## Why
With `allow_local_binding = false`, proxy-aware clients bypassed the managed
proxy for loopback and private IP targets. This prevented explicit local IP and
`localhost` allowlist entries from taking effect.
## What changed
- Route local targets through the managed proxy when local binding is disabled,
while preserving direct access when it is enabled.
- Allow a non-public connection only when its requested IP literal or
`localhost` target is explicitly permitted. Continue blocking private
addresses reached through unrelated hostnames.
- Bypass inherited upstream proxies for non-public targets so Codex applies the
local-target policy directly.
## Testing
Added connector, upstream proxy, environment override, and Linux sandbox
coverage for explicitly allowlisted loopback access.
GitOrigin-RevId: 35e0d73633d5051816e096bc5aa8d586aec5eea4
## Why
`NetworkProxyConfig` only wrapped `NetworkProxySettings` in a single
`network` field. That extra level made runtime callers repeat `.network`
everywhere without representing a real boundary.
## What changed
- move the managed-network fields directly onto `NetworkProxyConfig`
- collapse the matching partial-config wrapper
- update runtime callers and tests to use the direct fields
- keep the user-facing permissions/profile TOML layout unchanged
The internal serialized shape now matches the runtime type itself. This
does not change managed-network behavior or the `config.toml` shape.
## Why
The proxy checks the requested host before opening the upstream
connection, but DNS can resolve an allowed hostname to a loopback,
private, or other non-public address after that first decision. Without
a final check on the actual socket target, a request that looks
acceptable at the hostname layer can still connect to a local service
once resolution completes.
## What changed
- add a shared TCP connector check for direct proxy egress
- use that path for HTTP, `CONNECT`, SOCKS5, and MITM upstream
connections
- keep configured upstream proxy hops on the existing proxy path
- add direct-connector coverage for allowed and rejected local targets
## Security impact
Direct proxy egress now rechecks the resolved socket address before
connecting, closing the gap between hostname policy evaluation and the
final network target.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
viyatb-oai