## Why
Destination restrictions and policy revocation must remain effective during redirects, response body reads, and established WebSocket traffic. Policy denials must also survive error handling so callers do not retry them or report a revoked operation as successful.
## What changed
- Route managed HTTP clients through a shared `RequestBuilder` and policy-aware execution, checking each redirect destination before route resolution and retaining a network permit while consuming response bodies.
- Guard WebSocket connection setup, reads, and writes with revocable permits, including independent wakeups for split readers and writers.
- Preserve `TransportError::Policy` through HTTP, SSE, and realtime error handling, and treat policy denials as non-retryable.
- Keep the supplied network policy in plugin startup HTTP requests and propagate response body failures from backend and plugin requests.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for rejection before connecting, revocation during redirect routing and streamed body reads, split WebSocket revocation, realtime writer error propagation, and revoked plugin upload responses.
GitOrigin-RevId: fba36700444c98a8364c09b4dc5452c4d78a90fb
## Why
Truncating diagnostic attachments can corrupt compressed archives, while skipping unreadable files can hide incomplete diagnostic delivery.
## What changed
- Remove attachment truncation and the 40,000,000-byte wire cap. Enforce the 200 MiB decoded envelope limit, including framing, and report oversized or unreadable attachments as upload failures.
- Use gzip only when it reduces envelope size, and set `Content-Encoding` according to the request bytes for both interactive and report uploads.
- Document that successful uploads mean HTTP acceptance, not durable attachment storage, and that callers must retain source files.
## Testing
Add coverage for incomplete uploads caused by missing or oversized files. Update large-file coverage to verify byte-for-byte delivery of JSONL files and a gzip archive exceeding the former wire cap, including successful archive decompression.
GitOrigin-RevId: a5316e9f407f16ee5a3dfb3f15122b1db51d6a94
## Why
Diagnostic reports can span several envelopes, and the previous 10-second shared
network budget could expire before slow uploads and their attachments completed.
## What changed
- Give each diagnostic report a single five-minute deadline shared by the event,
attachments, retries, and retry backoff.
- Stop reading or sending later attachments once the deadline or a Sentry rate
limit is reached.
- Limit the app server to three concurrent report uploads and return an
overloaded JSON-RPC error for additional requests until a slot is released.
## Testing
Add coverage for slow multi-envelope reports, deadline-aware retries, skipped
attachments, rate-limit handling, and concurrency-slot release after failures.
GitOrigin-RevId: bdacf6c9731df16d2763e204565986eb6d540233
## What changed
- Send the core report event before its attachments, then upload each attachment in a separate gzip-compressed envelope linked to that event.
- Bound encoded and decoded payload sizes, truncate oversized attachment copies with format-aware handling for JSONL, and preserve attachment priority when applying size limits.
- Retry transient attachment failures within a shared upload-time budget while honoring Sentry rate-limit and retry headers without replaying the core event.
- Add APIs to prepare and send persisted report events and attachments using a stable report ID, explicit delivery outcomes, and caller-controlled retries.
## Testing
- Cover attachment retries, truncation, rate limits, rejected responses, transport failures, redirect handling, content types, diagnostic consent, and report tags.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5eacd384843795d05d1c024b76e1c6d0c1c4b8d7
acrognale-oai