grants.
## What changed
- Preserve omission of `dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` separately from `false`, and retain explicitly empty `unix_sockets` maps.
- Defer to attachment socket permissions when the controller supplies neither setting. Continue enforcing explicit restrictions, socket denials, and managed requirements.
- Resolve omitted values to `false` for ordinary execution and remote configuration, preserving the default for commands without attachment grants.
- Add debug logging for effective environment and remote execution network policies.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for omitted, explicit, finite, empty, and managed socket policies through remote launch configuration, including live policy replacement and serialization round trips. Adjust remote environment tests to tolerate child-completion ordering and box large cold-resume test futures to reduce Windows stack usage.
GitOrigin-RevId: 98a88d01cbb91aea1faaa03b3c414ef3be7af398
## What changed
- Track the Windows sandbox implementation separately from its legacy setup level.
- Select dedicated proxy listeners for `WindowsMxc` on Windows across sessions, app-server command execution, and the sandbox CLI.
- Rebuild the session proxy when routing changes, retaining its network policy decider.
- Add a sandbox CLI execution path through the MXC sandbox transform when `WindowsMxc` is selected.
## Testing
Extend configuration assertions for the selected sandbox type and the session refresh test to verify dedicated routing and policy decider retention on Windows.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2a22192636c542022ec81a378a16c1bb6867e145
## Why
Linux proxy-routed sandboxing denied standalone Unix sockets even when the effective network policy enabled `dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets`.
## What changed
- Carry Unix socket permissions in `ManagedNetworkSandboxContext` and pass the prepared context through Linux sandbox launches with `--managed-network`.
- Allow `AF_UNIX` socket creation in proxy-routed mode when `dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` is enabled, while preserving network namespace isolation and restrictions on other socket families.
- Keep standalone Unix sockets denied by default and for path-only grants. Default missing fields in older serialized contexts to restrictive values.
## Testing
Add coverage for policy preparation and transport, legacy deserialization, and malformed policy rejection. Add a Linux integration test covering default denial, path-only denial, and explicit allow-all access, while checking that direct TCP access and `AF_NETLINK`/`AF_VSOCK` sockets remain blocked.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2695b945ad3e59fcb3faf7662d852a26650af16c
## Why
Sandboxes that enforce endpoint access directly need dedicated loopback proxy ports instead of shared SID-attributed ingress.
## What changed
Expose `ManagedProxyRouting` through `NetworkProxyBuilder::managed_proxy_routing`. Selecting `DedicatedListeners` reserves per-proxy loopback listeners on Windows as well as other platforms. Keep `SharedIngress` as the default and include the routing mode in proxy equality.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for distinct loopback endpoints, sandbox port metadata, and HTTP and SOCKS allow/deny policy enforcement. On Windows, verify that dedicated routing requires no restricting SID and omits the shared-ingress proxy-port environment variable.
GitOrigin-RevId: e198891bef1d089f9492d2982505a2d6bb002a74
## Why
Credential brokerage must retain trusted destination hints even when shell environment policy hides them from child processes. Snapshot replay also needs to preserve credential aliases when tokens are short or captured dummy values change.
## What changed
- Add `features.network_proxy.credentials` and preserve provider settings when toggling the proxy. Prevent project configuration from overriding providers or their credential and destination environment variables.
- Use provider metadata throughout snapshot capture and replay, and pass hidden destination context to the broker without exposing it in the child environment.
- Rewrite aliases containing short credentials or previously captured dummies, respecting environment filters and explicit overrides.
- Preserve case-distinct `shell_environment_policy.set` keys so Windows credential ambiguity checks survive configuration merging and permission profile changes.
- Restore independent MITM settings when credential brokerage is disabled.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for custom providers, hidden destination hints, Bash and Zsh alias replay, configuration edits and merging, Windows ambiguity handling, and credential protection during approved execution.
GitOrigin-RevId: b2bd935d2d8555be56baf8feb1a8e5b3a0c666bc
## Why
Filtering destination variables out of a child environment can undo credential registrations. Rotating a provider token and destination must also leave older credential aliases bound to their original destinations.
## What changed
- Add `CredentialBrokerContext` to retain local destination hints for built-in and configured providers without adding them to child environments or serialized configuration. Explicit environment values, including empty values, override these fallbacks.
- Preserve registered destinations when hints are absent, reconcile fallback changes, and keep credential aliases scoped to their source identities and environments during rotation and inheritance.
- Expose provider context and source matching for trusted captured text, including configured provider context keys.
- Disable brokerage on Windows when provider environment overrides contain conflicting case-insensitive keys.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for filtered destinations, token rotation, inherited aliases, fallback updates and clearing, context redaction, trusted text matching, and non-Unicode environment values.
GitOrigin-RevId: 411790ea6339e1d8fa568049cf8160a67b134666
## What changed
- Discover configured provider credentials in child environment values even when canonical credential variables are absent. Match complete tokens while preserving regex word boundaries and avoiding ambiguous or overlapping provider matches.
- Replace and restore credentials by their original spans, preserving adjacent tokens and generated dummy aliases across destination rebinding. Reject dummy values that embed another provider's credentials.
- Extend text virtualization and provider source checks to configured credentials, including short credentials with distinctive prefixes, while preserving operational paths.
- Expose trusted provider metadata and active bindings through `CredentialBrokerEnvironment`, and remove marked configured credential variables when stripping the managed proxy environment.
## Testing
Add regression tests for alias discovery, regex boundaries and alternatives, overlapping and adjacent credentials, destination rebinding, dummy restoration, disallowed credential sources, and operational path preservation.
GitOrigin-RevId: dd85c595ce9550fbfdb07ef296a23e458ca165dd
## What changed
- Add `credential_providers` configuration for environment variables, credential patterns, static or environment-derived URL prefixes, and bearer, token, Basic, or custom header authentication.
- Generate matching dummy credentials and restrict replacement to authorized schemes, hosts, ports, and path prefixes. Scope credentials and destination history to each environment.
- Preserve real credentials for destinations that bypass the proxy with `allow_local_binding`, while providing snapshot redaction and alias matching.
- Validate provider definitions and preserve unchanged providers across configuration reloads.
## Testing
Add coverage for dummy generation, authentication translation, URL restrictions, environment isolation, configuration reloads, and credential restoration for local proxy bypass.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5d60ecc684cf4e9aa7637af33af12179aa0c672a
## Why
Shell startup can copy a credential into another variable and unset its original source. These aliases need credential brokering without losing source restrictions or mistaking ordinary shell content for credentials.
## What changed
- Discover supported GitHub and OpenAI credentials embedded in environment values, even without their canonical variables. Preserve source ownership so unbound enterprise tokens cannot acquire a default host binding.
- Redact unregistered supported credentials during text virtualization, distinguish adjacent credentials, and avoid matching unrelated provider prefixes and common hashed paths.
- Expose helpers for checking allowed credential sources and restoring known dummy credentials in trusted text for fail-open execution.
- Render allowed credential aliases as snapshot exports and replace known credential values in shell state, preserving exported functions and credential-shaped function names.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for copied aliases, enterprise host binding, source filtering, adjacent tokens, path false positives, and dummy restoration. Add a Bash snapshot test that preserves exported functions while replacing credentials in heredoc content.
GitOrigin-RevId: f1c3d531405a96ac6bfa3882a11b74643fa6f123
## Why
Credential-brokered commands rebuild shell snapshots on every invocation. Snapshot capture failures can also include credential-bearing startup output, and descendants holding output pipes need cleanup even after the shell exits.
## What changed
- Cache successful protected snapshots per environment, keyed by working directory, shell, login mode, and sandbox configuration. Rebuild missing or stale snapshots while keeping concurrent captures independently cancellable.
- Invalidate snapshots when shell settings or credential broker configuration change, and retry capture once if broker configuration changes during startup.
- Restore credentials and associated provider context while respecting environment policy filters and explicit overrides.
- Keep full-buffer capture subject to timeout and cancellation through output draining, clean up descendants on capture expiration or drain failure, and omit startup output from snapshot errors.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for snapshot reuse, invalidation, recovery after storage failure, concurrent cancellation, credential-safe errors, and descendant cleanup. Verify that successful background startup and output beyond the shell output cap remain supported.
GitOrigin-RevId: 7c7c8455bf6e3b9ca173dbb4277783469f0b45e6
## Why
Shell startup files can introduce credentials or overwrite brokered dummy values. Snapshot capture and replay need to respect the command's sandbox and environment policy without persisting real credentials.
## What changed
- Capture and validate brokered snapshots per command using its requested shell, working directory, login mode, sandbox, and environment policy.
- Discover shell-initialized credentials and prepare snapshot exports for brokered replay. Preserve shell functions and aliases while preventing startup files from overwriting dummy credentials during replay.
- Rebuild snapshots as credential broker state changes and retain each command's snapshot for the lifetime of its process.
- Reject brokered POSIX shell execution when a protected snapshot cannot be created, and reject brokerage with `shell_zsh_fork`. Restore real credentials and remove brokerage markers for unsupported PowerShell and Cmd execution; escalated commands bypass protected snapshots.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for credential discovery and redaction, environment filtering, readonly exports, shell function and heredoc replay, command working directories and login modes, sandbox enforcement, and missing or disabled snapshots.
GitOrigin-RevId: 685356cb9e80f11cf69d053e4d239ee6ccf43a9e
## Why
Stopping proxy listeners could leave accepted connections and half-closed tunnels alive after their owning thread was unloaded.
## What changed
Tie HTTP and SOCKS5 connection work, including HTTP CONNECT upgrades, to the lifetime of the proxy listeners. Cancel connections across the main and environment proxies when the handle is dropped, shutdown is requested, or `wait()` is canceled. Explicit shutdown waits for connection cleanup.
## Testing
Add live TCP regression tests for HTTP keep-alive connections and open or half-closed HTTP CONNECT and SOCKS5 tunnels across shutdown, handle drop, and canceled waits. Verify that half-closed tunnels still carry return traffic while the proxy is running, and that repeated thread creation and unloading closes managed proxy tunnels.
GitOrigin-RevId: b523f3b08d73e9ae368f6932952cc930c7b038c9
## What changed
- Discover supported credentials inherited from the parent even when their canonical provider variable is filtered from the child environment.
- Replace matching values and credentials embedded in longer child environment values with broker dummies, then restore only aliases that the broker virtualized.
- Preserve provider and host bindings when selecting credentials for outbound requests, including GitHub Enterprise and custom OpenAI hosts.
- Expose helpers for identifying provider and binding variables, plus an API for virtualizing credential-bearing text before it is persisted.
## Testing
- Extend credential broker tests for filtered parent variables, exact and embedded aliases, text virtualization, user overrides, and host-bound GitHub and OpenAI credentials.
GitOrigin-RevId: 55d673911900470aab4e206d0f4f5e62ed3611ae
## Why
`EnvironmentConfig.network_policy` could describe attachment-owned traffic
restrictions, but core rejected every configured policy because execution did
not enforce it.
## What changed
- Resolve each remote environment's network policy for the selected command
and apply it to the execution-scoped proxy.
- Compose owner rules with controller constraints and saved network decisions
while preserving inherited domain and Unix-socket denials.
- Keep strict allowlists non-expandable, allow reviewable policies to use
network approvals, and reject sandbox escalation that would bypass an owner
policy.
- Reject policies for local execution, disabled managed enforcement, or a
disabled controller proxy.
## Testing
Added coverage for policy composition, scoped remote proxy behavior, approval
and denial flows, offline execution, and unsupported environment authority.
GitOrigin-RevId: d9331f616df24de6cd13ed68196f0ff7b0ca4dd9
## What changed
- Try the explicitly configured Windows HTTP or SOCKS5 proxy port first, then scan the protocol's preferred port range when that port is unavailable.
- Reserve HTTP and SOCKS5 listeners independently so a SOCKS5 collision does not replace an already available HTTP listener.
- Retain ephemeral loopback fallback when all preferred ports are unavailable, and document the HTTP (`3128-3159`) and SOCKS5 (`8081-8112`) ranges.
## Testing
- Cover bounded HTTP and SOCKS5 fallback, independent listener reservation, and ephemeral fallback after preferred-port exhaustion.
GitOrigin-RevId: 002c641f5bd70fedf04cca96c65c5fee2c5ebcac
## What changed
- Bind OpenAI credentials to `api.openai.com` and trusted HTTPS hosts derived from local configuration or `OPENAI_BASE_URL`.
- Support GitHub credentials for `uploads.github.com` and translate Bearer, token, and Basic authorization forms while preserving their schemes.
- Apply credential broker configuration changes without restarting the proxy, including clearing affected credential mappings when trusted OpenAI hosts change.
- Restore brokered credentials in environments and command arguments that intentionally leave managed networking, while preserving user overrides and handling Windows environment keys case-insensitively.
- Keep local credential brokerage out of remote proxy launch configuration and avoid launching a remote proxy when brokerage alone enabled the local proxy.
## Testing
Added coverage for trusted host binding, authorization translation, live reconfiguration, credential restoration, managed-disabled behavior, remote launch configuration, and Windows environment key matching.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8d8bd3aaf6e581849cb622b2faec62cee4e13e52
## Why
Unix socket proxy permissions are macOS-only, but configuring them could still
clamp Windows proxy listeners to loopback and emit warnings about unsupported
settings.
## What changed
- Exclude Unix socket permissions from Windows runtime settings and bind-address
clamping.
- Suppress the macOS-only Unix socket warning on Windows.
- Preserve the original configuration for state updates and remote launch
configuration.
## Testing
Add coverage for proxy startup, live configuration replacement, remote launch
configuration, and warning behavior with Unix socket permissions configured.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5d72f5365486ab11ae3cf5edfd78da665e05344d
## What changed
- Forward remote managed-network policy requests to the controller-side decider when Guardian review is enabled.
- Bound callbacks using the configured permission-hook and Guardian review timeouts, restore trusted execution attribution, and recheck live baseline policy before requesting a decision.
- Cancel pending decisions when the process or execution scope ends, and propagate EOF across the sandbox proxy bridge with half-closes.
## Testing
- Cover callback enablement, strict allowlist behavior, live policy updates, trusted attribution, and execution-scope cancellation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 83b47657c8c4546dfe98eec8b272833e96a46b7e
## What changed
- Add client-side handling for exec-server network policy requests, including request validation, per-process decision routing, and allow, deny, or ask responses.
- Bound concurrent callbacks and fail closed when requests are invalid, exceed capacity, time out, or outlive their process session.
- Replace the callback opt-in flag with a launch-level `policyDecisionTimeoutMs` value and include transport overhead in the executor timeout.
- Preserve callback admission limits across connection recovery and clean up policy state when process startup is abandoned or a session ends.
## Testing
- Cover decision forwarding, invalid and excess requests, cancellation during process cleanup, abandoned starts, timeout propagation, and launch-config serialization.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6ee2a0139e0f8170cf1a5cdd646bd811b7d3c1f6
## What changed
- Make the generated Linux proxy socket directory readable inside restricted
`bubblewrap` sandboxes so the proxy bridge can connect.
- Route `WS_PROXY` and `WSS_PROXY` through the Linux managed proxy bridge.
- Remove inherited proxy attribution tokens from unscoped executions while
continuing to replace them with the current token for scoped executions.
## Testing
- Exercise `WSS_PROXY` routing with a minimal filesystem policy.
- Cover attribution-token removal and replacement during environment setup.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2f14ddb26baab0147a786bc354d93eb5aad059f3
## Why
Elevated Windows sandboxes need stable managed-proxy ports while preserving the network policy and environment attribution of each sandboxed process.
## What changed
- Keep shared HTTP and SOCKS5 loopback ingress listeners alive across managed-proxy instances.
- Add a per-route restricting SID to elevated sandbox tokens and dispatch incoming connections to the matching proxy policy after attributing the client process.
- Reject connections without exactly one registered route, remove routes when their proxy handle is dropped, and keep unsandboxed Windows launches off the managed ingress.
- Provision the elevated sandbox with the configured proxy ports and local-binding setting, honoring the selected profile and CLI overrides.
## Testing
- Add Windows unit tests for TCP ownership attribution, route selection, restricting-token propagation, and setup settings.
- Add an end-to-end Windows test covering stable ports, isolated environment policies, HTTP and SOCKS5 routing, and route teardown.
GitOrigin-RevId: 783fac6e0f904dc9bb1955b75d4a5895e8bb9690
## Why
With `allow_local_binding = false`, proxy-aware clients bypassed the managed
proxy for loopback and private IP targets. This prevented explicit local IP and
`localhost` allowlist entries from taking effect.
## What changed
- Route local targets through the managed proxy when local binding is disabled,
while preserving direct access when it is enabled.
- Allow a non-public connection only when its requested IP literal or
`localhost` target is explicitly permitted. Continue blocking private
addresses reached through unrelated hostnames.
- Bypass inherited upstream proxies for non-public targets so Codex applies the
local-target policy directly.
## Testing
Added connector, upstream proxy, environment override, and Linux sandbox
coverage for explicitly allowlisted loopback access.
GitOrigin-RevId: 35e0d73633d5051816e096bc5aa8d586aec5eea4
## Why
Remote executions need managed-network proxy listeners in the executor so their
loopback proxy addresses are reachable by the launched process.
## What changed
- Add a capability-gated exec-server protocol field for executor-local proxy
launch configuration, including network policy, audit metadata, and execution
attribution.
- Start the proxy while preparing a remote process, replace inherited proxy
environment variables with its local addresses, and derive the sandbox
context from its listeners.
- Keep the proxy alive until inherited output streams close, then shut it down.
- Reject unsupported remote settings such as MITM and credential injection.
## Testing
- Cover configuration round trips and rejection of unsupported settings.
- Verify executor-local startup, blocked-domain enforcement, protocol
compatibility, and proxy lifetime through process closure.
GitOrigin-RevId: c984f54e3e600aa9ebcbf8cf4574046e2c199d11
## Why
`NetworkProxyConfig` only wrapped `NetworkProxySettings` in a single
`network` field. That extra level made runtime callers repeat `.network`
everywhere without representing a real boundary.
## What changed
- move the managed-network fields directly onto `NetworkProxyConfig`
- collapse the matching partial-config wrapper
- update runtime callers and tests to use the direct fields
- keep the user-facing permissions/profile TOML layout unchanged
The internal serialized shape now matches the runtime type itself. This
does not change managed-network behavior or the `config.toml` shape.
## Why
Managed-network commands within one Codex conversation share the same
HTTP and SOCKS proxy ingress. When several exec calls run concurrently,
the proxy sees the requested destination but cannot tell which exec
opened the connection.
For example:
```text
exec A: curl https://example.com/a ─┐
├─> conversation proxy ─> Guardian
exec B: curl https://example.com/b ─┘ host: example.com
trigger: unknown
```. Three parallel network execs reached Guardian without their
triggering call IDs or commands. Guardian denied the requests, but Codex
could not safely associate those outcomes with the individual tool
calls.
## What changes
Keep the shared proxy ingress and tag each connection at the existing
trusted Linux bridge:
```text
exec A ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token A][proxy bytes] ─┐
├─> shared HTTP/SOCKS ingress
exec B ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token B][proxy bytes] ─┘
│
token A ─> exec A ─────┤
token B ─> exec B ─────┘
```
The complete path is:
```text
active exec registration
│
├─ registers its UUID as a short-lived attribution token
├─ passes the token to the Linux sandbox helper
├─ helper removes the token before launching the user command
├─ existing host bridge prepends the token to each proxy connection
├─ shared proxy consumes the bounded attribution frame
└─ proxy attaches the matching execution-scoped state
├─ Guardian receives the exact call ID and command
└─ a denial finishes/cancels the matching tool call
```
Dropping the active or deferred exec registration removes the token.
Connections that were already accepted retain their resolved
attribution; new connections using an expired token fail closed.
## Before and after
Before, Guardian could receive only the network destination:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"host": "www.17track.net",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "https"
}
```
After, the same request includes the action that caused it:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"host": "www.17track.net",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "https",
"trigger": {
"callId": "exec-network-first",
"command": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "curl https://www.17track.net"]
}
}
```
## Listener accounting
This PR does **not** create proxy listeners per exec.
```text
Existing topology:
one conversation -> one HTTP listener + optional one SOCKS listener
Discarded per-exec approach:
one conversation -> existing listener pair
+ up to one additional listener pair per active exec
This PR:
one conversation -> existing listener pair only
+ one small token-map entry per active exec
```
The Linux sandbox already creates a trusted routing bridge for each
sandboxed command. This PR adds a short frame write to that bridge
rather than introducing another listener, task, or proxy process.
The existing conversation-scoped listener pair remains. Making a single
proxy service shared across multiple conversations would be a separate
multi-tenant architecture change involving per-conversation policy,
configuration, audit, and Guardian routing.
## Keeping the implementation small
The attribution is bound once, when the TCP connection enters the proxy.
The ingress installs an execution-scoped clone of the existing
`NetworkProxyState`, so the established HTTP, SOCKS, MITM, policy,
audit, and blocked-request paths continue using their existing state
lookup.
This avoids plumbing a new request-context type through every protocol
handler. Outside the two ingress wrappers, protocol-specific request
handling is unchanged.
## Security behavior
- Tokens are generated from the existing random execution registration
IDs.
- The trusted Linux helper consumes and removes the token before
executing user code.
- Attribution frames have a fixed magic prefix, bounded token length,
and bounded read timeout.
- Unknown or expired tokens close the connection.
- A token presented to a proxy for another environment closes the
connection.
- Existing unframed callers preserve the current conservative
attribution behavior.
## Platform scope
Exact bridge attribution is enabled on Linux. macOS and Windows retain
their current shared-proxy behavior.
## Test coverage
The concurrent end-to-end test starts two managed-network execs together
and synchronizes them so both are active before either connects. It then
inspects the two Guardian requests and compares the complete attribution
pairs:
```text
(exec-network-first, exact first command)
(exec-network-second, exact second command)
```
Focused proxy coverage verifies the bounded frame and that a registered
framed connection receives the matching execution and environment state.
## Scope
This fixes the Linux network-to-exec attribution path and records a
denial against the exact matching tool call. It intentionally does not
change:
- delivery of an entirely unattributed denial to the parent turn;
- how parallel denials count toward the Guardian circuit breaker;
- how the UI displays the rejection reason or completed-turn state.
Those remain separate concerns from attribution.
## Relationship to #29456 and #29668#29456 made the proxy environment and sandbox policy come from the same
prepared network context. This PR adds the execution token to that
prepared launch and consumes it at the shared ingress.
This follows #29668's shared-ingress framing direction, but completes
the production registration, Linux bridge, core call mapping, denial
mapping, and concurrent end-to-end path. It also keeps attribution in
the existing per-connection proxy state instead of introducing
request-context plumbing through every HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM handler.
This PR is intended to supersede #29668 for the Linux attribution fix.
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Codex child processes can inherit injectable local credentials directly,
which lets commands read and exfiltrate the real values. This
experimental slice keeps supported workflows working while moving those
credentials behind the managed network proxy.
This PR contains only the proxy-owned broker implementation. The Codex
config and runtime integration is stacked separately in #29752.
## What changed
- discover supported credentials during child setup, retain real values
only in the in-memory proxy broker, and replace them with shaped dummy
values
- require a presented dummy to select a stored credential and preserve
unrelated explicit authorization headers
- bind GitHub cloud, GitHub Enterprise, and OpenAI credentials to their
intended hosts
- inject credentials only into TLS traffic by default; plaintext
injection requires the explicit dangerous opt-in
- use TLS ClientHello routing for CONNECT so non-TLS protocols remain
opaque tunnels
- expose a pure API that identifies environment keys still holding
broker-generated dummies without mutating the caller's environment
## Scope
- supported credentials: `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`,
`GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, and `OPENAI_API_KEY`
- GitHub cloud credentials match `github.com`, `api.github.com`, and
`*.ghe.com`
- GitHub Enterprise credentials match only the normalized non-cloud
`GH_HOST`
- OpenAI API keys match only `api.openai.com`
- this does not cover SSH agents, kube client certificates, filesystem
secret discovery, or context-injected secret scrubbing
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy` (191 passed)
- focused opaque CONNECT, plaintext opt-in, dummy-selection, and
child-isolation regressions passed
- scoped Clippy check for `codex-network-proxy` passed
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Managed network configures commands to use local HTTP and SOCKS proxies.
For commands delegated to the exec server, the proxy environment and the
sandbox policy were prepared separately. On macOS, that meant a command
could receive `HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123` while Seatbelt still
denied access to port `43123`.
## What changed
`NetworkProxy` now prepares the command environment and sandbox context
together from the same runtime snapshot:
```text
Prepared managed network
├── command environment: HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123
└── sandbox context: allow outbound to 127.0.0.1:43123
```
That context travels with remote exec requests. The exec server
preserves the managed proxy and CA environment, and macOS Seatbelt
allows only the prepared loopback proxy ports without enabling broad
network access or local binding.
The protocol field is optional and the existing enforcement flag remains
in place, preserving compatibility with callers that do not send the new
context.
## Why
When Codex starts with a custom CA override such as
`SSL_CERT_FILE=/path/to/corp-ca.pem codex`, `rustls-native-certs` treats
that override as a replacement for the platform trust store. The managed
proxy then rewrites child CA variables to its generated bundle, so the
custom root or the ordinary platform roots can be lost. The proxy's
upstream TLS connector must trust the same roots or private and
corporate upstream certificates still fail after interception.
## What
- load platform-native roots without consulting inherited CA override
variables
- append certificates from the existing curated startup CA file
variables and `SSL_CERT_DIR`
- share those platform and startup roots with the MITM upstream rustls
connector
- exclude the Codex managed MITM CA from upstream trust
- normalize OpenSSL `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` blocks while dropping trailing
trust metadata
- skip an inherited current Codex-managed bundle so nested launches do
not duplicate it
- append the Codex managed MITM CA to the child-facing bundle
- copy certificate material only, so a private key or unrelated text
colocated in a startup file is never exposed through the public bundle
This is intentionally limited to CA paths present when Codex starts. It
does not parse inline shell assignments or add per-command bundle
materialization.
This changes only `codex-network-proxy` and dependency metadata; it does
not touch `codex-core` or sandbox orchestration.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy`
- includes an end-to-end upstream TLS test using a server trusted only
by the startup custom CA
- `just fix -p codex-network-proxy`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
Stacked on #28766.
## Why
Network approvals are environment-scoped: allowing a host in one
execution environment should not allow the same host in another
environment.
#28766 adds the inert IDs and constructor plumbing. This PR applies the
behavior on top.
## What changed
- Route managed network traffic through per-environment HTTP and SOCKS
proxy listeners.
- Stamp HTTP, HTTPS CONNECT, SOCKS TCP, and SOCKS UDP policy requests
with the source environment at the proxy boundary.
- Carry the selected execution environment through shell, unified exec,
zsh-fork, and sandbox transform paths.
- Include the environment in pending, approved-for-session, and
denied-for-session network approval cache keys.
- Include the environment in approval IDs and approval prompts.
- Preserve legacy fallback for unattributed requests, but deny when
active-call attribution is ambiguous.
- Fail closed if an environment-specific proxy endpoint cannot be
prepared.
## Validation
- just fmt
- CI will run tests and clippy
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18240 uses named MITM permissions config.
2. This PR wires managed MITM CA trust into spawned child processes.
## Why
When Codex terminates HTTPS for limited mode or MITM hooks, child HTTPS
clients need to trust Codex's managed MITM CA. Exporting proxy URLs
alone is not enough, but blindly replacing user CA settings would be
wrong: it can break custom enterprise/test roots, leak unreadable CA
files into generated bundles, or make the child env disagree with its
sandbox policy.
## Summary
1. Build immutable managed CA bundles under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy` that
include native roots, the managed MITM CA, and only inherited or
command-scoped CA bundles the child is allowed to read.
2. Export curated CA env vars alongside managed proxy env vars while
preserving user CA override semantics, including nested Codex
`SSL_CERT_FILE` precedence.
3. Thread generated CA bundle paths into child sandbox readable roots,
including debug sandbox execution, so the exported env vars work inside
sandboxed commands.
4. Remove only Codex-generated MITM CA bundle env when a child
intentionally drops managed proxying for escalation or no-proxy retry.
5. Document the managed CA bundle behavior and cover env injection,
per-child bundle generation, sandbox readable roots, and no-proxy
cleanup in tests.
## Validation
1. Ran `just test -p codex-network-proxy`.
2. Ran `just test -p codex-protocol`.
3. Ran `just fix -p codex-network-proxy -p codex-protocol`.
4. Tried focused `codex-core` validation, but the crate currently fails
to compile in `core/tests/suite/guardian_review.rs` because an existing
`Op::UserInput` initializer is missing `additional_context`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eva Wong <evawong@openai.com>
## Summary
- set `NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1` when Codex applies managed network proxy
environment overrides
- keep the Node opt-in in the proxy environment key set used by
shell/runtime env handling
- cover the new env var in the focused network proxy env test
## Why
Codex already sets HTTP proxy environment variables for child processes
when the managed network proxy is active. Node's built-in network
behavior needs the `NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY` opt-in to honor those env vars,
so Node-based skill scripts can otherwise skip the managed proxy path
and fail under restricted network access.
## Validation
- `just fmt` in `codex-rs`
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy` in `codex-rs`
## Why
The proxy matches allow and deny rules against normalized host strings.
Scoped IPv6 literals can arrive in equivalent forms, such as
`fd00::1%eth0`, `[fd00::1%eth0]`, or `[fd00::1%25eth0]`. Policy should
canonicalize those spellings without erasing scope granularity: an
unscoped rule like `fd00::1` should still cover scoped requests for that
address, while a scoped rule like `fd00::1%eth0` should remain exact to
that scope.
## What changed
- preserve IPv6 scope IDs during host normalization and canonicalize
`%25scope` to `%scope`
- match policy against the exact normalized host plus the unscoped IP
base for scoped literals
- keep local-address explicit allow checks aligned with the same
scoped/unscoped semantics
- add focused coverage for scoped IPv6 normalization, scoped allow
rules, and scoped deny rules in `network-proxy`
## Security impact
A request cannot bypass a broad deny rule by adding an IPv6 scope
suffix. At the same time, scoped policy remains precise:
`deny=fd00::1%eth0` affects that scoped spelling without collapsing
`fd00::1%eth1` onto the same key, and `allow=fe80::1%eth0` does not
implicitly allow other scopes.
## Verification
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
- `just fix -p codex-network-proxy`
- `git diff --check`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: evawong-oai <evawong@openai.com>
## Why
Managed sessions use `NO_PROXY` to keep a small set of destinations on
the direct path by default. The old default also bypassed all IPv4
link-local addresses in `169.254.0.0/16`, which includes metadata
endpoints such as `169.254.169.254`. Because `NO_PROXY` is evaluated by
the client before the request reaches the managed proxy, requests to
that range could skip proxy-side allowlist and local-binding checks
entirely. On hosts where a link-local metadata service is reachable,
that creates a path to sensitive environment metadata or credentials
outside the intended enforcement point.
## What changed
- remove the default IPv4 link-local `169.254.0.0/16` bypass from the
managed proxy environment
- keep the existing loopback and private-network defaults unchanged
- update the regression assertion to lock in the narrower default
## Security impact
Link-local requests now stay on the managed-proxy path by default, so
the proxy can apply configured policy before they reach metadata-style
endpoints or other link-local services.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This fixes a stale-environment path in shell snapshot restoration. A
sandboxed command can source a shell snapshot that was captured while an
older proxy process was running. If that proxy has died and come back on
a different port, the snapshot can otherwise put old proxy values back
into the command environment, which is how tools like `pip` end up
talking to a dead proxy.
The wrapper now captures the live process environment before sourcing
the snapshot and then restores or clears every proxy env var from the
proxy crate's canonical list. That makes proxy state after shell
snapshot restoration match the current command environment, rather than
whatever proxy values happened to be present in the snapshot. On macOS,
the Codex-generated `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` is refreshed when the SOCKS
listener changes, while custom SSH wrappers are still left alone.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- keep hostname targets proxied by default by removing hostname suffixes
from the managed `NO_PROXY` value while preserving private/link-local
CIDRs
- make the macOS `allow_local_binding` sandbox rules match the local
socket shape used by DNS tools by allowing wildcard local binds
- allow raw DNS egress to remote port 53 only when `allow_local_binding`
is enabled, without opening blanket outbound network access
## Root cause
Raw DNS tools do not honor `HTTP_PROXY` or `ALL_PROXY`, so the
proxy-only Seatbelt policy blocked their resolver traffic before it
could reach host DNS. In the affected managed config,
`allow_local_binding = true`, but the existing rule only allowed
`localhost:*` binds; `dig`/BIND can bind sockets in a way that needs
wildcard local binding. Separately, hostname suffixes in `NO_PROXY`
could force internal hostnames to resolve locally instead of through the
proxy path.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
Fix network proxy sessions so changing sandbox mode recomputes the
effective managed network policy and applies it to the already-running
per-session proxy.
## Root Cause
`danger_full_access_denylist_only` injects `"*"` only while building the
proxy spec for Full Access. Sessions built that spec once at startup, so
a later permission switch to Full Access left the live proxy in its
original restricted policy. Switching back needed the same recompute
path to remove the synthetic wildcard again.
## What Changed
- Preserve the original managed network proxy config/requirements so the
effective spec can be recomputed for a new sandbox policy.
- Refresh the current session proxy when sandbox settings change, then
reapply exec-policy network overlays.
- Add an in-place proxy state update path while rejecting
listener/port/SOCKS changes that cannot be hot-reloaded.
- Keep runtime proxy settings cheap to snapshot and update.
- Add regression coverage for workspace-write -> Full Access ->
workspace-write.
## Why
The initial `argument-comment-lint` rollout left Windows on
default-target coverage because there were still Windows-only callsites
failing under `--all-targets`. This follow-up cleans up those remaining
Windows-specific violations so the Windows CI lane can enforce the same
stricter coverage, leaving Linux as the remaining platform-specific
follow-up.
## What changed
- switched the Windows `rust-ci` argument-comment-lint step back to the
default wrapper invocation so it runs full-target coverage again
- added the required `/*param_name*/` annotations at Windows-gated
literal callsites in:
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs`
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs`
- `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/multi_agents.rs`
- `codex-rs/network-proxy/src/proxy.rs`
## Validation
- Windows `argument comment lint` CI on this PR
viyatb-oai