## What changed
- Recognize validated create and edit marker commands from the trusted presentations, documents, spreadsheets, and PDF plugins.
- Emit a `codex_artifact_operation` analytics event plus started-count and expected-output-count metrics when a recognized marker starts through unified exec.
- Attribute remote executor commands only when their plugin cache path and script contents match a trusted local plugin, including primary-runtime plugins.
## Testing
- Cover supported marker combinations and reject mismatched plugins, paths, arguments, counts, and output formats.
- Cover local, relocated remote, and Windows-style plugin attribution, including rejection of modified remote scripts.
GitOrigin-RevId: 475cc1689aa7f371a24dec0a8bdb6f7fd5a2e922
## What changed
- Set `CODEX_SESSION_ID` to the shared root-session ID for shell tool calls,
unified exec processes, and user shell commands.
- Preserve `CODEX_SESSION_ID` when restoring a shell snapshot, alongside the
existing runtime-owned environment variables.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5228867d25507105c7edf11607a8298958c3b917
## What changed
- Add the `apply_patch_preserve_line_endings` feature, disabled by default, to
preserve CRLF, CR, and mixed line endings when `apply_patch` updates files.
- Apply the feature consistently to built-in patch handling and patches invoked
through shell, user-shell, unified-exec, and app-server command execution.
- Keep the active feature configuration authoritative over inherited, shell
snapshot, and client-provided environment values.
## Testing
- Cover line-ending behavior with the feature enabled and disabled for custom
tool calls, shell heredocs, command execution, and the `apply_patch` CLI.
GitOrigin-RevId: 531a7c66761959c650270559f57941929f03e6c4
## What changed
Read `allow_prefix_rules` from the turn attached to the active step context
when selecting the exec policy and constructing unified exec approval requests.
GitOrigin-RevId: d2d26e88b9cefa28bb2df5b9f71aa7b30b7ea331
## Why
Deferred environments can become ready after a turn starts. Guardian approval
reviews must use the environment selected for the current step so their working
directory and permission context are not taken from the stale turn snapshot.
## What changed
- Carry `StepContext` through tool execution and approval handling.
- Add a Guardian review context that pairs the parent turn with the current
step's environment snapshot.
- Use that snapshot for Guardian prompts, reviewer sessions, and delegated
reviewer threads while retaining turn-level fallbacks for callers without a
step context.
## Testing
Added an integration test that makes a deferred remote environment ready before
an escalated command and verifies Guardian receives that environment's working
directory and denied-read policy instead of the initial local environment's.
GitOrigin-RevId: 779096bc7d0e0c7453a009c02141029714b9b407
## Why
Model-reachable child processes should not inherit Codex launch context.
## What changed
- Treat `OPENAI_FEDERATION_RULE_ID` and `OPENAI_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE` as non-inheritable environment variables, with case-insensitive matching.
- Remove them after shell environment policy overrides and before spawning commands across execution, MCP, hooks, Git helpers, and remote helper processes.
## Testing
- Cover inherited and explicitly configured variants, including mixed-case names.
- Verify the variables are absent from real child environments and app-server command and process execution.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2535527893985fef0995617f4c5b2462bea7c136
## What changed
- Filter saved `allow` prefix rules from the execution policy for cyber-specialized models and models listed in `auto_review.ignore_rules`, while preserving prompt, forbidden, network, and host-executable policy entries.
- Apply the filtered policy consistently to permission instructions, shell commands, unified exec, and the zsh-fork backend.
- Limit cyber-model command approvals to one-time decisions without proposing reusable policy amendments. General models continue to honor saved prefixes, including after switching models within a thread.
## Testing
- Add policy-level coverage for filtering allow-prefix rules while retaining restrictive and network rules.
- Add end-to-end coverage across shell and unified exec paths, zsh-fork execution, user and automatic review, and model switching.
GitOrigin-RevId: f3bd3872424291b12354ec415f33986ec369a368
## What changed
Store the output buffer, notifications, closed state, and cancellation token
together in `OutputHandles`. Pass that shared bundle through output collection
and local output tasks instead of cloning and forwarding each field separately.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2f0f66dd419778e0b17ff47323c795f5dc88fe33
## What changed
- Derive sandboxing, approval, and permission-profile environment variables from the selected turn environment for shell, unified exec, `apply_patch`, image viewing, and network approval flows.
- Materialize project-root permissions against every workspace root in that environment, allowing `apply_patch` to write to secondary workspace roots while preserving protected paths.
- Carry the selected environment's permission profile into spawned or resumed agents and Guardian permission context.
## Testing
- Add an integration test covering `apply_patch` writes in a secondary workspace root.
- Extend tool, Guardian, and multi-agent tests to distinguish environment permissions from thread-level permissions.
GitOrigin-RevId: e22da8974bcd3de1e724978b1a7790307a51e4bc
## Why
Thread settings can update the approval policy after a turn context is created.
Keeping a separate copy on `TurnContext` could leave tool approval checks using
the previous policy.
## What changed
- Remove the duplicated approval-policy field from `TurnContext`.
- Resolve the policy through the turn's current configuration everywhere it is
needed, including tool execution, Guardian routing, MCP handling, and
permission requests.
## Testing
- Update the shell escalation test to apply a thread-level policy override and
verify that the next turn rejects an escalation using the updated policy.
GitOrigin-RevId: e5966ba08f179d53fd76871ad904762958c0f5ea
## Why
Filesystem denials and managed-network blocks did not share a structured event
shape, requiring downstream consumers to rediscover enforcement paths and parse
backend-specific output. See https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17573.
## What changed
- Add normalized filesystem and network violation types in `codex-sandboxing`
and emit them through a shared tracing seam.
- Classify filesystem denials by backend and reason, retaining an optional path
and bounded output snippet, and preserve managed-network block context.
- Report the sandbox type through exec-server responses so unified exec can
classify remote denials without guessing; omitted values remain compatible
with older peers.
- Record violations from exec, apply-patch, shell-escalation, unified-exec, and
managed-network enforcement paths without changing denial behavior.
## Testing
- Cover filesystem classification, path extraction, `SIGSYS`, network event
conversion, protocol compatibility, and remote sandbox-type propagation.
GitOrigin-RevId: d673173b4fa6bdf0a24421194a8a61c81fab9c96
## Why
Removing each decoded prefix from a `Vec` shifts all remaining bytes. Repeating
that work is costly for streams containing many invalid UTF-8 bytes or many
framed messages in one relay record.
## What changed
- Buffer unified exec output in a `VecDeque` and use UTF-8 error offsets to
consume the largest valid prefix while continuing to make progress on invalid
input.
- Buffer Noise relay messages in `BytesMut` and advance past decoded frames
without moving the remaining bytes.
## Testing
Added regression coverage for valid data surrounding invalid UTF-8, front
consumption without shifting, and reassembling many JSON-RPC messages from one
record.
GitOrigin-RevId: 661ccfffc68960ac6c9d37c738224da8ea83cbf0
## What changed
- Pass the canonical `PermissionProfile` through execution requests, sandbox
selection, escalation, and the exec server instead of carrying separate
derived filesystem and network policies.
- Derive runtime sandbox policies from the effective profile at their points of
use, including after applying additional permissions.
- Update sandbox and escalation tests to inspect policies through the profile.
GitOrigin-RevId: 695b82ea94f5289516b0933bb23074cb2dcce8ac
## What changed
- Clamp the initial `exec_command` yield time to at least 10 seconds on Windows.
- Update the tool description and unit coverage for the new effective range.
- Allow the Windows Ctrl-C integration test up to 20 seconds to complete.
GitOrigin-RevId: 65d4d1c9a89dc9979e10d3e565af61c9f632c058
Initialize the Windows-only `ProcessDriver::tty` field to `false` when
constructing the streaming output test harness.
GitOrigin-RevId: 95683779072cba31664d059750b81ee0d9c17664
## What changed
- Forward remote managed-network policy requests to the controller-side decider when Guardian review is enabled.
- Bound callbacks using the configured permission-hook and Guardian review timeouts, restore trusted execution attribution, and recheck live baseline policy before requesting a decision.
- Cancel pending decisions when the process or execution scope ends, and propagate EOF across the sandbox proxy bridge with half-closes.
## Testing
- Cover callback enablement, strict allowlist behavior, live policy updates, trusted attribution, and execution-scope cancellation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 83b47657c8c4546dfe98eec8b272833e96a46b7e
## Why
Guardian review commands can run without the proxy-port environment used to
configure the parent session. Reconciling persistent Windows sandbox settings
for those commands can discard the parent's proxy configuration.
## What changed
- Add a session-level Windows sandbox proxy-settings mode and use `Preserve`
for guardian review sessions while keeping `Reconcile` as the default.
- Carry the mode through unified exec and the exec-server sandbox context to
Windows process launches.
- In preserve mode, reuse the proxy settings recorded by the existing sandbox
setup marker.
## Testing
Added coverage for guardian session configuration, exec-server transport, and
preserving an existing setup marker when proxy-port environment variables are
absent.
GitOrigin-RevId: 214655c6e6d97360906431773dc0de0fdda2db6e
## What changed
- Resolve shell and unified-exec commands against the trusted plugin roots loaded for each turn.
- Add optional `pluginId` and safe plugin-relative `scriptPath` fields to command execution items and legacy execution events, and propagate them through app-server notifications.
- Include the attribution in command execution analytics while rejecting absolute, unsafe, and unattributed script paths.
## Testing
- Cover attribution for cached curated and remote plugin scripts from command execution through core and app-server events.
- Verify analytics serialization and unsafe-path filtering.
GitOrigin-RevId: 02fac3a233284ccfc6642fa502a95f1881dba83d
## What changed
- Wrap `CodexErrorDetails` and an optional retry delay in `CodexErr`, allowing any mapped error to preserve server-provided retry timing.
- Generate the payload-free `CodexErrKind` classification alongside the error details and reuse it for analytics.
- Update error handling sites to inspect `CodexErr::details()` while preserving existing display, debug, protocol mapping, and retryability behavior.
## Testing
- Add coverage for legacy debug formatting, error-specific retryability, and retry-delay propagation through API error mapping.
GitOrigin-RevId: d3ab8a305f2a2ee21d0c0a8c8c388b06dda9c59a
## What changed
- Treat output-task closure as the signal that trailing output is complete, drain any remaining chunks before publishing command completion, and retain the grace period as a fallback.
- Wait for deferred network-denial classification before emitting the final command result.
- Serialize `write_stdin` interaction and completion events so an interaction that exits a process is published first, and avoid pruning processes while their terminal events are being finalized.
## Testing
- Add coverage for late output, missing output-close signals, late network denials, interaction/completion ordering, cross-platform aggregated output, and pruning during finalization.
GitOrigin-RevId: 46a118552bb1a4658b78aa5a5ca76eb8c5fba571
## Why
Elevated Windows sandboxes need stable managed-proxy ports while preserving the network policy and environment attribution of each sandboxed process.
## What changed
- Keep shared HTTP and SOCKS5 loopback ingress listeners alive across managed-proxy instances.
- Add a per-route restricting SID to elevated sandbox tokens and dispatch incoming connections to the matching proxy policy after attributing the client process.
- Reject connections without exactly one registered route, remove routes when their proxy handle is dropped, and keep unsandboxed Windows launches off the managed ingress.
- Provision the elevated sandbox with the configured proxy ports and local-binding setting, honoring the selected profile and CLI overrides.
## Testing
- Add Windows unit tests for TCP ownership attribution, route selection, restricting-token propagation, and setup settings.
- Add an end-to-end Windows test covering stable ports, isolated environment policies, HTTP and SOCKS5 routing, and route teardown.
GitOrigin-RevId: 783fac6e0f904dc9bb1955b75d4a5895e8bb9690
## Why
Sandboxed process launch through the exec server was unsupported on Windows.
## What changed
- Add a shared native process launcher that selects the Windows sandbox session backend when required and otherwise launches PTY or pipe-based processes.
- Pass Windows permission, workspace-root, proxy, filesystem-override, and desktop settings through exec-server process preparation.
- Preserve piped stdin and inherited file descriptors across the shared launch path.
## Testing
- Verify that a remote Windows sandbox process accepts stdin while blocking a write under a read-only policy.
- Enable workspace-root sandbox tests on native Windows while continuing to skip environments that cannot emulate Windows sandbox semantics.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6719ccbe87ad0d5a57af56503e3f23f894c60a71
## Why
Remote executions need managed-network proxy listeners in the executor so their
loopback proxy addresses are reachable by the launched process.
## What changed
- Add a capability-gated exec-server protocol field for executor-local proxy
launch configuration, including network policy, audit metadata, and execution
attribution.
- Start the proxy while preparing a remote process, replace inherited proxy
environment variables with its local addresses, and derive the sandbox
context from its listeners.
- Keep the proxy alive until inherited output streams close, then shut it down.
- Reject unsupported remote settings such as MITM and credential injection.
## Testing
- Cover configuration round trips and rejection of unsupported settings.
- Verify executor-local startup, blocked-domain enforcement, protocol
compatibility, and proxy lifetime through process closure.
GitOrigin-RevId: c984f54e3e600aa9ebcbf8cf4574046e2c199d11
## What changed
- Remove the ignored explorer-role test for role-specific model and reasoning defaults.
- Remove two ignored unified exec tests for timeout capping and completed-session cleanup.
GitOrigin-RevId: 39386546c7628c2e1cf713139cd09fd0bf172700
## Why
With deferred execution enabled, rebuilding a step context from the latest
thread environment snapshot could apply a settings update to a turn that was
already in progress.
## What changed
- Preserve each turn's captured environment selections when creating later
step contexts.
- Refresh only the readiness of environments that were already starting, while
retaining their original selection order.
- Apply updated environment selections to the next turn.
## Testing
Add coverage for changing the selected workspace while a turn is paused,
verifying that the active turn keeps its original working directory and the
next turn uses the new one.
GitOrigin-RevId: c6f4388c843384ef045b7abdbc303dcfca11d230
## What changed
- Allow parallel `write_stdin` tool calls to interact with independent terminal sessions.
- Serialize reads and writes within each session so its output buffer and process lifecycle remain consistent.
- Prevent active sessions from being pruned while a `write_stdin` interaction is in progress.
## Testing
- Added unified exec and code mode coverage that uses two terminal sessions concurrently and verifies output from both.
GitOrigin-RevId: 618f5503f4c4670421f680c0f0c27414bc6b2ddd
## Why
Windows firewall enforcement is tied to the logon-user sandbox identities. Proxy-enforced commands therefore need the elevated backend even when the configured sandbox mode is the default restricted-token mode.
## What changed
- Select the elevated Windows sandbox backend whenever a command uses the managed network proxy.
- Remove configuration and startup checks that required users or managed requirements to select the elevated sandbox explicitly.
- Start and expose managed network proxy state consistently on Windows.
## Testing
- Verify that proxy enforcement selects the elevated backend for the restricted-token sandbox mode.
GitOrigin-RevId: e01ac052587721c468a8fbcf4e2c7c5a185a3e05
## Why
Network proxy enforcement on Windows requires the elevated sandbox backend. Silently selecting that backend for an unelevated configuration makes the effective sandbox differ from the configured mode.
## What changed
- Reject enabled network proxy configurations on Windows unless managed requirements allow only the elevated sandbox and `windows.sandbox` resolves to `"elevated"`.
- Preserve the configured sandbox backend during execution and validate proxy compatibility at config loading, sandbox setup, and process launch boundaries.
- Defer this validation during cloud-config bootstrap so authoritative managed requirements can be loaded first.
- Do not start or expose disabled Windows proxies, and render transitions to disabled networking as `<network enabled="false"></network>`.
## Testing
- Cover Windows requirement and sandbox compatibility matrices, bootstrap behavior, backend selection, disabled proxy handling, and environment-context updates.
GitOrigin-RevId: bfa1dda98594e0db61883f8e7f65bd560e3453e6
## Why
Unified exec can drain process output multiple times while waiting for a command. Collecting those drains into an uncapped buffer allows large commands to exceed the output collection limit.
## What changed
- Accumulate drained output through the capped head/tail buffer so collection remains bounded while preserving the beginning and end of the stream.
- Include a `... N bytes omitted ...` marker when the collection cap drops output.
- Calculate the original token estimate from all observed bytes and preserve omission metadata through truncation and sandbox-denial responses.
## Testing
- Cover repeated drains, previously omitted output, omission markers, and large-output summaries.
GitOrigin-RevId: c6e2efeb875ed8f35914365eab7431f25fd3484c
This PR depends on [#31296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/31296)
for the canonical-to-legacy event mappings.
## Description
This PR makes command execution emit canonical
`TurnItem::CommandExecution` lifecycle from both the shell tool path and
user `/shell` commands.
App-server v2 consumes the canonical command items directly and ignores
the mapped `ExecCommandBegin` / `ExecCommandEnd` compatibility events,
so clients still receive one command item lifecycle.
`UnifiedExecInteraction` stays on the legacy path because
`TerminalInteraction` is still the v2 surface for stdin and poll events.
Emitting a command item there would render the same wait twice.
## Why
This is the first live producer migration after the compatibility
mappings in #31296. Keeping command execution separate makes the unified
exec exception reviewable without mixing in dynamic tools or multi-agent
behavior.
## What changed
- Emit canonical command execution items from shell tool events and user
shell commands.
- Preserve the existing unified exec interaction carveout.
- Move app-server command deduplication and completion bookkeeping onto
canonical item events.
- Update unified exec coverage to assert the completed command item.
## Why
Code-mode tool results could return to the model while an MCP
elicitation was still waiting for user input. This differed from
parallel tool calling and could let the model continue before the user
resolved the request.
We need one session-level view of outstanding elicitations so tool
runtimes can consistently hold results until every pending elicitation
is resolved.
## What changed
- Added a counted, session-owned ElicitationService with RAII
registrations.
- Registered both core-originated and server-originated MCP elicitations
with the service.
- Migrated out-of-band elicitation tracking and unified exec timeout
pausing to the shared service.
- Made code-mode functions.exec and functions.wait capture their runtime
result normally, then hold it before returning while an elicitation is
outstanding.
- Kept terminate: true immediate; only its result is held.
- Preserved model-visible wall time across the elicitation hold.
- Kept the behavior session-scoped, with concurrent elicitations holding
the pause until all registrations are released.
## Summary
- complete unified-exec processes from the ordered event stream instead
of issuing a final zero-wait `process/read`
- add optional executor sandbox-denial state to `process/exited`
- retain `process/read` as a retained-output and compatibility fallback
for receiver lag, sequence gaps, and legacy servers
- recover sandbox-denial state across transport reconnection
- cover the real `TestCodex` remote-exec path without adding a public
test-only event constructor
## Why
A successful one-shot tool call currently receives its output and
terminal notifications, then pays another wide-area `process/read` round
trip before returning. Staging traces showed that remote response wait
accounted for more than 99.8% of RPC time; local serialization,
queueing, and deserialization were below 0.6 ms.
## Measured impact
A direct staging A/B used the same build and route and changed only
completion mode. Each arm ran three times with 30 one-shot
`/usr/bin/true` calls per run. The table reports the median of the three
per-run percentiles.
| Metric | Final `process/read` | Pushed events | Change |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| End-to-end completion p50 | 159.5 ms | 118.7 ms | -40.8 ms (-25.6%) |
| End-to-end completion p95 | 182.4 ms | 131.7 ms | -50.6 ms (-27.8%) |
| Completion-wait p50 | 80.1 ms | 41.5 ms | -38.5 ms (-48.1%) |
| Final `process/read` RPC p50 | 79.9 ms | eliminated | -79.9 ms |
TCP_NODELAY was enabled in both A/B arms, so its effect cancels out. The
successful, complete, in-order event path issued zero final
`process/read` calls.
## Compatibility and recovery
- new servers send `sandboxDenied` on `process/exited`
- legacy servers omit it, which triggers one compatibility
`process/read`
- broadcast lag or a sequence gap triggers a retained-output read
- recovery remains bounded by the server's existing 1 MiB
retained-output window
- complete, in-order event streams issue no completion read
- sandbox denial is attached to the exit event before consumers can
observe process completion
- server-first and client-first rollouts remain wire-compatible;
server-first realizes the latency win immediately
## Integration coverage
The `TestCodex` suite exercises four distinct remote-exec contracts:
- complete pushed output/exit/close with zero reads
- direct pushed sandbox denial with zero reads
- legacy missing denial metadata with exactly one compatibility read
- count-bounded replay eviction recovered from retained output without
duplication
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-core
exec_command_consumes_pushed_remote_process_events`: 4 passed
- `just test -p codex-core unified_exec::process_tests::`: 4 passed
- `just test -p codex-exec-server`: 294 passed, 2 skipped
- `just test -p codex-exec-server-protocol`: 5 passed
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client`: 89 passed, 2 skipped
- focused Bazel `//codex-rs/core:core-all-test`: passed across 16 shards
- scoped `just fix` passed for core and exec-server
- `just fmt` passed
The complete workspace suite was not rerun; focused Cargo and Bazel
coverage passed for the changed behavior.
## tl;dr
Inject a `CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE` environment variable with the name
of the current permission profile when invoking a shell tool.
## Why
Shell tool owners may need to launch nested commands under the same
named permission profile, including through `codex sandbox -P PROFILE
--include-managed-config`. Until now, child processes could observe
sandbox and network metadata but could not identify the active named
permission profile.
The `--include-managed-config` flag is essential when a helper
reconstructs the sandbox from a profile name: it ensures the nested
sandbox also loads managed enterprise requirements. Without it, using
the inherited profile could unintentionally create a sandbox that does
not enforce the organization's managed restrictions.
The new environment value is intentionally informational and **must not
be treated as trusted input**. Any process in the ancestry can overwrite
an environment variable, so a consumer that passes this value to `codex
sandbox -P` must first validate it against the profiles that helper is
authorized to use.
## Example Use Case
Suppose an organization provides a trusted `remote-bash` wrapper that
lets Codex run a command on an approved build host. The local shell
command uses the named `:workspace` permission profile:
```toml
default_permissions = ":workspace"
```
The command exposed to the model is a small zsh wrapper. It deliberately
delegates with `exec`, preserving the original arguments and process
environment:
```zsh
#!/usr/bin/env zsh
exec /opt/codex-tools/remote_bash.py "$@"
```
The model invokes the public wrapper, not its Python implementation:
```sh
/opt/codex-tools/remote-bash \
--host builder.example.com \
-- printf '%s' 'hello world'
```
Only the inner implementation is authorized to escape the local sandbox:
```starlark
prefix_rule(
pattern=["/opt/codex-tools/remote_bash.py"],
decision="allow",
)
```
With zsh-fork, execution begins with `remote-bash` inside the
`:workspace` sandbox. When the wrapper calls `exec`, the exact prefix
rule matches `remote_bash.py`, so that inner script is restarted
unsandboxed. The escalated process inherits:
```text
CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE=:workspace
```
Inheritance does not make the value trustworthy. `remote_bash.py`
independently allowlists both the remote host and the permission profile
before using either value. In particular, a forged value such as
`:danger-full-access` is rejected before it can reach `codex sandbox
-P`:
```python
import argparse
import os
import shlex
import sys
ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"builder.example.com"}
ALLOWED_PROFILES = {":workspace"}
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--host", required=True)
separator = sys.argv.index("--")
args = parser.parse_args(sys.argv[1:separator])
command = sys.argv[separator + 1:]
if args.host not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
parser.error("host is not allowlisted")
if not command:
parser.error("the remote command must not be empty")
profile = os.environ.get("CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE")
if not profile:
raise SystemExit("CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE must not be empty")
if profile not in ALLOWED_PROFILES:
raise SystemExit("CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE is not allowlisted")
remote_command = shlex.join(command)
sandbox_command = shlex.join([
"codex", "sandbox", "-P", profile,
"--include-managed-config", "--",
"bash", "-lc", remote_command,
])
print(shlex.join(["ssh", args.host, sandbox_command]))
```
This builds each command layer as an argument vector and uses
`shlex.join()` at the boundary, rather than interpolating untrusted
shell text. After validation and parsing, the nested command has this
structure:
```text
ssh argv:
["ssh", "builder.example.com", SANDBOX_COMMAND]
SANDBOX_COMMAND argv:
["codex", "sandbox", "-P", ":workspace",
"--include-managed-config", "--",
"bash", "-lc", "printf %s 'hello world'"]
bash -lc payload argv:
["printf", "%s", "hello world"]
```
A production implementation could execute that SSH command. The
integration fixture prints it and parses the result back into arguments,
verifying the complete flow:
```text
model invokes outer wrapper
-> zsh-fork starts wrapper under :workspace
-> wrapper execs allowlisted Python script
-> prefix rule restarts Python script unsandboxed
-> Python script inherits CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE=:workspace
-> Python script verifies :workspace is allowlisted
-> remote command runs codex sandbox -P :workspace
with --include-managed-config
-> nested sandbox honors managed enterprise requirements
```
This gives the trusted helper access to resources outside the local
sandbox—such as SSH credentials—while ensuring that it can select only
an explicitly authorized profile and that work on the remote host
remains subject to the organization's managed requirements.
## What changed
- Inject `CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE` after shell environment policy
evaluation so the active profile wins over inherited or configured stale
values.
- Apply the variable to both `shell_command` and unified `exec_command`,
including local, zsh-fork, and remote exec-server paths.
- Remove stale values when the session has no active named profile.
- Preserve the current profile value when loading a shell snapshot so a
parent snapshot cannot restore an older profile.
## Testing
- Added classic-shell integration coverage proving an exact prefix rule
can run a `require_escalated` script outside the `:workspace` sandbox
while preserving `CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE=:workspace`.
- Added zsh-fork integration coverage in which the model invokes an
outer zsh wrapper, an inner allowlisted `remote_bash.py` runs
unsandboxed, and its printed SSH command reconstructs the inherited
`:workspace` sandbox with `--include-managed-config` while preserving
every argument after `--`.
- The example helper treats `CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE` as untrusted and
validates it against `ALLOWED_PROFILES` before constructing the nested
command.
- Assert that the reconstructed sandbox command includes
`--include-managed-config` so nested use of the inherited profile cannot
bypass managed enterprise requirements.
- Added coverage for overriding and removing stale profile values.
- Verified `shell_command` receives the selected active profile.
- Added shell snapshot coverage using `printenv
CODEX_PERMISSION_PROFILE`.
## Why
Core tests should branch on the executor's operating system, not on
runner details such as Docker or Wine. This keeps platform behavior
stable as new test backends are added and reserves Wine-specific skips
for actual runner debt.
## What
- Add `TestTargetOs` and target/host-aware skip helpers while keeping
`TestEnvironment` internal.
- Replace topology enum access with remote predicates and a narrow
Docker accessor.
- Migrate OS-semantic Wine skips, preserve runner-specific gaps, and
document the skip taxonomy.
## Validation
- `just test -p core_test_support`
- `just test -p codex-core
remote_test_env_can_connect_and_use_filesystem`
- `bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test
--test_output=errors` reached test execution; unrelated existing
view-image, path, and timing failures remain.
- `just test -p codex-core` and `just test` reached broad test
execution; this checkout has unrelated helper, sandbox, and timing
failures.
## Why
Managed network configures commands to use local HTTP and SOCKS proxies.
For commands delegated to the exec server, the proxy environment and the
sandbox policy were prepared separately. On macOS, that meant a command
could receive `HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123` while Seatbelt still
denied access to port `43123`.
## What changed
`NetworkProxy` now prepares the command environment and sandbox context
together from the same runtime snapshot:
```text
Prepared managed network
├── command environment: HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123
└── sandbox context: allow outbound to 127.0.0.1:43123
```
That context travels with remote exec requests. The exec server
preserves the managed proxy and CA environment, and macOS Seatbelt
allows only the prepared loopback proxy ports without enabling broad
network access or local binding.
The protocol field is optional and the existing enforcement flag remains
in place, preserving compatibility with callers that do not send the new
context.
## Why
#29113 moved remote sandbox setup and enforcement to the exec server.
That gives the executor ownership of the platform-specific work: a Linux
executor chooses and runs a Linux sandbox even when the Codex
orchestrator is running on macOS or Windows.
It also means the orchestrator no longer knows which concrete sandbox
the executor selected. When that sandbox blocks a remote command, the
orchestrator currently sees only a failed process and can treat the
denial as an ordinary command failure. The existing sandbox approval and
retry path is then skipped.
This PR lets the executor report one portable fact:
> This command probably failed because the executor sandbox blocked it.
The executor keeps its concrete sandbox type private. The protocol sends
only the semantic result.
## Example
Suppose a local macOS Codex session asks a Linux devbox to write outside
the allowed workspace.
Before this PR:
```text
Linux sandbox blocks the write
-> remote process exits with "Permission denied"
-> local orchestrator sees an ordinary command failure
-> the normal sandbox approval and retry path can be skipped
```
With this PR:
```text
Linux sandbox blocks the write
-> executor reports sandboxDenied: true
-> unified exec returns UnifiedExecError::SandboxDenied
-> the existing approval prompt is shown
-> an approved retry runs through the existing unsandboxed retry path
```
## What changes
### The executor remembers its selected sandbox
The prepared remote process now retains the executor-selected
`SandboxType`. This value never crosses the executor boundary.
Commands started without a sandbox retain `SandboxType::None` and are
never reported as sandbox denials.
### The executor uses the existing denial heuristic
The existing local denial heuristic moves from `codex-core` into the
shared `codex-sandboxing` crate.
When a sandboxed remote process exits, the executor:
1. waits the same short output grace period used by local unified exec;
2. reads the output currently available in the existing retained output
buffer;
3. runs the existing heuristic using the exit code and common denial
messages;
4. stores the yes/no result before publishing the process exit.
This deliberately matches the old local unified-exec behavior. It does
not add a new streaming classifier, another output buffer, or stronger
output-retention guarantees.
### The protocol reports a portable boolean
`process/read` gains `sandboxDenied`:
```json
{
"exited": true,
"exitCode": 1,
"closed": false,
"sandboxDenied": true
}
```
The field defaults to `false` when an older executor omits it. The
response does not expose the executor sandbox implementation or
executor-native paths.
### Unified exec uses the existing error path
The exec-server client carries `sandboxDenied` into the unified process
state. If it is true, unified exec returns the existing `SandboxDenied`
error instead of trying to classify remote output using an
orchestrator-side sandbox type.
Remote process exit remains visible as soon as the process exits. This
PR does not wait for stdout or stderr to close and does not change the
existing process lifecycle.
## Scope
This PR is intentionally limited to matching the existing local
unified-exec behavior for the initial command execution path.
It does not add:
- incremental denial tracking across the full output stream;
- new denial handling for commands completed later through
`write_stdin`;
- new guarantees for preserving the semantic flag during the narrow
reconnect-recovery race.
Those can be considered separately if the same behavior is added for
local execution.
## Test coverage
One remote end-to-end integration test covers the complete intended
flow:
```text
remote read-only sandbox
-> denied write
-> executor reports the denial
-> Codex requests approval
-> user approves
-> retry succeeds on the remote executor
```
Existing lifecycle coverage continues to verify that remote process exit
is reported before late output streams close.
## What changed
PR #29099 stopped sending the orchestrator's concrete sandbox wrapper to
a remote exec-server. Remote commands now arrive as plain native argv.
This PR adds the next piece: Codex also sends portable sandbox intent
next to that plain argv.
For a remote unified-exec command, the request can now include:
- the canonical permission profile before local workspace-root
materialization
- the sandbox cwd and workspace roots as `PathUri` values
- Windows sandbox settings
- the legacy Landlock setting
- whether managed networking must be enforced
The important part is that symbolic entries such as `:workspace_roots`
stay symbolic while crossing the boundary. The executor can then bind
them to its own workspace-root paths instead of receiving
orchestrator-local absolute paths.
The data travels through `ExecRequest` into `ExecParams`. Older
exec-servers can still deserialize requests because the new fields have
defaults.
## Why
The orchestrator should not decide how another machine implements
sandboxing.
For example:
- a local macOS Codex would normally build a Seatbelt command
- a remote Linux executor needs a Linux sandbox command instead
The orchestrator now sends the plain command plus the policy it intended
to enforce. A later PR can let the exec-server choose and build the
correct sandbox for its own operating system.
## Important detail
This keeps the portable intent separate from the local `SandboxType`.
`SandboxType::None` is ambiguous:
- it can mean the command was explicitly approved to run without a
sandbox
- it can also mean the orchestrator host has no concrete sandbox
implementation available
Those cases are different for remote execution. This PR adds
`sandbox_requested` so an executor can still receive sandbox intent when
the orchestrator cannot build a local wrapper. Explicit unsandboxed
retries still send no sandbox context.
## Behavior today
This PR only transports the intent. The exec-server accepts the new
fields but does not apply them yet.
Remote commands therefore remain unsandboxed after this PR, just as they
are after PR #29099.
## Follow-up
The next PR will make exec-server read this portable intent, bind
symbolic workspace permissions to executor-native roots, choose the
sandbox for its own operating system, build the wrapper locally, and
then spawn the command.
## Summary
- Remote unified-exec now sends the original command argv to exec-server
instead of materializing the orchestrator's sandbox wrapper first.
- Local unified-exec keeps the existing sandbox path unchanged.
- Add a focused regression test for a macOS-selected sandbox producing
plain remote argv.
Before:
macOS orchestrator -> /usr/bin/sandbox-exec ... -> Linux exec-server
After:
macOS orchestrator -> /bin/bash -lc pwd -> Linux exec-server
This is intentionally only the first cleanup step. Remote unified-exec
commands are sent without a process sandbox until the targeted
follow-ups below land. For the macOS-to-Linux path this is not a
practical regression: the old sandboxed attempt failed before process
launch because the Linux executor could not spawn macOS sandbox paths.
## Targeted follow-ups
1. Carry sandbox intent separately from argv.
- Add an optional sandbox field to exec-server process params.
- Reuse FileSystemSandboxContext rather than introducing a new sandbox
model.
- Carry managed-network enforcement as one explicit bit.
- Keep argv plain.
2. Apply that intent inside exec-server.
- Add a small process-start adapter before LocalProcess::exec.
- Reuse the existing codex-sandboxing SandboxManager and exec-server
runtime paths.
- Follow the same shape already used by exec-server filesystem
sandboxing.
- Do not duplicate or move the sandbox implementations.
3. Report the sandbox actually used.
- Return the executor-selected sandbox type from process/start.
- Use that value in core for sandbox-denial detection and retry
behavior.
## End state
The orchestrator sends plain commands plus portable sandbox intent. The
executor chooses and applies its own native sandbox: Linux executors use
Linux sandboxing, macOS executors use Seatbelt, and Windows executors
use Windows sandboxing. Concrete wrapper argv, helper paths, and sandbox
env markers never cross the executor boundary.
## Why
Prepare network approval scoping to distinguish execution environments
without changing behavior yet.
## What changed
- Add optional environment IDs to network policy requests.
- Add optional network environment IDs to exec and sandbox request
structs.
- Thread default None values through existing construction points.
- Fix stale constructor call sites that caused the CI compile failures.
## Not included
- Per-environment proxy listeners.
- Network approval cache or prompt behavior changes.
- Ambiguous request attribution handling.
Those behavior changes moved to stacked follow-up #28899.
## Validation
- just fmt
- CI will run tests and clippy
## Why
It should be possible for app-server to handle "foreign" OS paths in
unified_exec working directories, allowing e.g. a Linux app-server to
run processes on e.g. a Windows exec-server.
## What
Convert the core unified_exec cwd values to use `PathUri`.
Adds fallible path conversion in several places to try to minimize the
scope of this change. The only time this change suppresses errors from
converting `PathUri` to an `AbsolutePathBuf` is when the turn is
configured with no sandboxing at all to allow us to make progress
testing without sandboxing.
Future changes to apply_patch and sandboxing will clean up these error
paths.
A tool's cwd is resolved from joining a model-provided workdir to the
environment's cwd. When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()`, an
absolute-path workdir would overwrite the environment's cwd and we would
resolve permissions/sandboxing against the model-provided path. This
change extends `PathUri::join()` to also treat an absolute rhs as an
override of the base/lhs.
This also removes some coverage from the remove_env_windows tests until
a follow-up converts foreign paths in command exec events correctly.
## Breaking Changes
When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()` for workdir resolution, we ended up
resolving tilde-prefixed paths against the app-server's `$HOME`, e.g.
`~/foo/bar` becomes `/home/anp/foo/bar`. It's difficult to do this with
`PathUri` joining, so after offline discussion this PR no longer
implements it.
A quick check of some power users' rollouts suggests that models don't
actually generate home-prefixed absolute working directories for their
spawns, so this shouldn't have any real blast radius.
## Why
`TurnContext` had accumulated dead fields and cached projections of
values already owned by its per-turn `Config` or `ModelInfo`. Keeping
both copies made ownership unclear and allowed artificial split-brain
states, such as a compatibility hash differing from the model metadata
it came from.
`Prompt` similarly carried a write-only personality after personality
selection had already been materialized into its base instructions.
This makes the canonical owner explicit: configuration-backed values
come from `config`, model-derived values come from `model_info`, and
prompts contain only data consumed by request construction.
## What changed
- Remove the unused `ghost_snapshot`, `codex_self_exe`, and
`thread_source` fields.
- Remove duplicate `comp_hash`, `truncation_policy`, `features`,
`shell_environment_policy`, `codex_linux_sandbox_exe`, `compact_prompt`,
and `tool_mode` fields.
- Read those values directly from `TurnContext::config` or
`TurnContext::model_info` at their consumers.
- Remove the write-only `Prompt::personality` field and its constructor
assignments.
- Preserve review-turn inheritance of the parent turn's shell policy,
Linux sandbox executable, and compact prompt through the review config.
## Testing
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
## Why
Shell snapshots are currently session-scoped even though shell and cwd
are properties of a selected turn environment. That makes snapshot
refresh depend on separate session-cwd plumbing, prevents retained
environments from retaining their snapshot work, and can make snapshot
construction use a different shell than command execution.
This follows #27955 by making the retained thread-environment service
own environment snapshot lifecycles. Session configuration remains the
requested selection state, while `ThreadEnvironments` remains the source
of successfully resolved environments.
## What changed
- Configure the shell-snapshot builder before initial environment
resolution.
- Start each local environment snapshot task when its `TurnEnvironment`
is built and retain that shared task while environment ID and cwd still
match.
- Inherit retained environment snapshots into spawned child threads.
- Carry the selected `TurnEnvironment` through shell runtimes so
snapshot construction and command execution use the same
environment-specific shell and cwd.
- Load project instructions and warm plugins/skills after initial
environment resolution.
- Continue decoding invalid UTF-8 instruction files lossily without
emitting a startup warning.
- Keep requested selections in `SessionConfiguration`; failed or
duplicate resolutions only affect the resolved environment snapshot.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `just test -p codex-home instructions` (6 passed)
- Focused environment, instruction, shell-snapshot, and user-shell tests
(84 passed)
- Focused shell-snapshot, user-shell, and unified-exec tests (126
passed; two event-timing tests passed on retry)
## Why
This is the second PR in the Windows fs-helper sandbox stack. The
fs-helper path needs a Windows sandbox launcher that has the same
argv-shaped contract as macOS `sandbox-exec` and `codex-linux-sandbox`,
but this PR only introduces that hidden launcher. It does not route
fs-helper through it yet.
The hidden launcher still needs to be policy-complete before later
direct-spawn callers use it. In particular, it has to carry the same
Windows sandbox policy details that the existing spawn paths already
understand: proxy enforcement, read/write root overrides, and
deny-read/deny-write overrides.
## What Changed
- Added the hidden `codex.exe --run-as-windows-sandbox` arg1 dispatch
path.
- Added `windows-sandbox-rs/src/wrapper.rs`, which parses the wrapper
argv, launches the requested command through the shared Windows sandbox
session runner from PR1, and forwards stdio.
- Added `create_windows_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile()`
so later direct-spawn callers can build the wrapper argv consistently.
- Made the wrapper argv round-trip the full Windows sandbox policy
surface it needs later: workspace roots, environment, permission
profile, sandbox level, private desktop, proxy enforcement, read/write
root overrides, and deny-read/deny-write overrides.
- Carried `proxy_enforced` through the shared Windows session request so
proxy-managed executions continue to use the offline/elevated sandbox
identity.
- Added wrapper argument round-trip coverage for the full policy fields.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-windows-sandbox windows_wrapper_args_round_trip`
- `just test -p codex-arg0`
- `just test -p codex-core exec::tests::windows_`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-cli`
Local note: the full `just fmt` command still fails on this workstation
in non-Rust formatter setup (`uv` cache access denied and missing
`dotslash`/buildifier), but the Rust formatter phase completed.
## Why
The Windows `unified_exec` experiment regressed at the turn level in a
way that points to premature backgrounding / extra command cycles rather
than individual responses getting heavier:
- `codex_local_tool_calls_per_turn` was up about 20.7%.
- `codex_local_blended_tokens_per_turn` was up about 4.1%, and
`codex_local_output_tokens_per_turn` was up about 4.0%.
- `codex_local_response_latency_per_turn` was up about 8.3%.
- The primary activity metrics also moved down: `codex_turns` about
-6.6%, `codex_dau` about -1.0%, and `codex_local_hourly_active_users`
about -3.0%.
At the same time, the per-response metrics moved in the other direction:
blended tokens per response, output tokens per response, and latency per
response were all lower in test. That suggests the bad turn-level shape
is largely about extra tool/model cycles, not each response being slower
or more expensive on its own.
Local Windows benchmarking showed the likely mechanism: shell-wrapped
commands pay a large PowerShell startup/teardown tax before the actual
command has much time to run. In the benchmark, the PowerShell wrapper
added roughly 0.7-1.0s versus direct exec:
- Windows PowerShell: about 740ms p50 / 800ms p90 overhead versus direct
exec.
- PowerShell 7 (`pwsh`): about 930ms p50 / 980ms p90 overhead versus
direct exec.
The model commonly asks for a 1s initial yield. On Windows, that can
spend nearly the whole window waiting on PowerShell machinery, so
otherwise-short commands are more likely to return as background
sessions and require follow-up polling/tool calls.
This is intentionally a temporary unlock. It gives Windows closer to the
same useful post-shell command window as other platforms while we work
on reducing the PowerShell tax directly, for example with persistent
PowerShell workers or conservative direct-exec paths for commands that
do not need shell semantics.
## What changed
- Adds a Windows-only 2s floor to `unified_exec`'s initial
`yield_time_ms` clamp.
- Keeps larger model-requested waits unchanged, including the existing
10s default.
- Keeps the existing 30s max clamp.
- Leaves non-Windows behavior unchanged.
- Adds platform-gated tests for both the Windows floor and the
non-Windows clamp behavior.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-core unified_exec`
## Why
This is the second-to-last place in the exec-server protocol that needs
to migrate to URIs to support cross-OS operation.
## What
- Change `ExecParams.cwd` to `PathUri`.
- Keep the cwd URI-shaped through core and rmcp producers, converting it
to `AbsolutePathBuf` only in `LocalProcess::start_process`.
- Reject non-native cwd URIs before launch and update the affected
protocol documentation and call sites.
## Why
First-party async traits should expose their `Send` contracts explicitly
without requiring `async_trait`. This completes the migration pattern
established in #27303 and #27304.
## What changed
- Replaced the remaining first-party `async_trait` traits with native
return-position `impl Future + Send` where statically dispatched and
explicit boxed `Send` futures where object safety is required.
- Kept implementations behavior-preserving, outlining existing async
bodies into inherent methods where that keeps the diff reviewable.
- Removed all direct first-party `async-trait` dependencies and the
workspace dependency declaration.
- Added a cargo-deny policy that permits `async-trait` only through the
remaining transitive wrapper crates.
- Updated `rand` from 0.8.5 to 0.8.6 to resolve RUSTSEC-2026-0097 and
keep the full cargo-deny check passing.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-exec-server`: 216 passed, 2 skipped.
- `just test -p codex-model-provider`: 39 passed.
- `just test -p codex-core` and `just test`: changed tests passed;
remaining failures are environment-sensitive suites unrelated to this
migration.
- `cargo deny check`
- `just fix`
- `just fmt`
- `cargo shear`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Summary
Codex Apps needs app-server as the source of truth for chat-started
background terminals instead of guessing from local process trees.
This PR adds experimental v2 APIs to list and terminate background
terminals for a loaded thread using app-server process ids, so clients
can manage background terminals without local PID discovery.
## Changes
- `thread/backgroundTerminals/list` returns paginated background
terminal records with `itemId`, app-server `processId`, `command`,
`cwd`, nullable `osPid`, nullable `cpuPercent`, and nullable `rssKb`.
- `thread/backgroundTerminals/terminate` terminates one running
background terminal by app-server `processId` and returns whether a
process was terminated.
- Background terminal list and terminate operations use unified-exec
process manager state as their source of truth.
## Why
A long-running unified exec process started with `tty: false` could not
be interrupted via `write_stdin`: ordinary non-TTY stdin writes are
rejected once stdin is closed, but an exact U+0003 payload should still
map to a process interrupt. The interrupt should flow through the same
process lifecycle path as a real signal so Codex preserves
process-reported output and exit metadata instead of fabricating a
Ctrl-C exit code or tearing down the session early.
## What Changed
- Add `process/signal` to exec-server with `ProcessSignal::Interrupt`
and an empty response.
- Add a non-consuming `ProcessHandle::signal` path for spawned
processes; on Unix it sends SIGINT to the process group and leaves
terminate/hard-kill unchanged.
- Route non-TTY U+0003 `write_stdin` through `process.signal(...)`
instead of `terminate`, then let the normal post-write collection path
drain output and observe exit.
- Add exec-server coverage where a shell `trap INT` handler prints the
signal and exits with its own code.
- Add unified exec coverage where a `tty: false` process traps SIGINT,
emits output, and exits with its own code.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-exec-server
exec_process_signal_interrupts_process`
- `just test -p codex-exec-server`
- `just test -p codex-core
write_stdin_ctrl_c_interrupts_non_tty_session`
## Why
Windows managed filesystem permissions can now be backed by a real
Windows sandbox. `exec-policy` was still treating the managed read-only
policy shape as if there were never a sandbox backend, so benign
unmatched commands such as PowerShell directory listings could be
rejected with `blocked by policy` even when `windows.sandbox` was
enabled.
The inverse case still needs to stay conservative: when the Windows
sandbox backend is disabled, managed filesystem restrictions are only
configuration intent, not an enforced filesystem boundary. That applies
to writable-root restricted profiles too, not just read-only profiles.
## What Changed
- Thread the effective `WindowsSandboxLevel` into exec-policy approval
decisions for shell, unified exec, and intercepted shell exec paths.
- Treat managed restricted filesystem profiles as lacking sandbox
protection only on Windows when `WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled`.
- Exclude full-disk-write profiles from that no-backend path because
they do not rely on filesystem sandbox enforcement.
- Remove the cwd-sensitive read-only heuristic and the now-stale cwd
plumbing from exec-policy approval contexts.
- Add Windows coverage for both enabled-sandbox and disabled-backend
behavior, including a writable-root managed profile.
## Validation
- Added/updated `exec_policy` coverage for managed filesystem
restrictions, full-disk-write exclusion, enabled Windows sandbox
behavior, and disabled-backend read-only/writable-root behavior.
- `just test -p codex-core exec_policy` — 100 passed, 10 leaky
- Empirical local `codex exec` probe with `--sandbox read-only -c
'windows.sandbox="unelevated"'`: PowerShell directory listing completed
successfully.
- Disabled-backend control with Windows sandbox cleared: the same
command was rejected with `blocked by policy`.
## Why
Shell detection needs to be available through the `Environment`
abstraction so callers can ask the selected local or remote environment
for shell metadata without adding a separate HTTP endpoint or parallel
info-source path. This keeps shell metadata shaped like the existing
environment-owned filesystem capability and lets remote environments
answer through exec-server JSON-RPC.
## What changed
- Added `environment/info` to the exec-server protocol/client/server and
exposed `Environment::info()`.
- Added local and remote environment info providers on `Environment`,
following the existing capability-provider pattern used for filesystem
access.
- Moved the shared shell detection logic into `codex-shell-command` and
kept core shell APIs as wrappers around that implementation.
- Returned shell metadata as `EnvironmentInfo { shell: ShellInfo }`
using the existing shell detection path.
- Added a remote environment test that calls `Environment::info()`
through an exec-server-backed environment.
## Validation
- `git diff --check`
- `just test -p codex-shell-command`
- `just test -p codex-core -E 'test(/shell::tests::/)'`\n- `just test -p
codex-exec-server environment`
edwardysun3