## What changed
- Export `StaticNetworkProxyConfig` to parse and serialize network policy with constraints, and validate them before building proxy state.
- Add `--strict` and `from_slice_strict` for managed callers, requiring explicit `constraints` and rejecting unknown fields at every typed level. Default parsing permits top-level `metadata` and omitted constraints while still rejecting unknown policy fields.
- Match allowed Unix socket paths case-sensitively when validating constraints.
- Bound configuration file reads to the size limit plus one byte.
## Testing
Add coverage for constraint round trips, weakened policy rejection, exact socket path matching, parsing modes, and CLI flag selection. Exercise automatic MITM enablement through both parsers.
GitOrigin-RevId: c45d094624240f23dd4659128e72a4208d5d5f1c
## Why
Managed network policies need to require approval for selected hosts even when an exact or wildcard allow rule matches them.
## What changed
- Add `experimental_network.review_domains` to managed requirements and route matching hosts through the existing network approval flow. Explicit denials retain precedence, and approved connections still undergo DNS and local-address checks.
- Preserve review patterns across environment policy attachments and remote proxy configuration. Reject execution on an exec-server that lacks the `networkProxyReviewDomains` capability when review patterns are present.
- Expose `reviewDomains` through the app-server requirements API and generated schemas, and show `review_domains` in debug configuration output.
- Update approval reasons to say that network access requires approval rather than assuming the host is absent from the allowlist.
## Testing
Extend coverage for review precedence over exact and wildcard allows, explicit denials, DNS checks after local and remote approvals, approval hooks, policy merging, remote configuration round trips, and requirements API serialization.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4a861061a0ed80b3537d3b72f2caecb0db2a4f0b
## What changed
- Add optional `network.mitm_ca` configuration with `certificate_file` and
`private_key_file` for trusted proxy configuration. Require MITM to be enabled
and retain the generated CA when no external CA is configured.
- Validate absolute paths, regular files, file sizes, certificate/key matching,
and Unix private-key permissions. Reject symlinks on Unix, private keys embedded
in certificate files, and external private keys on non-Unix platforms.
- Store derived external-CA trust bundles in the proxy artifact directory,
include only certificates, and skip inherited generated bundles to avoid
retaining stale roots.
- Preserve MITM for external CAs when disabling credential brokerage. Reject
external CA configuration for remote execution, even when the proxy is disabled,
and reject unknown fields in `NetworkProxyConfig`.
- Default the upstream request version adapter to HTTP/1.1 and remove the request
URI from upstream request failure context.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for external CA configuration, mismatched keys, embedded
private keys, non-Unix rejection, trust-bundle placement and contents, stale-root
exclusion, credential-broker toggling, and remote configuration rejection.
GitOrigin-RevId: cb209295c19fbe53a9fa0194f11ff06acccabef6
## Why
MXC's native host-loopback access is bidirectional, so it cannot enforce `allow_local_binding = false`. Treating an omitted setting as `false` prevents managed networking from working with the default configuration.
## What changed
- Preserve an omitted `allow_local_binding` until the executor's sandbox policy is known. Default to `true` for Windows MXC and `false` elsewhere, including remote execution.
- Reject an effective `false` for MXC managed networking after applying policy restrictions, without enabling disabled networking.
- Use the executor's resolved value for remote network approval decisions while preserving explicit controller restrictions.
- Document that local binding permits local servers and direct host-loopback connections and skips additional private-network destination checks; proxy domain rules still apply.
## Testing
Add coverage for per-executor defaults, explicit values, MXC rejection of `false`, and remote network review cleanup with the resolved policy.
GitOrigin-RevId: 0fa7c1eaec68bebada2b8f7af45688315eea70a9
## What changed
- Add `Platform` to `codex-utils-path-uri` with metadata parsing, native platform detection, and path convention mapping. Preserve missing or unrecognized metadata as `Unknown`.
- Replace `NetworkProxyExecutorOs` with the shared type and keep executor-specific socket path validation in the network proxy.
- Extract `effective_sandbox_mode` with explicit platform and Windows sandbox level inputs, preserving the native Windows fallback from `workspace-write` to `read-only` when the sandbox is disabled.
## Testing
Add unit tests for platform metadata, path conventions, native platform detection, and sandbox mode selection across platforms and Windows sandbox levels.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4fe0972e3a91040e35f2a6dfa5bcdf6c9a29be88
## Why
A controller and its executor can run different operating systems. Validating socket paths against the controller's OS can reject absolute paths that are valid on the executor, such as Windows paths on a Linux controller.
## What changed
- Thread `NetworkProxyExecutorOs` through network policy validation, proxy construction, and policy updates.
- Require allowed socket paths to be NUL-free and absolute for the executor OS, while preserving deny entries unchanged.
- Accept either Unix or Windows absolute syntax when executor metadata omits the OS, then validate against the executor's own OS at launch.
- Keep native path normalization and socket support checks at execution time.
## Testing
Add coverage for cross-platform absolute path syntax, invalid allow entries, preserved deny entries, and remote policy round trips that retain executor semantics through domain edits and proxy construction.
GitOrigin-RevId: 1ebc09cbce7138f60ec5fd62875591a3df52d067
## Why
An omitted controller socket policy was treated as an explicit denial, preventing execution environments from supplying their own Unix socket grants.
## What changed
- Preserve omission of `dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` separately from `false`, and retain explicitly empty `unix_sockets` maps.
- Defer to attachment socket permissions when the controller supplies neither setting. Continue enforcing explicit restrictions, socket denials, and managed requirements.
- Resolve omitted values to `false` for ordinary execution and remote configuration, preserving the default for commands without attachment grants.
- Add debug logging for effective environment and remote execution network policies.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for omitted, explicit, finite, empty, and managed socket policies through remote launch configuration, including live policy replacement and serialization round trips. Adjust remote environment tests to tolerate child-completion ordering and box large cold-resume test futures to reduce Windows stack usage.
GitOrigin-RevId: 98a88d01cbb91aea1faaa03b3c414ef3be7af398
## Why
Credential brokerage must retain trusted destination hints even when shell environment policy hides them from child processes. Snapshot replay also needs to preserve credential aliases when tokens are short or captured dummy values change.
## What changed
- Add `features.network_proxy.credentials` and preserve provider settings when toggling the proxy. Prevent project configuration from overriding providers or their credential and destination environment variables.
- Use provider metadata throughout snapshot capture and replay, and pass hidden destination context to the broker without exposing it in the child environment.
- Rewrite aliases containing short credentials or previously captured dummies, respecting environment filters and explicit overrides.
- Preserve case-distinct `shell_environment_policy.set` keys so Windows credential ambiguity checks survive configuration merging and permission profile changes.
- Restore independent MITM settings when credential brokerage is disabled.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for custom providers, hidden destination hints, Bash and Zsh alias replay, configuration edits and merging, Windows ambiguity handling, and credential protection during approved execution.
GitOrigin-RevId: b2bd935d2d8555be56baf8feb1a8e5b3a0c666bc
## Why
Filtering destination variables out of a child environment can undo credential registrations. Rotating a provider token and destination must also leave older credential aliases bound to their original destinations.
## What changed
- Add `CredentialBrokerContext` to retain local destination hints for built-in and configured providers without adding them to child environments or serialized configuration. Explicit environment values, including empty values, override these fallbacks.
- Preserve registered destinations when hints are absent, reconcile fallback changes, and keep credential aliases scoped to their source identities and environments during rotation and inheritance.
- Expose provider context and source matching for trusted captured text, including configured provider context keys.
- Disable brokerage on Windows when provider environment overrides contain conflicting case-insensitive keys.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for filtered destinations, token rotation, inherited aliases, fallback updates and clearing, context redaction, trusted text matching, and non-Unicode environment values.
GitOrigin-RevId: 411790ea6339e1d8fa568049cf8160a67b134666
## What changed
- Add `credential_providers` configuration for environment variables, credential patterns, static or environment-derived URL prefixes, and bearer, token, Basic, or custom header authentication.
- Generate matching dummy credentials and restrict replacement to authorized schemes, hosts, ports, and path prefixes. Scope credentials and destination history to each environment.
- Preserve real credentials for destinations that bypass the proxy with `allow_local_binding`, while providing snapshot redaction and alias matching.
- Validate provider definitions and preserve unchanged providers across configuration reloads.
## Testing
Add coverage for dummy generation, authentication translation, URL restrictions, environment isolation, configuration reloads, and credential restoration for local proxy bypass.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5d60ecc684cf4e9aa7637af33af12179aa0c672a
## What changed
- Bind OpenAI credentials to `api.openai.com` and trusted HTTPS hosts derived from local configuration or `OPENAI_BASE_URL`.
- Support GitHub credentials for `uploads.github.com` and translate Bearer, token, and Basic authorization forms while preserving their schemes.
- Apply credential broker configuration changes without restarting the proxy, including clearing affected credential mappings when trusted OpenAI hosts change.
- Restore brokered credentials in environments and command arguments that intentionally leave managed networking, while preserving user overrides and handling Windows environment keys case-insensitively.
- Keep local credential brokerage out of remote proxy launch configuration and avoid launching a remote proxy when brokerage alone enabled the local proxy.
## Testing
Added coverage for trusted host binding, authorization translation, live reconfiguration, credential restoration, managed-disabled behavior, remote launch configuration, and Windows environment key matching.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8d8bd3aaf6e581849cb622b2faec62cee4e13e52
## Why
Elevated Windows sandboxes need stable managed-proxy ports while preserving the network policy and environment attribution of each sandboxed process.
## What changed
- Keep shared HTTP and SOCKS5 loopback ingress listeners alive across managed-proxy instances.
- Add a per-route restricting SID to elevated sandbox tokens and dispatch incoming connections to the matching proxy policy after attributing the client process.
- Reject connections without exactly one registered route, remove routes when their proxy handle is dropped, and keep unsandboxed Windows launches off the managed ingress.
- Provision the elevated sandbox with the configured proxy ports and local-binding setting, honoring the selected profile and CLI overrides.
## Testing
- Add Windows unit tests for TCP ownership attribution, route selection, restricting-token propagation, and setup settings.
- Add an end-to-end Windows test covering stable ports, isolated environment policies, HTTP and SOCKS5 routing, and route teardown.
GitOrigin-RevId: 783fac6e0f904dc9bb1955b75d4a5895e8bb9690
## Why
`NetworkProxyConfig` only wrapped `NetworkProxySettings` in a single
`network` field. That extra level made runtime callers repeat `.network`
everywhere without representing a real boundary.
## What changed
- move the managed-network fields directly onto `NetworkProxyConfig`
- collapse the matching partial-config wrapper
- update runtime callers and tests to use the direct fields
- keep the user-facing permissions/profile TOML layout unchanged
The internal serialized shape now matches the runtime type itself. This
does not change managed-network behavior or the `config.toml` shape.
## Why
Codex child processes can inherit injectable local credentials directly,
which lets commands read and exfiltrate the real values. This
experimental slice keeps supported workflows working while moving those
credentials behind the managed network proxy.
This PR contains only the proxy-owned broker implementation. The Codex
config and runtime integration is stacked separately in #29752.
## What changed
- discover supported credentials during child setup, retain real values
only in the in-memory proxy broker, and replace them with shaped dummy
values
- require a presented dummy to select a stored credential and preserve
unrelated explicit authorization headers
- bind GitHub cloud, GitHub Enterprise, and OpenAI credentials to their
intended hosts
- inject credentials only into TLS traffic by default; plaintext
injection requires the explicit dangerous opt-in
- use TLS ClientHello routing for CONNECT so non-TLS protocols remain
opaque tunnels
- expose a pure API that identifies environment keys still holding
broker-generated dummies without mutating the caller's environment
## Scope
- supported credentials: `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`,
`GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, and `OPENAI_API_KEY`
- GitHub cloud credentials match `github.com`, `api.github.com`, and
`*.ghe.com`
- GitHub Enterprise credentials match only the normalized non-cloud
`GH_HOST`
- OpenAI API keys match only `api.openai.com`
- this does not cover SSH agents, kube client certificates, filesystem
secret discovery, or context-injected secret scrubbing
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy` (191 passed)
- focused opaque CONNECT, plaintext opt-in, dummy-selection, and
child-isolation regressions passed
- scoped Clippy check for `codex-network-proxy` passed
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Stack
1. This PR adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Runtime follow up: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy
request path.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. Viyat asked for the original parent PR to be split so reviewers can
inspect the policy model before request behavior changes.
2. This PR gives the proxy a typed MITM hook model, validation, matcher
compilation, permissions TOML plumbing, schema support, and config
tests.
3. This PR deliberately does not change CONNECT or MITM request
handling.
4. Keeping runtime behavior out of this PR makes the review boundary
simple: does the policy model parse, validate, compile, and lower
correctly.
## Summary
1. Add the MITM hook config model and matcher compilation.
2. Validate hosts, methods, paths, query matchers, header matchers,
secret sources, and reserved body matching.
3. Add wildcard matcher support for path, query value, and header value
matching.
4. Add permissions TOML and schema support for flat runtime hook config.
5. Add config loader tests for MITM hook overlay behavior.
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the network proxy MITM hook unit tests.
3. Ran the core permission profile MITM hook parsing tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Notes
1. Runtime enforcement moved to #20659.
2. User facing PermissionProfile TOML shape remains in #18240.
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.
Concretely, it:
- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format
## Why
The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.
## Backward Compatibility
### Backward compatible
- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.
### Not backward compatible
- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.
Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- treat `requirements.toml` `allowed_domains` and `denied_domains` as
managed network baselines for the proxy
- in restricted modes by default, build the effective runtime policy
from the managed baseline plus user-configured allowlist and denylist
entries, so common hosts can be pre-approved without blocking later user
expansion
- add `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` to pin
the effective allowlist to managed entries, ignore user allowlist
additions, and hard-deny non-managed domains without prompting
- apply `managed_allowed_domains_only` anywhere managed network
enforcement is active, including full access, while continuing to
respect denied domains from all sources
- add regression coverage for merged-baseline behavior, managed-only
behavior, and full-access managed-only enforcement
## Behavior
Assuming `requirements.toml` defines both
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` and
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.
### Default mode
- By default, the effective allowlist is
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` plus user or persisted allowlist
additions.
- By default, the effective denylist is
`experimental_network.denied_domains` plus user or persisted denylist
additions.
- Allowlist misses can go through the network approval flow.
- Explicit denylist hits and local or private-network blocks are still
hard-denied.
- When `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true`, only
managed `allowed_domains` are respected, user allowlist additions are
ignored, and non-managed domains are hard-denied without prompting.
- Denied domains continue to be respected from all sources.
### Full access
- With managed requirements present, the effective allowlist is pinned
to `experimental_network.allowed_domains`.
- With managed requirements present, the effective denylist is pinned to
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.
- There is no allowlist-miss approval path in full access.
- Explicit denylist hits are hard-denied.
- `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` now also
applies in full access, so managed-only behavior remains in effect
anywhere managed network enforcement is active.
## Summary
- delete the network proxy admin server and its runtime listener/task
plumbing
- remove the admin endpoint config, runtime, requirement, protocol,
schema, and debug-surface fields
- update proxy docs to reflect the remaining HTTP and SOCKS listeners
only
## Summary
Adds support for a Unix socket escape hatch so we can bypass socket
allowlisting when explicitly enabled.
## Description
* added a new flag, `network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets` as an
explicit escape hatch
* In codex-network-proxy, enabling that flag now allows any absolute
Unix socket path from x-unix-socket instead of requiring each path to be
explicitly allowlisted. Relative paths are still rejected.
* updated the macOS seatbelt path in core so it enforces the same Unix
socket behavior:
* allowlisted sockets generate explicit network* subpath rules
* allow-all generates a broad network* (subpath "/") rule
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
- enable local-use defaults in network proxy settings: SOCKS5 on, SOCKS5
UDP on, upstream proxying on, and local binding on
- add a regression test that asserts the full
`NetworkProxySettings::default()` baseline
- Fixed managed listener reservation behavior.
Before: we always reserved a loopback SOCKS listener, even when
enable_socks5 = false.
Now: SOCKS listener is only reserved when SOCKS is enabled.
- Fixed /debug-config env output for SOCKS-disabled sessions.
ALL_PROXY now shows the HTTP proxy URL when SOCKS is disabled (instead
of incorrectly showing socks5h://...).
## Validation
- just fmt
- cargo test -p codex-network-proxy
- cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets
As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
`Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
`NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
when it is dropped.)
The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
the appropriate places.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
* #11285
* __->__ #11207
Summary:
- Rename config table from network_proxy to network.
- Flatten allowed_domains, denied_domains, allow_unix_sockets, and
allow_local_binding onto NetworkProxySettings.
- Update runtime, state constraints, tests, and README to the new config
shape.
### Summary
- Adds an optional SOCKS5 listener via `rama-socks5`
- SOCKS5 is disabled by default and gated by config
- Reuses existing policy enforcement and blocked-request recording
- Blocks SOCKS5 in limited mode to prevent method-policy bypass
- Applies bind clamping to the SOCKS5 listener
### Config
New/used fields under `network_proxy`:
- `enable_socks5`
- `socks_url`
- `enable_socks5_udp`
### Scope
- Changes limited to `codex-rs/network-proxy` (+ `codex-rs/Cargo.lock`)
### Testing
```bash
cd codex-rs
just fmt
cargo test -p codex-network-proxy --offline
This add a new crate, `codex-network-proxy`, a local network proxy
service used by Codex to enforce fine-grained network policy (domain
allow/deny) and to surface blocked network events for interactive
approvals.
- New crate: `codex-rs/network-proxy/` (`codex-network-proxy` binary +
library)
- Core capabilities:
- HTTP proxy support (including CONNECT tunneling)
- SOCKS5 proxy support (in the later PR)
- policy evaluation (allowed/denied domain lists; denylist wins;
wildcard support)
- small admin API for polling/reload/mode changes
- optional MITM support for HTTPS CONNECT to enforce “limited mode”
method restrictions (later PR)
Will follow up integration with codex in subsequent PRs.
## Testing
- `cd codex-rs && cargo build -p codex-network-proxy`
- `cd codex-rs && cargo run -p codex-network-proxy -- proxy`
viyatb-oai