## What changed
- Add `body_secret_substitution` actions to version 2 MITM configuration, replacing exact opaque placeholders with secrets from environment variables or files within the matching hook's scope.
- Bound body size, expansion, replacement count, and search work. Reject overlapping matches, compressed payloads, trailers, and supplied payload-integrity headers.
- Recompute `Content-Length` and substitute before SigV4 signing so signatures cover the transmitted body.
## Testing
Add coverage for markers split across chunks, expansion limits, invalid payloads, overlapping bindings, secret redaction, and search limits. Add a TLS forwarding test that verifies hook scope and independently checks the signature of the substituted body.
GitOrigin-RevId: fa95c9ae0c8fc8f695e03c0e87a0a4875d8418fd
## What changed
- Expose `aws_sigv4` actions in version 2 MITM permissions configuration and the config schema, rejecting multiple signing actions per hook.
- Give local managed commands placeholder AWS credentials for the selected signing pair, and mask configured credentials in environment values and protected shell snapshots.
- Set `AWS_CA_BUNDLE` to the managed proxy CA bundle when unset, and require `features.credential_masking` for local AWS signing hooks.
- Validate placeholders against every configured signing pair to prevent overlap with real credentials.
## Testing
Extend configuration, signing, and TLS forwarding tests to cover action resolution, invalid signing configuration, credential masking, CA trust, snapshot protection, and exclusion of local AWS defaults from remote environments.
GitOrigin-RevId: 81dfdea30ebde74829882b38891ea41e9737058a
## Why
Allow workloads to make AWS requests with placeholder credentials while keeping real AWS credentials in the trusted proxy process.
## What changed
- Add an `aws_sigv4` hook action with a placeholder access key ID, region, service, HTTPS port, and credential sources from proxy environment variables or files.
- Re-sign matching requests after network and hook authorization and header transformations, using the configured credentials and optional session token.
- Support empty payloads and explicitly unsigned payloads, including streaming unsigned S3 uploads. Reject selected requests with incompatible credential scopes, presigned URLs, unsupported streaming signatures, or ambiguous framing through the hook denial path.
- Mark generated credential headers as sensitive and suppress signing SDK trace events that could expose credentials.
## Testing
Add tests for the published AWS IAM signature vector, unsigned S3 uploads with a session token, and rejection of invalid transport, credential scopes, signing inputs, and unsupported bodies.
GitOrigin-RevId: ab4fbbc00ba40a5bb309add521fea6ee2ff6e79e
## Why
Credential substitution needs to authorize the destination and the original request before exposing host secrets. Project configuration must not redirect trusted credential policies, and older clients must reject scoped policies rather than silently apply unconditional injection.
## What changed
- Add hook `schemes` and `ports` constraints and an exact whole-header `placeholder` for secret substitution. Require `network.mitm.version = 2` for these options in permission profiles.
- Restrict placeholder substitution to HTTPS on port 443 and reject missing, mismatched, or duplicate placeholder headers.
- Reject project changes to trusted MITM definitions and their inheritance chains. Allow self-contained project header-stripping policies only when no trusted MITM policy exists.
- Reject ambiguous query values, value-constrained headers, and semicolon paths during authorization, and preserve case-sensitive extension methods.
- Mark resolved secret headers sensitive, reject secret injection into `User-Agent`, restrict substitution headers, and limit secret files to 64 KiB.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for scoped TOML resolution, legacy-format rejection, unknown fields, project policy restrictions, origin and placeholder denials, ambiguous request matching, secret redaction, and hook application after credential brokerage.
GitOrigin-RevId: 78dc115ab6c88c9a734377626429bc4840731f89
## Why
MITM hooks authorize requests before the upstream server parses them. Paths that
can be decoded or normalized to a different resource must not match an allowed
path, and hosts that require MITM inspection must not bypass it through the
plain HTTP proxy path.
## What changed
- Reject ambiguous hook paths, including traversal segments, backslashes,
malformed percent encodings, and encoded separators or percent signs.
- Block plain HTTP proxy requests for hosts whose policy always requires MITM,
recording the decision as `mitm_required`.
## Testing
- Cover safe and ambiguous path forms, encoded traversal through repository
allowlists, and absolute-form HTTPS requests sent to the HTTP proxy.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8812a980ac64a97cbac3a237376d29be5ded9220
## Why
`NetworkProxyConfig` only wrapped `NetworkProxySettings` in a single
`network` field. That extra level made runtime callers repeat `.network`
everywhere without representing a real boundary.
## What changed
- move the managed-network fields directly onto `NetworkProxyConfig`
- collapse the matching partial-config wrapper
- update runtime callers and tests to use the direct fields
- keep the user-facing permissions/profile TOML layout unchanged
The internal serialized shape now matches the runtime type itself. This
does not change managed-network behavior or the `config.toml` shape.
## Stack
1. This PR adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Runtime follow up: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy
request path.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. Viyat asked for the original parent PR to be split so reviewers can
inspect the policy model before request behavior changes.
2. This PR gives the proxy a typed MITM hook model, validation, matcher
compilation, permissions TOML plumbing, schema support, and config
tests.
3. This PR deliberately does not change CONNECT or MITM request
handling.
4. Keeping runtime behavior out of this PR makes the review boundary
simple: does the policy model parse, validate, compile, and lower
correctly.
## Summary
1. Add the MITM hook config model and matcher compilation.
2. Validate hosts, methods, paths, query matchers, header matchers,
secret sources, and reserved body matching.
3. Add wildcard matcher support for path, query value, and header value
matching.
4. Add permissions TOML and schema support for flat runtime hook config.
5. Add config loader tests for MITM hook overlay behavior.
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the network proxy MITM hook unit tests.
3. Ran the core permission profile MITM hook parsing tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Notes
1. Runtime enforcement moved to #20659.
2. User facing PermissionProfile TOML shape remains in #18240.
viyatb-oai