## What
This change introduces a new `ReadOnlyAccess` model and threads it through
sandbox policy consumers so read access is explicit instead of implicit.
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` to protocol:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Changed `SandboxPolicy` shape:
- `ReadOnly` is now `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite` now carries `read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess`
- Kept existing behavior for now by defaulting to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`
in constructors and current config/app-server mappings.
- Added helper methods to compute effective readable roots (including optional
platform defaults + cwd) and to detect full read access.
- Updated seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by emitting
scoped `(allow file-read* ...)` entries when full read access is not granted.
- Updated Linux backends (`bwrap`, legacy landlock path) to fail closed with an
explicit `UnsupportedOperation` when restricted read access is requested but
not yet implemented there.
- Updated Windows sandbox backends (standard, elevated, and runner paths) to
fail closed in the same way for restricted read access.
- Updated all call sites/tests/pattern matches for the new structured variants
and regenerated app-server protocol schema/types.
## Why
The previous `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` implied full-disk read access and left
no way to express a narrower read surface.
This refactor establishes the policy model needed to support user-configurable
read restrictions in a follow-up without changing current runtime behavior.
It also ensures we do not silently ignore future restricted-read policies on
platform backends that do not support them yet. Failing closed keeps sandbox
semantics predictable and avoids accidental over-permission.
## Compatibility and rollout notes
- Existing behavior is preserved by default (`FullAccess`).
- Existing config/app-server flows continue to serialize/deserialize cleanly.
- New schema artifacts are included to keep generated protocol outputs in sync.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Targeted crate/test runs were executed during development for protocol/core/
sandbox-related crates.
## Summary
- enable local-use defaults in network proxy settings: SOCKS5 on, SOCKS5
UDP on, upstream proxying on, and local binding on
- add a regression test that asserts the full
`NetworkProxySettings::default()` baseline
- Fixed managed listener reservation behavior.
Before: we always reserved a loopback SOCKS listener, even when
enable_socks5 = false.
Now: SOCKS listener is only reserved when SOCKS is enabled.
- Fixed /debug-config env output for SOCKS-disabled sessions.
ALL_PROXY now shows the HTTP proxy URL when SOCKS is disabled (instead
of incorrectly showing socks5h://...).
## Validation
- just fmt
- cargo test -p codex-network-proxy
- cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets
As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
`Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
`NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
when it is dropped.)
The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
the appropriate places.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
* #11285
* __->__ #11207
We support requirements on Unix, loading from
`/etc/codex/requirements.toml`. On MacOS, we also support MDM.
Now, on Windows, we'll load requirements from
`%ProgramData%\OpenAI\Codex\requirements.toml`
#10958 introduced experimental support for a network config in
`/etc/codex/requirements.toml`, so this extends `/debug-config` to
surface this information, if set, which should make it easier to debug.
This PR makes it possible to disable live web search via an enterprise
config even if the user is running in `--yolo` mode (though cached web
search will still be available). To do this, create
`/etc/codex/requirements.toml` as follows:
```toml
# "live" is not allowed; "disabled" is allowed even though not listed explicitly.
allowed_web_search_modes = ["cached"]
```
Or set `requirements_toml_base64` MDM as explained on
https://developers.openai.com/codex/security/#locations.
### Why
- Enforce admin/MDM/`requirements.toml` constraints on web-search
behavior, independent of user config and per-turn sandbox defaults.
- Ensure per-turn config resolution and review-mode overrides never
crash when constraints are present.
### What
- Add `allowed_web_search_modes` to requirements parsing and surface it
in app-server v2 `ConfigRequirements` (`allowedWebSearchModes`), with
fixtures updated.
- Define a requirements allowlist type (`WebSearchModeRequirement`) and
normalize semantics:
- `disabled` is always implicitly allowed (even if not listed).
- An empty list is treated as `["disabled"]`.
- Make `Config.web_search_mode` a `Constrained<WebSearchMode>` and apply
requirements via `ConstrainedWithSource<WebSearchMode>`.
- Update per-turn resolution (`resolve_web_search_mode_for_turn`) to:
- Prefer `Live → Cached → Disabled` when
`SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess` is active (subject to requirements),
unless the user preference is explicitly `Disabled`.
- Otherwise, honor the user’s preferred mode, falling back to an allowed
mode when necessary.
- Update TUI `/debug-config` and app-server mapping to display
normalized `allowed_web_search_modes` (including implicit `disabled`).
- Fix web-search integration tests to assert cached behavior under
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` (since `DangerFullAccess` legitimately prefers
`live` when allowed).