# Why
Hook trust happens through the TUI in `/hooks` so it can block
non-interactive use cases. This flag will allow users that are using
codex headlessly to bypass hooks when they want to.
# What
This adds one invocation-scoped escape hatch.
- the CLI flag sets a runtime-only `bypass_hook_trust` override; there
is no durable `config.toml` setting
- hook discovery still respects normal enablement, so explicitly
disabled hooks remain disabled
- we show a `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust is enabled. Enabled hooks
may run without review for this invocation.` message on startup so
accidental use is visible in both interactive and exec flows
This keeps “enabled” and “trusted” as separate concepts in the normal
path, while giving CI/E2E callers a stable way to opt into the
exceptional path when they already control the hook set.
## Summary
Starts the process of getting rid of `--full-auto`, with some
concessions:
1. Fully removes the command from the tui, since it just resolves to the
default permissions there, and encourages users to use the one-time
trust flow if they're not in a trusted repo.
2. Marks the command as deprecated in `codex exec`, in case users are
actively relying on this. We'll remove in an upcoming n+X release.
3. Cleans up some of the `codex sandbox` cli logic, to keep supporting
legacy sandbox policies for now.
This isn't the cleanest setup, but I think it is worthwhile to warn
users for one release before hard-removing it.
## Testing
- [x] Updated unit tests
Addresses #18113
Problem: Shared flags provided before the exec subcommand were parsed by
the root CLI but not inherited by the exec CLI, so exec sessions could
run with stale or default sandbox and model configuration.
Solution: Move shared TUI and exec flags into a common option block and
merge root selections into exec before dispatch, while preserving exec's
global subcommand flag behavior.
Abhinav