## What changed
- Allow `requirements.toml` to manage OpenTelemetry logging flags, tool-result byte limits, environment, and log, trace, and metrics exporters.
- Apply higher-priority managed values over user configuration, replacing exporters atomically and warning when configured values conflict. Preserve unmanaged settings, including `span_attributes` and `tracestate`.
- Expose managed `otel` settings through `configRequirements/read`, apply them in `config/read` without ordinary field origins, and reject configuration writes that overlap managed fields.
- Distinguish omitted tool-result limits from explicit values while preserving the runtime default.
## Testing
Add coverage for requirement precedence, relative TLS paths, override warnings, managed write protection, effective configuration reads, and exporter serialization through the app-server API.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6a3343563bd3acb53a366ea6723684e3d0a4a01d
## What changed
Accept `[network_proxy]` in `requirements.toml`, retaining `[experimental_network]` as a compatibility alias. Reject both names in a single layer and normalize them before merging across layers so precedence and source tracking are preserved.
Honor the new spelling during credential broker project discovery, display `network_proxy` in debug configuration, and update diagnostics and documentation. Document the distinction between managed requirements, proxy feature configuration, and permission profiles. Policy publishers must keep using `[experimental_network]` until all clients and policy validation layers support the new spelling.
## Testing
Add coverage for alias equivalence, duplicate rejection, cross-layer precedence and sources, and broker project discovery. Exercise both spellings in proxy configuration, network approval routing, app-server requirements responses, and Windows machine policy validation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5c5bb82bd4b6b1431aa97f27248775820eae6302
## Why
Existing databases retain their journal mode, so selecting `DELETE` for new NFS databases leaves existing WAL databases unchanged.
## What changed
- Add the managed `unsafe_enforce_sqlite_journal_mode` requirement to migrate existing NFS databases before opening writable pools and require `DELETE` on each connection.
- Share migration code between startup and `codex migrate-nfs-db`, preserving WAL backups and resuming interrupted replacements, including lazily opened databases.
- Hold the migration lock through pool initialization and keep migration failures out of automatic corruption recovery.
- Preserve local logs behavior and skip legacy NFS logs cleanup when enforcement is enabled.
## Testing
Add coverage for requirement precedence, database settings, data and backup preservation across restarts, interrupted replacement recovery, refusal of active WAL databases, migration lock waiting, and local logs remaining in WAL mode.
GitOrigin-RevId: da41ec1b58b1ee8092591cdf8b358280928ff9d4
## Why
Managed network policies need to require approval for selected hosts even when an exact or wildcard allow rule matches them.
## What changed
- Add `experimental_network.review_domains` to managed requirements and route matching hosts through the existing network approval flow. Explicit denials retain precedence, and approved connections still undergo DNS and local-address checks.
- Preserve review patterns across environment policy attachments and remote proxy configuration. Reject execution on an exec-server that lacks the `networkProxyReviewDomains` capability when review patterns are present.
- Expose `reviewDomains` through the app-server requirements API and generated schemas, and show `review_domains` in debug configuration output.
- Update approval reasons to say that network access requires approval rather than assuming the host is absent from the allowlist.
## Testing
Extend coverage for review precedence over exact and wildcard allows, explicit denials, DNS checks after local and remote approvals, approval hooks, policy merging, remote configuration round trips, and requirements API serialization.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4a861061a0ed80b3537d3b72f2caecb0db2a4f0b
## Why
Local administrators need to require managed configuration from a specific customer-hosted server before a session can start.
## What changed
- Add a local managed `config_server` requirement with an HTTPS base URL and optional OAuth settings. Validate endpoints and derive the bundle route as `codex/config/bundle` beneath the base URL.
- Replace the entire `config_server` block when a higher-priority requirements layer supplies one, keeping the endpoint and OAuth settings together. Reject this setting in fetched policy.
- Track the applied server through configuration snapshots, role overrides, and refreshes. Reject session startup and managed refreshes when the applied server does not match the requirement; user refreshes retain the session's managed configuration.
## Testing
Add coverage for missing, mismatched, and matching server configuration at session startup, whole-block replacement, rejection of server settings in fetched policy, and preservation across role overrides and refreshes.
GitOrigin-RevId: 51e8a1738dabdb117ae858120f6fb09ae2ff1261
## What changed
- Add `PreModelRequest` and `PostModelRequest` hooks around model request attempts, including retries. Pass model, session, turn, and optional subagent context; report completion, failure, or cancellation with errors and token usage when available.
- Treat hook output as diagnostic data without allowing it to veto requests or alter model context. Wait for synchronous post-request hooks before dispatching tools, while asynchronous hooks allow streaming tool dispatch to continue.
- Apply memory-consolidation hook filtering and expose the new events through configuration, protocol schemas, generated clients, and the hooks browser.
## Testing
Add integration coverage for failures and retries, ignored control directives, cancellation, synchronous and asynchronous tool ordering, interrupted-turn resume and token accounting, and memory-consolidation filtering. Update hook schema fixtures and hooks browser snapshots.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6ed7b39fc8bb94cf467e350d07d97fcc729c21ce
## What changed
Add `windows.require_mxc` to managed requirements. When set to `true` on Windows, reject configurations whose effective local sandbox backend is not MXC without changing the selected backend.
Validate after cloud configuration loads and outside startup recovery fallbacks. Apply the check to app-server startup and configuration loads, in-process bootstrap, session creation, sandbox debugging, and runtime configuration refreshes.
## Testing
Extend configuration tests to cover required and optional MXC selection, separately loaded policy requirements, and runtime refresh validation. Expand app-server startup tests to cover local and cloud MXC requirements, cloud preference selection, and failures without default-config recovery.
GitOrigin-RevId: 16456611bfd9df77e7f959b52515f1885b59ac75
## Why
`windows.allowed_sandbox_implementations` permits MXC regardless of the listed implementations. Managed requirements need a separate way to block both explicit MXC configuration and automatic selection through `prefer_mxc`.
## What changed
Add the optional managed requirement `windows.allow_mxc`. Setting it to `false` disables automatic MXC selection and rejects explicit `windows.sandbox = "mxc"` configuration with an error identifying the requirement. Leaving it unset or setting it to `true` preserves existing behavior.
## Testing
Add coverage for the requirement alongside allowed sandbox implementations, preference resolution, and cloud-managed opt-out behavior for implicit, elevated, and explicit MXC configurations.
GitOrigin-RevId: a458a7b4c92cf17e687dbbad8208884d1c097da5
## What changed
- Add `auto_review.extra_policy` and the managed `guardian_extra_policy` requirement to supply policy text alongside the resolved tenant policy. Nonblank managed values take precedence; blank values are ignored.
- Render the additional text through `{{ extra_policy }}` in Guardian reviewer templates and append it to the tenant policy for Guardian v2 classification before truncation.
- Preserve placeholder-like text inside supplied policies literally.
## Testing
Add coverage for configuration precedence, blank values, template substitution, and classifier prompts, plus a scenario verifying that managed tenant and extra policies reach the Guardian reviewer together.
GitOrigin-RevId: 180d8d716c63fe96a92ec5bfbd22db4ddccd4f1f
## What changed
- Remove the private-desktop opt-out from elevated and unelevated Windows sandbox launches.
- Remove `windows.sandbox_private_desktop` and its managed requirement and API fields. Warn users to remove the obsolete setting.
- Require a private desktop name when launching through the Windows sandbox wrapper and command runner.
## Testing
Add coverage for the obsolete-setting migration warning and update wrapper tests to verify a live private desktop is passed and a missing desktop name is rejected.
GitOrigin-RevId: c7135f8d211aac8d812180691c2c1e433d77cde4
## What changed
- Support `model_provider` and `model_providers` in managed requirements. Required selection overrides local and session configuration; each required provider definition replaces the corresponding local entry, including its authentication and headers.
- Merge provider requirement fragments before validation, preserving source-relative `auth.cwd` paths. Reject invalid cloud provider definitions before replacing the cached bundle, including unsupported Bedrock overrides.
- Expose `modelProvider` and `modelProviders` through the configuration requirements API and generated schemas. Reject writes to managed provider settings and omit their local origins, including for provider IDs containing dots.
## Testing
Add tests for requirement precedence, authentication fragment merging, path resolution, cloud cache preservation, and read-only configuration RPCs. Integration tests verify that model discovery and inference use the required gateway and ChatGPT authentication without leaking local headers, and that provider requirements survive configuration rebuilds.
GitOrigin-RevId: d1448604d4ef5662ebb5df7b693712d3b8ad6d54
## What changed
- Add `application.network` managed requirements with exact-domain allow/deny
rules, default-enabled behavior, domain normalization, and normal managed TOML
precedence.
- Return the policy separately from agent network requirements through the
experimental `configRequirements/read` API. The endpoint reports the policy
but does not enforce it.
- Export the new protocol types and schemas, and document the TOML format.
## Testing
- Cover parsing, validation, normalization, layered precedence, and cloud
requirement composition.
- Verify app-server responses, defaults, separation from agent policy, and
rejection of invalid domains.
GitOrigin-RevId: 563eeed296d9748430b819797204a44a8db92f3b
## What changed
- Parse `experimental_network.header_injections` rules with host, method, path-prefix, and header mappings and carry them into `NetworkConstraints`.
- Export the rule type from `codex_config`.
- Summarize configured rule counts and hosts in the TUI debug configuration without exposing header values.
## Testing
- Cover managed configuration parsing and redaction of header values from debug output.
GitOrigin-RevId: 623b047e6c6111a9f2ccbe79c9ace054631a3c67
## What changed
- Add a top-level `allow_browser_and_computer_use` requirement.
- Support browser requirements for history access, automatic review, persistent approvals, and default or per-origin access policies.
- Support computer-use requirements for persistent approvals, default app access, macOS bundle IDs, Windows AUMIDs, and Windows executables.
- Preserve these settings and their sources when composing layered requirements.
## Testing
- Cover deserialization, empty-value detection, source propagation, and layered TOML merging for the new requirements.
GitOrigin-RevId: d14a10b64465f1c54e9bcc3795dc93031e6b029b
## What changed
- Add `additional_developer_instructions` to managed requirements and expose it through `configRequirements/read` as `additionalDeveloperInstructions`, independently of ordinary developer instructions.
- Include the managed instructions in model context, emit explicit replacement or removal messages when requirements change, and preserve the current value across compaction, resume, and agent forks without duplication.
- Reject managed instructions whose rendered context exceeds 10,000 estimated tokens.
## Testing
- Cover requirements layering and API serialization, context updates and removal, size validation, repeated model requests, compaction and resume, rollout migration, and agent forks.
GitOrigin-RevId: bc0b70fb7988944c2f68176dff55f5ed61eb46c8
## What changed
- Add `in_app_browser.allow_external_browser_settings_import` to managed requirements, preserving explicit Boolean values through layered composition while leaving an omitted value unset.
- Return the policy as `inAppBrowser.allowExternalBrowserSettingsImport` from `configRequirements/read` and include it in the generated protocol schemas.
- Keep the import policy independent from the in-app browser feature flag and agent Browser Use requirements.
## Testing
- Cover parsing, managed-layer precedence, invalid values, user and session override resistance, and app-server response serialization.
GitOrigin-RevId: efa2621d2b1cf503f1bee2505d9914cb4fb7221d
## What changed
- Add `cli_auth_credentials_store` and `chatgpt_base_url` as exact managed requirements loaded from local requirements configuration.
- Apply these requirements to runtime and bootstrap authentication configuration, overriding user-configured values.
- Expose the managed values through `configRequirements/read` and reject attempts to change them through config write APIs.
- Ignore these local-only authentication requirements in cloud-managed requirement layers.
## Testing
- Cover requirement loading and composition, runtime and bootstrap overrides, app-server responses, and read-only config writes.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8ea9c096386072036ca5441f3d48af8707988a65
## What changed
- Load an optional package-supplied config file as the lowest-precedence
configuration layer, so every existing layer can override its values.
- Report the layer as `packagedDefaults`, including its source path, through
config diagnostics and the app-server protocol.
- Return an error when a configured packaged defaults file is missing.
## Testing
- Cover precedence across packaged, system, user, and session layers.
- Cover the missing-file error path.
GitOrigin-RevId: 52406890f4d580eedabc90bf2a9ee3affa36fee1
## What changed
- Add the managed `auto_review.required_on_models` requirement, unioning model slugs across requirement layers and exposing the result through `configRequirements/read`.
- Force listed models to use `on-request` approvals with the `auto_review` reviewer. Downgrade Full Access to workspace-write when starting a protected session, and reject incompatible runtime overrides or use when automatic review is disabled.
- Preserve these protections across thread starts, resumes, forks, model changes, turn overrides, MCP approvals, and TUI session attachment.
## Testing
- Add coverage for layered model requirements and exact provider-alias matching.
- Add app-server tests for protected thread lifecycle operations, unsafe setting overrides, legacy thread upgrades, disabled automatic review, and requirements API output.
GitOrigin-RevId: c4b1d52c3b5b75e86880725412b8f0812e0dfcd9
## Why
Authentication restrictions must apply before stored or environment-provided credentials can be used, including during bootstrap before cloud requirements are fetched.
## What changed
- Add local `requirements.toml` allowlists for login methods and ChatGPT workspaces. Ignore these fields in cloud-provided requirements.
- Combine managed workspace allowlists with existing workspace restrictions by intersection, and fail closed when the resulting policy permits no usable login method.
- Centralize policy checks in the authentication manager so CLI, TUI, app-server, external-auth, and credential-loading paths consistently reject disallowed authentication before token hydration or network requests.
## Testing
- Cover policy composition, workspace intersection, invalid stored and external credentials, bootstrap enforcement, and login endpoint restrictions.
GitOrigin-RevId: efef22b248f3c3333e9aa55423e539efa2d2dd48
## What changed
- Replace the ordering enum and `include_disabled` boolean with named
`ConfigLayerStack` iterators for each precedence direction.
- Keep enabled-only iteration separate from `all_layers_*` iteration, which
includes disabled layers.
- Update config consumers to use the iterator matching their precedence and
disabled-layer requirements without allocating an intermediate `Vec`.
## Testing
- Add coverage that verifies ordering and disabled-layer filtering for all four
iterators.
GitOrigin-RevId: d14df3db4a2eae80ba97cdec246bff405e6c5f3d
## What changed
- Parse the `browser_use.disable_auto_review` setting from layered
`requirements.toml` configuration.
- Return the setting as `browserUse.disableAutoReview` from
`configRequirements/read` and publish it in the generated JSON and TypeScript
schemas.
## Testing
- Add an app-server RPC test covering the Browser Use requirement.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5749d5bc17bcc5b582bf7ed59b8e5b72d6c8f7fc
## What changed
- Apply managed values for `sqlite_home`, `log_dir`, `model_catalog_json`,
`check_for_update_on_startup`, `allow_login_shell`, the report-submission
opt-in, and `windows.sandbox_private_desktop` to the runtime configuration,
with source-aware warnings when they override configured values.
- Expose these values through `configRequirements/read`, return them from
`config/read`, include them in session config locks, and show their sources in
the TUI config debug view.
- Reject app-server writes that overlap an exact managed requirement with
`configRequirementReadonly` while leaving unrelated sibling keys writable.
## Testing
- Cover runtime overrides, requirement API mapping, config reads and writes,
session lock serialization, cross-platform path URIs, and debug output.
GitOrigin-RevId: d4e23b6fd7775c1a6dfe2eab313cdcee50b07081
## What changed
- Remove the `spawn_agents_on_csv` and `report_agent_job_result` tools and their agent-job runtime and state models.
- Drop the legacy `agent_jobs` and `agent_job_items` tables during state database migration.
- Keep `features.enable_fanout` and `agents.job_max_runtime_seconds` accepted as no-op compatibility settings while omitting them from the generated configuration schema.
## Testing
- Verify upgrades remove both legacy agent-job tables.
- Verify the removed feature and configuration keys still parse without taking effect.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8cc3337da78c67162229f02f40a747f503542646
## What changed
- Add `additionalContextLimit` to command hook configuration for events that can emit `additionalContext`.
- Apply the limit independently to each hook's context before it is sent to the model. Unset values retain the 2,500-token default, while `0` disables spilling for that hook.
- Expose configured limits through app-server hook and requirements responses, and show them in the TUI hooks browser.
## Testing
- Cover JSON and TOML parsing, discovery and hashing, per-hook spilling behavior, app-server responses, and TUI rendering.
GitOrigin-RevId: 55ddc2dbbdf9067dceee3e1968c03617bbf6bcea
## What changed
- Apply `agents.default_subagent_model` and
`agents.default_subagent_reasoning_effort` when a spawn request does not
provide explicit values, including agent job workers.
- Allow full-history forks to use configured defaults or explicit model and
reasoning-effort overrides while retaining the parent conversation context.
- Preserve the selected model and reasoning effort when an agent role does not
override them.
## Testing
- Cover configured defaults, explicit override precedence, full-history forks,
role application, and agent job workers.
GitOrigin-RevId: b1efa8c9abeee82355088fceef57560433144595
## Why
The `agent_type` argument is only useful when agent roles are configured. Avoid
advertising an inapplicable override in the model-visible `spawn_agent` schema.
## What changed
- Include `agent_type` in the V1 and V2 spawn tools only when configured roles
are available.
- Clarify that `agent_type` is an explicit override and document its interaction
with context forking.
- Remove the unused `agents.support_agent_type` configuration field.
## Testing
- Add coverage for hiding `agent_type` without roles and exposing it when a role
is configured.
GitOrigin-RevId: 32e0f123b15f317e9cdb71774029375bc073d9ad
## What changed
- Add `agents.enabled` as a user override for multi-agent tools while keeping an enabled `features.multi_agent_v2` authoritative.
- Rename the shared spawned-thread limit to `agents.max_concurrent_threads_per_session`, retain `agents.max_threads` as an alias, and apply the setting to both multi-agent backends.
- Add reserved subagent model, reasoning effort, and agent-type settings to the config surface and persist all resolved agent settings in config locks.
- Show the resolved `[agents]` values in TUI debug-config output.
## Testing
- Cover config loading, legacy alias normalization across merged layers, backend-selection precedence, V2 concurrency, and debug output.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2957c954a2e1aef51592768dbbccd56c4bf8f118
## Why
Admins need persistent defaults for the model, reasoning effort, and
service tier shown when the Desktop App creates a new thread. These are
initialization defaults rather than runtime constraints: the App should
use them to initialize its draft while still allowing a user to make an
explicit selection.
The app-server therefore needs to expose the managed values before
thread creation without changing `thread/start` behavior for other
clients.
## What changed
- Parse `model`, `model_reasoning_effort`, and `service_tier` from
`[models.new_thread]` in `requirements.toml`.
- Compose the `models` requirements through the existing
requirements-layer precedence rules.
- Expose the resolved values through `configRequirements/read` as
`requirements.models.newThread`.
- Add the corresponding app-server protocol types and regenerate the
JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures.
- Document the new `configRequirements/read` fields in the app-server
README.
## Scope
This PR is data plumbing only. It does not apply these values during
`thread/start` and does not change thread creation for existing
app-server clients, resumed or forked sessions, internal or subagent
sessions, `codex exec`, or the TUI. A companion Desktop App change owns
draft initialization, sends the effective settings for ordinary and
prewarmed starts, and preserves explicit user changes.
## Validation
- Requirements deserialization coverage for `[models.new_thread]`
- Requirements-layer precedence coverage
- App-server API mapping coverage
- `configRequirements/read` integration coverage
- Regenerated app-server JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures
## Summary
This PR extends the existing managed `mcp_servers` identity requirement
so that one name-qualified rule can use either:
- the released exact command or URL identity;
- an exact stdio executable with an exact-length, ordered argument
matcher list; or
- a direct MCP URL matcher.
Matcher-based rules stay under the released `identity` key and use the
same `McpServerRequirement` abstraction and `mcp_servers.<server_name>`
namespace.
## Behavior
Policy activation and name qualification are unchanged:
- If `mcp_servers` is absent, ordinary configured MCP servers remain
unrestricted.
- If `mcp_servers` is present, a server needs a matching same-name
requirement.
- `mcp_servers = {}` continues to deny every configured MCP server.
- Existing exact identity requirements keep their released semantics.
Plugin-bundled MCP servers use the same requirement shapes under
`plugins.<plugin_name>.mcp_servers.<server_name>`. Top-level non-empty
rules continue to govern only ordinary configured servers; plugin rules
remain explicitly plugin-scoped. The existing globally empty
`mcp_servers = {}` plugin kill switch is preserved.
Requirements layers continue to use the existing regular TOML merge
behavior. Atomic replacement of named MCP requirements is intentionally
out of scope here and is tracked independently in #30118.
## Requirement contract
The released exact identity contract remains valid:
```toml
[mcp_servers.docs.identity]
command = "codex-mcp"
[mcp_servers.remote.identity]
url = "https://example.com/mcp"
```
Command identities continue to check only `command`; they do not inspect
arguments, `cwd`, `env`, or `env_vars`.
A command matcher uses an exact executable plus an exact-length, ordered
argument list. Each argument position supports `exact`, `prefix`, or
full-value `regex` matching:
```toml
[mcp_servers.internal_mcp_proxy.identity]
command = { executable = "company-cli", args = [
{ match = "exact", value = "mcp" },
{ match = "exact", value = "proxy" },
{ match = "exact", value = "--server" },
{ match = "regex", expression = '^https://[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.mcp\.internal\.example\.com(?::443)?(?:/.*)?$' },
] }
```
Direct streamable HTTP MCP definitions can use the same value matcher
types through `identity.url`:
```toml
[mcp_servers.internal_http.identity]
url = {
match = "regex",
expression = '^https://[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.mcp\.internal\.example\.com(?:/.*)?$',
}
```
Plugin-bundled MCP matchers use the same contract inside the
plugin-qualified allowlist:
```toml
[plugins."sample@test".mcp_servers.internal_mcp_proxy.identity]
command = { executable = "company-cli", args = [
{ match = "exact", value = "mcp" },
{ match = "exact", value = "proxy" },
] }
```
Regexes are validated while managed requirements are loaded, and regex
matching must cover the complete value. Command matchers constrain only
the executable and arguments.
## Why
Enterprise administrators need to allow MCP servers by executable and
positional-argument shape, including fixed arguments plus constrained
values such as internal MCP URLs passed to a proxy.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`
- `just test -p codex-config` (198 passed)
- `just test -p codex-core mcp_servers_by_matchers --lib` (2 passed)
## Why
Config layer provenance describes how effective configuration was
assembled, so it belongs with the config loader rather than in
app-server's serialized API types.
## What changed
- Moved `ConfigLayerSource`, `ConfigLayerMetadata`, and `ConfigLayer`
ownership into `codex-config`.
- Kept app-server's wire payloads unchanged and added explicit
conversions at the app boundary.
- Removed lower-level app-server-protocol dependencies from config
consumers.
## Stack
This is PR 3 of 6, stacked on [PR
#29721](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/29721). Review only the
delta from `codex/split-auth-domain-types`. Next: [PR
#29723](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/29723).
## Validation
- `codex-config` coverage passed.
- App-server config-manager and config RPC coverage passed.
## Why
Managed deployments need a mergeable way to declare which marketplace
sources Codex may use. An enterprise-keyed TOML table avoids array merge
ambiguity and lets every requirements layer use the existing config
precedence rules without a marketplace-specific merger.
## Requirements shape
```toml
[marketplaces]
restrict_to_allowed_sources = true
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.company_plugins]
source = "git"
url = "https://github.com/example/company-plugins.git"
ref = "main"
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.internal_git]
source = "host_pattern"
host_pattern = "^git\\.example\\.com$"
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.local_plugins]
source = "local"
path = "/opt/company/codex-plugins"
```
`restrict_to_allowed_sources` follows normal scalar precedence.
`allowed_sources` follows normal recursive TOML table merge behavior:
distinct keys accumulate and fields under the same key use normal layer
precedence. The final `source` value later selects which fields the
marketplace admission policy interprets.
The raw rule fields remain optional while requirements layers are
composed, so a higher-priority layer can override only `ref`, `url`, or
another individual field. Source-specific validation and normalization
intentionally belong to the marketplace admission layer, not
requirements merging.
This initial shape includes `git`, `host_pattern`, and `local` sources.
It does not add npm or path-pattern rules.
## What changed
- Add the marketplace requirements TOML shape to
`ConfigRequirementsToml`, `ConfigRequirementsWithSources`, and
`ConfigRequirements`.
- Carry marketplace requirements through the existing regular
requirements merge path.
- Keep allowed-source entries as raw partial tables for downstream
policy interpretation.
- Cover partial same-key overlays, source changes, unknown fields, and
unmodified local paths.
This PR defines and composes the requirements only. Source admission is
implemented by the next PR in the stack.
## Stack
This is PR 1 of 3. #29753 adds source admission on top of this PR; draft
#29691 will add runtime enforcement after it is rebased later.
## Test plan
- `just test -p codex-config marketplace_`
## Why
Managed deployments need a reliable deny gate for remote control.
Persisted enablement and explicit startup requests currently remain able
to start the transport, while the removed `features.remote_control` key
is intentionally only a compatibility no-op.
This adds a dedicated requirement that administrators can use to force
remote control off without deleting the user's persisted preference.
Removing the requirement and restarting restores the prior choice.
## What Changed
- Added top-level `allow_remote_control` requirements parsing, sourced
layer precedence, debug output, and `configRequirements/read` exposure
as `allowRemoteControl`.
- Added a typed transport policy captured from the startup requirements
snapshot. Managed disable forces the initial state to disabled and
prevents enrollment, refresh, connection, and persisted-preference
mutation.
- Rejected every `remoteControl/*` RPC before parameter deserialization
with JSON-RPC `-32600` and `remote control is disabled by managed
requirements`.
- Preserved the existing disabled status notification and the previous
behavior when the requirement is `true` or omitted.
- Regenerated app-server protocol schemas and documented the new
requirement.
## Verification
- Confirmed all remote-control RPCs, including a malformed request,
return the managed-policy error while the initial status notification
remains `disabled`.
- Confirmed explicit ephemeral startup and persisted enablement make no
backend connection and leave the SQLite preference unchanged.
- Confirmed `allow_remote_control = true` does not enable or block
remote control and `configRequirements/read` returns
`allowRemoteControl: false` for the deny policy.
Related issue: N/A (managed-policy hardening).
## Why
The TUI now sits on the app-server layer, but
`app-server-client::legacy_core` still exposed core test helpers solely
for TUI tests. We've been whittling away the remaining dependencies.
This is the next step on that journey.
There is no functional change — just a refactor, and this affects only
test code, so it should be low risk.
## What changed
- remove the `legacy_core::test_support` re-export and call
model-manager test helpers directly
- keep the bundled model-preset cache local to TUI test support
- import constraint types directly from `codex-config`
## Summary
- Render `/debug-config`'s `allowed_sandbox_modes` from the finalized
permission constraints instead of the raw requirements list.
- Add regression coverage for configured full-access and external
sandbox modes being omitted when effective permissions reject them.
## Details
`allowed_sandbox_modes` comes from managed requirements, but the final
permissions can be further constrained by derived validation rules. For
example, `permissions.filesystem.deny_read` requires sandbox
enforcement, so modes that disable or externalize Codex's sandbox are
not actually usable even if they were present in the raw requirements
TOML.
The debug renderer now enumerates the configured sandbox-mode labels and
keeps only those accepted by `Config.permissions`. That makes
`/debug-config` reflect the same effective permission-profile constraint
path used by runtime config validation, while preserving the existing
source/provenance display.
## Validation
- Added a regression test for effective sandbox-mode filtering in
`/debug-config`.
## Why
Auto Review should remain the effective approval reviewer when settings
cross runtime boundaries. A config or app-server round trip must not
change the reviewer identity, and delegated work must not silently fall
back to user review.
This requires both a stable canonical serialized value and propagation
of the effective setting. `auto_review` is the canonical value across
protocol and app-server output, while `guardian_subagent` remains
accepted as backward-compatible input.
## What changed
- serialize `ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview` consistently as
`auto_review` across core protocol and app-server v2
- continue accepting `guardian_subagent` when reading existing config or
client requests
- carry the active turn's approval reviewer into spawned agents
- update config/debug expectations and add delegated-task regression
coverage
## Scope
This does not change Guardian policy or remove compatibility with
existing `guardian_subagent` inputs. It preserves the selected reviewer
across serialization, config reloads, app-server settings, and delegated
task setup.
Related Guardian changes are split independently:
- #26231 adds denials and soft denials
- #26334 retries transient reviewer failures
- #26333 reuses narrowly scoped low-risk approvals
- #26232 adds TUI denial recovery
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` (224 passed)
- regression coverage for delegated task reviewer propagation
- serialization coverage for canonical `auto_review` output and legacy
`guardian_subagent` input
---------
Co-authored-by: saud-oai <saud@openai.com>
## Why
Permission profile allowlists are an enterprise security boundary, but
they also need to compose across the managed requirements layers added
in #24620.
A map representation lets each requirements layer add, allow, or revoke
individual profiles without replacing an entire array.
## Managed Contract
Administrators configure the mergeable allow map with
`allowed_permission_profiles`. A recommended enterprise configuration
explicitly lists every built-in and custom profile users should be able
to select:
```toml
default_permissions = "review_only"
[allowed_permission_profiles]
":read-only" = true
":workspace" = true
review_only = true
# ":danger-full-access" is intentionally omitted, so it is denied.
[permissions.review_only]
extends = ":read-only"
```
- Profiles whose effective merged value is `true` are allowed.
- Missing profiles and profiles set to `false` are denied.
- This is a closed allowlist: built-in profiles and profiles introduced
in future versions are denied unless explicitly allowed.
- Explicitly list each built-in profile the enterprise wants to make
available. Omit built-ins such as `:danger-full-access` when they should
remain unavailable.
- Set `default_permissions` explicitly to the allowed profile users
should receive when they have no local selection.
- Higher-precedence layers override only the profile keys they define.
- `false` is only needed when a higher-precedence layer must revoke a
`true` inherited from a lower layer.
- Explicit keys must refer to known built-in or managed profiles.
A custom or narrowed allowlist requires an allowed
`default_permissions`. For compatibility, if both `:workspace` and
`:read-only` are explicitly allowed, an omitted default resolves to
`:workspace`; customer configurations should still set the intended
default explicitly.
When `allowed_permission_profiles` is absent, existing implicit
permission and legacy `sandbox_mode` behavior is unchanged.
## What Changed
- Add `allowed_permission_profiles` as a `BTreeMap<String, bool>` that
merges per profile across requirements layers.
- Enforce managed defaults, strict denial of omitted profiles, and the
explicitly allowed standard-pair fallback.
- Expose `allowedPermissionProfiles` through `configRequirements/read`
and regenerate its schemas.
- Add regression coverage for map composition and revocation, managed
defaults, strict denial of omitted built-ins, and API output.
## Verification
- Focused `codex-config` coverage for layered map composition and
revocation
- Focused `codex-core` coverage for managed defaults, invalid defaults,
strict denial of omitted built-ins, and the standard built-in pair
- Focused `codex-app-server` coverage for requirements API output
- Scoped Clippy for `codex-config`, `codex-core`,
`codex-app-server-protocol`, and `codex-app-server`
## Documentation
The managed `requirements.toml` documentation should introduce
`allowed_permission_profiles` as a closed permission-profile allowlist
before this setting is published on developers.openai.com.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- Adapts the moved `codex-cloud-config` crate from the legacy cloud
requirements endpoint to the new config bundle endpoint.
- Switches runtime consumers from `CloudRequirementsLoader` to
`CloudConfigBundleLoader` so one shared bundle supplies cloud-delivered
config and requirements.
- Removes the legacy cloud requirements domain loader path.
## Details
This intentionally keeps `codex-cloud-config` monolithic for review
lineage: the previous PR establishes the crate move, and this PR shows
the behavior change against that moved implementation. A follow-up PR
splits the module back into focused files.
The new bundle path preserves the important cloud requirements loader
semantics where intended: account-scoped signed cache, 30 minute TTL, 5
minute refresh cadence, retry/backoff, auth recovery, and fail-closed
startup loading. The cached payload changes from a single requirements
TOML string to the backend-delivered bundle, and validation rejects
malformed config or requirements fragments before cache write/use.
## Summary
PR 3 of 5 in the cloud-managed config client stack.
Adds enterprise-managed cloud config as a first-class config layer
source. The layer metadata is preserved through config loading,
diagnostics, debug output, hook attribution, and app-server protocol
surfaces.
## Details
- Enterprise-managed config becomes a normal config layer source with
backend-supplied `id` and display `name` attached for provenance.
- These layers are designed to behave like non-file managed config: they
can surface syntax/type diagnostics by layer name even though there is
no physical config file.
- Relative path settings are resolved from a stored config base so
cloud-delivered config remains consistent with existing MDM-delivered
config semantics.
- Hook attribution distinguishes config-delivered hooks from
requirements-delivered hooks via `HookSource::CloudManagedConfig`.
- This remains pull-based and snapshot-oriented; the PR adds layer
identity/diagnostics, not dynamic reload behavior.
## Validation
Validated through the targeted stack checks after rebasing onto current
`main`:
- Rust crate tests for
config/hooks/cloud-config/backend-client/app-server-protocol
- Filtered `codex-core` and `codex-app-server` `cloud_config_bundle`
tests
- Python generated-file contract test
- `cargo shear --deny-warnings`
- Targeted `argument-comment-lint` for config/hooks
# Why
Managed requirements can already constrain sandbox policy choices, but
Windows sandbox implementation selection was still resolved
independently from those requirements. That left the TUI able to
continue through the unelevated fallback even when an organization wants
to require the elevated Windows sandbox implementation.
# What
- Add `[windows].allowed_sandbox_implementations` requirements support
for the Windows `elevated` and `unelevated` implementations.
- Apply that allowlist during core config resolution so disallowed
configured or feature-selected Windows sandbox implementations fall back
to an allowed implementation with the existing requirements warning
path.
- Reuse the existing TUI Windows setup prompts to block disallowed
unelevated continuation, keep required elevated setup in front of the
user, and refuse to persist a TUI-selected Windows sandbox mode that
requirements disallow.
# Semantics
| Allowed | Selected | Effective |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `["elevated"]` | `unelevated` / unset | `elevated` |
| `["unelevated"]` | `elevated` / unset | `unelevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | `elevated` | `elevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | `unelevated` | `unelevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | unset | `elevated` |
Availability is handled by interactive setup surfaces after allowlist
resolution. If the effective elevated implementation is not ready,
elevated-only requirements block on setup. When unelevated is also
allowed, the UI may offer the existing unelevated fallback.
## TUI Screens
If elevated setup is not already complete:
```
Your organization requires the default Codex agent sandbox to continue. Set it up to protect your files and control
network access.
Learn more <https://developers.openai.com/codex/windows>
› 1. Set up default sandbox (requires Administrator permissions)
2. Quit
```
If admin setup fails under `["elevated"]`:
```
Couldn't set up your sandbox with Administrator permissions
Your organization requires the default sandbox before Codex can continue.
Learn more <https://developers.openai.com/codex/windows>
› 1. Try setting up admin sandbox again
2. Quit
```
# Next Steps
- extend the requirements/readout surface, such as
`configRequirements/read`, so clients can inspect the loaded
`[windows].allowed_sandbox_implementations` requirement instead of
inferring it from Windows setup state
- consider extending `windowsSandbox/readiness` as well
- update the App startup guide, setup flow, and banner surfaces so an
elevated-only requirement omits any continue-unelevated escape hatch and
blocks startup until a permitted implementation is ready;
- preserve the existing unelevated fallback path when requirements allow
it, including the `["unelevated"]` case where elevated is disallowed
Add new enterprise requirement gate.
Validation:
- `cargo test -p codex-config --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui --lib debug_config`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib` *(fails: stack overflow in
`in_process::tests::in_process_start_initializes_and_handles_typed_v2_request`;
reproduces when run alone)*
## Why
Cloud-managed `requirements.toml` should be able to define the managed
permission profiles a client may select and constrain that selectable
set without requiring local user config to recreate the profile catalog.
This keeps requirements focused on restrictions. The selected default
remains a config or session choice, while requirements contribute the
managed profile bodies and `allowed_permissions` allowlist that the
config-loading boundary validates before a resolved runtime
`PermissionProfile` is installed.
## What changed
- Add `requirements.toml` support for a managed permission-profile
catalog plus its allowlist:
```toml
allowed_permissions = ["review", "build"]
[permissions.review]
extends = ":read-only"
[permissions.build]
extends = ":workspace"
```
- Merge requirements-defined profile bodies into the effective
permission catalog and reject profile ids that collide with
config-defined profiles.
- Validate that every `allowed_permissions` entry resolves to a built-in
or catalog profile before selection uses it.
- Preserve allowed configured named-profile selections. When a
configured named profile is disallowed, fall back to the first allowed
requirements profile with a startup warning.
- Keep built-in selections and the stock trust-based `:read-only` /
`:workspace` fallback path intact when no permission profile is
explicitly selected.
- Centralize the managed catalog and allowlist selection path in
`EffectivePermissionSelection` so the requirements boundary is visible
in config loading.
- Surface `allowedPermissions` through `configRequirements/read`, and
update the generated app-server schema fixtures plus the app-server
README.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-config`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_requirements_`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_allowed_permissions_`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just write-app-server-schema`
## Related work
- Uses merged permission-profile inheritance support from #22270 and
#23705.
- Kept separate from the in-flight permission profile listing API in
#23412.
## Why
`--profile-v2 <name>` gives launchers and runtime entry points a named
profile config without making each profile duplicate the base user
config. The base `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml` still loads first, then
`$CODEX_HOME/<name>.config.toml` layers above it and becomes the active
writable user config for that session.
That keeps shared defaults, plugin/MCP setup, and managed/user
constraints in one place while letting a named profile override only the
pieces that need to differ.
## What Changed
- Added the shared `--profile-v2 <name>` runtime option with validated
plain names, now represented by `ProfileV2Name`.
- Extended config layer state so the base user config and selected
profile config are both `User` layers; APIs expose the active user layer
and merged effective user config.
- Threaded profile selection through runtime entry points: `codex`,
`codex exec`, `codex review`, `codex resume`, `codex fork`, and `codex
debug prompt-input`.
- Made user-facing config writes go to the selected profile file when
active, including TUI/settings persistence, app-server config writes,
and MCP/app tool approval persistence.
- Made plugin, marketplace, MCP, hooks, and config reload paths read
from the merged user config so base and profile layers both participate.
- Updated app-server config layer schemas to mark profile-backed user
layers.
## Limits
`--profile-v2` is still rejected for config-management subcommands such
as feature, MCP, and marketplace edits. Those paths remain tied to the
base `config.toml` until they have explicit profile-selection semantics.
Some adjacent background writes may still update base or global state
rather than the selected profile:
- marketplace auto-upgrade metadata
- automatic MCP dependency installs from skills
- remote plugin sync or uninstall config edits
- personality migration marker/default writes
## Verification
Added targeted coverage for profile name validation, layer
ordering/merging, selected-profile writes, app-server config writes,
session hot reload, plugin config merging, hooks/config fixture updates,
and MCP/app approval persistence.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Enterprise-managed hook policy needs a narrow way to require Codex to
ignore user-controlled lifecycle hooks without adopting the broader
trust-precedence model from earlier hook work. This keeps the policy
anchored in `requirements.toml`, so admins can opt into managed hooks
only while normal `config.toml` files cannot enable the restriction
themselves.
## What changed
- Added `allow_managed_hooks_only` to the requirements data flow and
preserved explicit `false` values.
- Also adds it to /debug-config
- Marked MDM, system, and legacy managed config layers as managed for
hook discovery.
- Updated hook discovery so `allow_managed_hooks_only = true`:
- keeps managed requirements hooks and managed config-layer hooks,
- skips user/project/session `hooks.json` and `[hooks]` entries with
concise startup warnings,
- skips current unmanaged plugin hooks,
- ignores any `allow_managed_hooks_only` key placed in ordinary
`config.toml` layers.
# Why
Managed hook configs need a shared cross-platform shape without making
the existing `command` field polymorphic. The common case is still one
command string, with Windows needing a different entrypoint only when
the runtime is actually Windows.
Keeping `command` as the portable/default path and adding an optional
Windows override keeps the config easier to read, preserves the existing
scalar shape for non-Windows users, and avoids forcing every caller into
a `{ unix, windows }` object when only one platform needs special
handling.
# What
- Add optional `command_windows` / `commandWindows` alongside the
existing hook `command` field.
- Resolve `command_windows` only on Windows during hook discovery; other
platforms continue to use `command` unchanged.
- Keep trust hashing aligned to the effective command selected for the
current runtime.
# Docs
The Codex hooks/config reference should document `command_windows` as
the Windows-only override for command hooks.
## Why
With the local model layer and app-server routing in place from PR1,
this PR moves the active TUI runtime onto app-server notifications. The
affected pieces share the same event flow, so the command surface,
session state, bottom-pane prompts, chat rendering, history/status
views, and tests move together to keep the stacked branch buildable.
This PR also removes the obsolete compatibility surface that is no
longer used after the migration. The proposed protocol-boundary verifier
layer was dropped from the stack; enforcing that final boundary will be
simpler once `codex-tui` no longer needs any `codex_protocol`
references.
This PR is part 2 of a 2-PR stack:
1. Add TUI-owned replacement models and extract app-server event
routing.
2. Move the active TUI flow to app-server notifications and delete
obsolete adapter code.
## What changed
- Rewired app command and session handling to use app-server request and
notification shapes.
- Moved approval overlays, request-user-input flows, MCP elicitation,
realtime events, and review commands onto the app-server-facing model
surface.
- Updated chat rendering, history cells, status views, multi-agent UI,
replay state, and TUI tests to use app-server notifications plus the
local models introduced in PR1.
- Deleted `codex-rs/tui/src/app/app_server_adapter.rs` and the
superseded `chatwidget/tests/background_events.rs` fixture path.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
- Top of stack: `cargo test -p codex-tui`
Plugin MCP servers are loaded from plugin manifests rather than
top-level `[mcp_servers]`, so their tool approval preferences need to be
stored and applied through the owning plugin config. Without this,
choosing "Always allow" for a plugin MCP tool could write a preference
that was not reliably used on later tool calls.
## Summary
- Add plugin-scoped MCP policy config under
`plugins.<plugin>.mcp_servers`, including server enablement, tool
allow/deny lists, server defaults, and per-tool approval modes.
- Overlay plugin MCP policy onto manifest-provided server configs when
plugins are loaded.
- Route persistent "Always allow" writes for plugin MCP tools back to
the owning `plugins.<plugin>.mcp_servers.<server>.tools.<tool>` config
entry.
- Reload user config after persisting an approval and make the plugin
load cache config-aware so stale plugin MCP policy is not reused after
`config.toml` changes.
- Regenerate the config schema and add coverage for plugin MCP policy
loading, approval lookup, persistence, and stale-cache prevention.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-config`
- `cargo test -p codex-core-plugins`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib plugin_mcp`
Abhinav