## What changed
- Add `body_secret_substitution` actions to version 2 MITM configuration, replacing exact opaque placeholders with secrets from environment variables or files within the matching hook's scope.
- Bound body size, expansion, replacement count, and search work. Reject overlapping matches, compressed payloads, trailers, and supplied payload-integrity headers.
- Recompute `Content-Length` and substitute before SigV4 signing so signatures cover the transmitted body.
## Testing
Add coverage for markers split across chunks, expansion limits, invalid payloads, overlapping bindings, secret redaction, and search limits. Add a TLS forwarding test that verifies hook scope and independently checks the signature of the substituted body.
GitOrigin-RevId: fa95c9ae0c8fc8f695e03c0e87a0a4875d8418fd
## Why
Allow workloads to make AWS requests with placeholder credentials while keeping real AWS credentials in the trusted proxy process.
## What changed
- Add an `aws_sigv4` hook action with a placeholder access key ID, region, service, HTTPS port, and credential sources from proxy environment variables or files.
- Re-sign matching requests after network and hook authorization and header transformations, using the configured credentials and optional session token.
- Support empty payloads and explicitly unsigned payloads, including streaming unsigned S3 uploads. Reject selected requests with incompatible credential scopes, presigned URLs, unsupported streaming signatures, or ambiguous framing through the hook denial path.
- Mark generated credential headers as sensitive and suppress signing SDK trace events that could expose credentials.
## Testing
Add tests for the published AWS IAM signature vector, unsigned S3 uploads with a session token, and rejection of invalid transport, credential scopes, signing inputs, and unsupported bodies.
GitOrigin-RevId: ab4fbbc00ba40a5bb309add521fea6ee2ff6e79e
## Why
Credential substitution needs to authorize the destination and the original request before exposing host secrets. Project configuration must not redirect trusted credential policies, and older clients must reject scoped policies rather than silently apply unconditional injection.
## What changed
- Add hook `schemes` and `ports` constraints and an exact whole-header `placeholder` for secret substitution. Require `network.mitm.version = 2` for these options in permission profiles.
- Restrict placeholder substitution to HTTPS on port 443 and reject missing, mismatched, or duplicate placeholder headers.
- Reject project changes to trusted MITM definitions and their inheritance chains. Allow self-contained project header-stripping policies only when no trusted MITM policy exists.
- Reject ambiguous query values, value-constrained headers, and semicolon paths during authorization, and preserve case-sensitive extension methods.
- Mark resolved secret headers sensitive, reject secret injection into `User-Agent`, restrict substitution headers, and limit secret files to 64 KiB.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for scoped TOML resolution, legacy-format rejection, unknown fields, project policy restrictions, origin and placeholder denials, ambiguous request matching, secret redaction, and hook application after credential brokerage.
GitOrigin-RevId: 78dc115ab6c88c9a734377626429bc4840731f89
## Why
A credential bound to a host with MITM hooks could also be used at an alias without hooks, allowing the proxy to inject the real credential without enforcing hook policy.
## What changed
Reject requests to unhooked aliases when their selected brokered credentials are also bound to a hooked host. Check both HTTP forwarding and MITM requests before replacing dummy credentials, returning `403` with `blocked-by-mitm-hook` for denied requests.
Use the same destination and credential-selection rules for alias checks and injection, including configured URL prefixes, safe paths, equivalent credentials, merged Basic authentication fields, and environment scope.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for built-in and configured provider aliases, IPv6 destinations, credential selection, and unrelated credentials. Add an agent-started proxy test that verifies credential masking and alias denial.
GitOrigin-RevId: 12be41654761cedcf87b170f7661d6566f7a864e
## Why
Resolving unapproved hostnames discloses them to DNS even when the proxy ultimately rejects the request. Allowing local binding in a managed macOS sandbox also granted direct outbound access to port `53`.
## What changed
- Require an allowlist match or policy approval before resolving a hostname for address checks.
- Recheck baseline restrictions after local and remote policy approval so approval cannot bypass explicit denies or local/private address restrictions.
- Preserve DNS checks for inner HTTPS requests after an approved CONNECT, including hosts without a persisted allowlist entry.
- Remove the Seatbelt allowance for external DNS while retaining local binding and loopback proxy access.
## Testing
Add regression tests for zero DNS lookups on unapproved hosts, private-address rejection after approval, local and remote approval ordering, and DNS checks after approved CONNECT requests. Add a macOS Seatbelt child test that verifies external UDP and TCP port `53` access is denied while local binding and proxy connectivity remain available.
GitOrigin-RevId: 490790462c51928e831dd8375ac098bc3a257bac
## Why
MXC's native host-loopback access is bidirectional, so it cannot enforce `allow_local_binding = false`. Treating an omitted setting as `false` prevents managed networking from working with the default configuration.
## What changed
- Preserve an omitted `allow_local_binding` until the executor's sandbox policy is known. Default to `true` for Windows MXC and `false` elsewhere, including remote execution.
- Reject an effective `false` for MXC managed networking after applying policy restrictions, without enabling disabled networking.
- Use the executor's resolved value for remote network approval decisions while preserving explicit controller restrictions.
- Document that local binding permits local servers and direct host-loopback connections and skips additional private-network destination checks; proxy domain rules still apply.
## Testing
Add coverage for per-executor defaults, explicit values, MXC rejection of `false`, and remote network review cleanup with the resolved policy.
GitOrigin-RevId: 0fa7c1eaec68bebada2b8f7af45688315eea70a9
## Why
Configured HTTP credential destinations need dummy credentials translated inside `CONNECT` and SOCKS5 tunnels, where credential interception previously detected only TLS.
## What changed
- Detect plaintext HTTP for configured credential destinations and proxy requests with URL-scoped credential substitution.
- Keep requests bound to the authorized tunnel destination, rejecting mismatched authorities and nested `CONNECT` requests.
- Support HTTP/2 clients and preserve HTTP upgrades, including `h2c`, and opaque traffic in full mode.
- Enforce limited-mode method restrictions on plaintext HTTP and reject upgrades and opaque traffic.
## Testing
Add end-to-end tests for both tunnel transports covering credential URL scope, request bodies, HTTP/2, destination mismatches, upgrades, lossless opaque forwarding, and limited-mode enforcement.
GitOrigin-RevId: 89262c996ea4ee156c628f9ed8e72b52504b2f6b
## What changed
Move TLS prefix detection into `brokered_tunnel` and carry explicit `BrokeredProtocols` requirements from the credential broker through HTTP `CONNECT` and SOCKS5 tunnel handling. Dispatch on `TunnelProtocol::Tls` or `TunnelProtocol::Opaque`, preserving the initial-read timeout, fragmented TLS header detection, and replay of all inspected bytes.
## Testing
Move the fragmented TLS regression test alongside the detector, retaining coverage for delayed header fragments and lossless prefix replay. Update broker and proxy assertions for the protocol-aware types.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6e5a92d8bdf6db5b59cff7f210c17b01d93ee23b
## Why
MITM hooks authorize requests before the upstream server parses them. Paths that
can be decoded or normalized to a different resource must not match an allowed
path, and hosts that require MITM inspection must not bypass it through the
plain HTTP proxy path.
## What changed
- Reject ambiguous hook paths, including traversal segments, backslashes,
malformed percent encodings, and encoded separators or percent signs.
- Block plain HTTP proxy requests for hosts whose policy always requires MITM,
recording the decision as `mitm_required`.
## Testing
- Cover safe and ambiguous path forms, encoded traversal through repository
allowlists, and absolute-form HTTPS requests sent to the HTTP proxy.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8812a980ac64a97cbac3a237376d29be5ded9220
## Why
`NetworkProxyConfig` only wrapped `NetworkProxySettings` in a single
`network` field. That extra level made runtime callers repeat `.network`
everywhere without representing a real boundary.
## What changed
- move the managed-network fields directly onto `NetworkProxyConfig`
- collapse the matching partial-config wrapper
- update runtime callers and tests to use the direct fields
- keep the user-facing permissions/profile TOML layout unchanged
The internal serialized shape now matches the runtime type itself. This
does not change managed-network behavior or the `config.toml` shape.
## Why
Codex child processes can inherit injectable local credentials directly,
which lets commands read and exfiltrate the real values. This
experimental slice keeps supported workflows working while moving those
credentials behind the managed network proxy.
This PR contains only the proxy-owned broker implementation. The Codex
config and runtime integration is stacked separately in #29752.
## What changed
- discover supported credentials during child setup, retain real values
only in the in-memory proxy broker, and replace them with shaped dummy
values
- require a presented dummy to select a stored credential and preserve
unrelated explicit authorization headers
- bind GitHub cloud, GitHub Enterprise, and OpenAI credentials to their
intended hosts
- inject credentials only into TLS traffic by default; plaintext
injection requires the explicit dangerous opt-in
- use TLS ClientHello routing for CONNECT so non-TLS protocols remain
opaque tunnels
- expose a pure API that identifies environment keys still holding
broker-generated dummies without mutating the caller's environment
## Scope
- supported credentials: `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`,
`GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, and `OPENAI_API_KEY`
- GitHub cloud credentials match `github.com`, `api.github.com`, and
`*.ghe.com`
- GitHub Enterprise credentials match only the normalized non-cloud
`GH_HOST`
- OpenAI API keys match only `api.openai.com`
- this does not cover SSH agents, kube client certificates, filesystem
secret discovery, or context-injected secret scrubbing
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy` (191 passed)
- focused opaque CONNECT, plaintext opt-in, dummy-selection, and
child-isolation regressions passed
- scoped Clippy check for `codex-network-proxy` passed
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Parent PR: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy request path.
3. This PR changes the user facing PermissionProfile TOML shape.
## Why
1. The broader goal is to make MITM clamping usable from the same
permission profile that already controls network behavior.
2. This PR is the config UX layer for the stack. It moves MITM policy
into `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` instead of exposing the flat
runtime shape to users.
3. The named hook and action tables belong here because users need
reusable policy blocks that are easy to review, while the proxy runtime
only needs a flat hook list.
4. This PR validates action refs during config parsing so mistakes in
the user facing policy fail before a proxy session starts.
5. Keeping the lowering here lets the proxy keep its simpler runtime
model and lets PermissionProfile remain the single source of network
permission policy.
## Summary
1. Keep MITM policy inside `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` so the
selected PermissionProfile owns network proxy policy.
2. Use named MITM hooks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.hooks.<name>]`.
3. Put host, methods, path prefixes, query, headers, body, and action
refs on the hook table.
4. Define reusable action blocks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.actions.<name>]`.
5. Represent action blocks with `NetworkMitmActionToml`, then lower them
into the proxy runtime action config.
6. Reject unknown refs, empty refs, and empty action blocks during
config parsing.
7. Keep the runtime hook model unchanged by lowering config into the
existing proxy hook list.
8. Preserve the #20659 activation fix for nested MITM policy.
## Example
```toml
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm]
enabled = true
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.hooks.github_write]
host = "api.github.com"
methods = ["POST", "PUT"]
path_prefixes = ["/repos/openai/"]
action = ["strip_auth"]
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.actions.strip_auth]
strip_request_headers = ["authorization"]
```
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the core MITM config parsing and validation tests.
3. Ran the core PermissionProfile MITM proxy activation tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
7. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
---------
Co-authored-by: Winston Howes <winston@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. This PR wires runtime enforcement.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. After the hook model exists, the proxy needs a separate behavior
change that can be tested at the request path.
2. This PR makes hooked HTTPS hosts require MITM, evaluates inner
requests after CONNECT, mutates headers for matching hooks, and blocks
hooked hosts when no hook matches.
3. It also fixes the activation path so a permission profile with MITM
hook policy starts the managed proxy.
4. Keeping this separate from #18868 lets reviewers focus on runtime
effects, telemetry, and request mutation.
## Summary
1. Store compiled MITM hooks in network proxy state.
2. Require MITM for hooked hosts even when network mode is full.
3. Evaluate inner HTTPS requests against host specific hooks.
4. Apply hook actions by replacing request headers before forwarding.
5. Block hooked hosts when no hook matches and record block telemetry.
6. Treat profile MITM hook policy as managed proxy policy so the proxy
starts when needed.
7. Keep the duplicate authorization header replacement and query
preserving request rebuild in this runtime PR.
8. Add runtime tests and README guidance for hook enforcement.
## Validation
1. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
2. Ran the hooked host CONNECT test.
3. Ran the authorization header replacement test.
4. Ran the core permission profile proxy activation test for MITM hooks.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.
Concretely, it:
- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format
## Why
The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.
## Backward Compatibility
### Backward compatible
- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.
### Not backward compatible
- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.
Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
## Summary
- reject the global `*` domain pattern in proxy allow/deny lists and
managed constraints introduced for testing earlier
- keep exact hosts plus scoped wildcards like `*.example.com` and
`**.example.com`
- update docs and regression tests for the new invalid-config behavior
viyatb-oai