## What changed
- Allow MCP server names to contain `:`, `@`, `/`, and `.`, enabling names such as `npm:@modelcontextprotocol/server-sequential.thinking`.
- Preserve these names across `mcp add`, `get`, `list`, and `remove`, runtime tool namespaces, and OAuth credential lookup.
- Quote non-bare server names in generated `config.toml` recovery hints and keep similarly escaped OAuth credential names isolated.
## Testing
- Add CLI and runtime round-trip coverage for npm-style names.
- Add snapshot coverage for quoted recovery hints and a regression test for OAuth credential-name collisions.
GitOrigin-RevId: 97e9353cdbc544db4eb2377ddbfa1d2d539b1e04
## What changed
- Resolve stored enterprise IdP sessions against discovered authorization
metadata, requiring the configured issuer, public-client authentication, and
supported ID-JAG token exchange capabilities.
- Bind OIDC identity claims and MCP resource indicators to their configured
issuer, client, and server, and require reauthentication when pinned keyring
credentials are removed or replaced.
- Hold the credential lock while rereading refresh tokens, and isolate
enterprise credentials by reserved namespace and Codex home.
## Testing
- Cover metadata and claim validation, resource binding, credential replacement
and keyring failures, refresh locking, expired ID tokens, and credential
namespace isolation.
GitOrigin-RevId: edce3c6159f7d6831edf72e9608b3fc3f5823c83
## Why
Interactive MCP OAuth must not trust authorization metadata that could route an
authorization code or PKCE verifier to an unrelated token endpoint.
## What changed
- Require an advertised issuer to match the origin that served authorization
metadata.
- Validate authorization and token endpoint origins before starting both
pre-registered and dynamically registered client flows.
- Allow delegated endpoint origins when the server advertises issuer-bound
authorization responses, while retaining narrow compatibility exceptions for
existing providers.
## Testing
Add coverage for rejected untrusted metadata, accepted issuer-bound delegation,
legacy provider exceptions, and both client registration paths.
GitOrigin-RevId: 43c9f94c9f6ba2d23d7e373576cf9fa26861cfc3
## Why
An authorization server discovered for an MCP server can change. A stored refresh token must not be sent to a different issuer than the one that originally granted it.
## What changed
- Persist the discovered authorization server issuer with new OAuth credentials and preserve it across refreshes.
- Validate that issuer against a single pinned metadata snapshot before refreshing or adopting stored refresh credentials.
- Require reauthentication when refresh credentials have no issuer or the issuer changed. An unexpired access token can still be used without exposing its refresh token.
## Testing
Add coverage for issuer persistence, missing and changed issuers, metadata changes during startup, and refresh-token preservation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 07e48ba892f627428a28bbed5cca4ad703e2a5fd
## Why
Headers configured for an MCP resource can contain credentials and must not be
forwarded to a different origin during OAuth discovery, registration, or token
exchange.
## What changed
- Apply configured resource headers only to OAuth requests on the MCP resource
origin, while allowing OAuth-generated headers to take precedence.
- Follow credentialed OAuth redirects only when each destination remains on the
resource origin. Preserve redirect method semantics, the overall timeout, the
response size limit, and a maximum of 10 redirects.
- Use the Codex MCP user agent for requests to authorization-server origins.
## Testing
Add coverage for cross-origin header isolation, same-origin dynamic client
registration redirects, OAuth header precedence, token refresh, timeout
accounting, and response size limits.
GitOrigin-RevId: 609d06e2b065e4aa9ca5382b4ae60455f9e26db9
## What changed
- Cover non-blocking credential probes when the file or secrets store is locked, including retaining only a matching prior credential snapshot and recovering after the lock is released.
- Extend the streamable HTTP OAuth round trip to verify that user turns continue during store contention, newly discovered servers recover after contention, and logged-out servers do not reuse authenticated connections.
- Cover reconciliation of authentication failures and effective `Authorization` headers.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8e377644001bd0be04dc9f79841080094d09d199
## Why
Refreshing MCP connection identities should not stall the async executor while another process holds the OAuth credential-store lock.
## What changed
- Probe file and secrets credential stores without waiting during runtime refreshes, retaining the last known credentials when the store is contended.
- Reuse unchanged authentication failures while credentials are temporarily unavailable instead of restarting the connection.
- Run blocking credential loads on a blocking worker during MCP client construction.
- Allow OAuth fallback when a configured authorization header is missing, empty, or invalid.
GitOrigin-RevId: 38dad5606da9a1ceb30fe945000ec9151a5058fa
## Why
Concurrent MCP startup and status checks should not serialize when they only read the shared credential store. Repeated reads of the encrypted MCP OAuth store also needlessly decrypted unchanged contents.
## What changed
- Use shared locks for `File` and `Secrets` credential reads while keeping saves and deletes exclusive.
- Cache decrypted MCP OAuth secrets by store path, ciphertext, and passphrase, and invalidate the cache after writes.
## Testing
- Cover concurrent readers, reader/writer exclusion, shared credential loads, and cache invalidation after updates and deletes.
GitOrigin-RevId: f13512e6404d4919879ba5ba77a3e34e52b35640
## What changed
- Require callers to provide an HTTP client for MCP OAuth discovery and login, removing the separate direct `reqwest` path.
- Use the shared `http` and `url` types throughout the MCP client and drop its direct `reqwest` dependency.
- Preserve configured MCP headers when routing OAuth discovery through the provided client.
## Testing
- Add coverage that routed OAuth discovery forwards configured headers.
GitOrigin-RevId: 1345f56bd794626533133447597a5908e57b9b48
## What changed
- Update the `rmcp` model and transport integrations for `3.0.0-beta.3`.
- Preserve legacy `elicitation/create` form requests, schema defaults, metadata, and wire-format compatibility while adopting the new elicitation types.
- Harden OAuth discovery by using GET-first discovery without starting an MCP session, preventing cross-origin header redirects, validating authorization-server and callback issuers, and retaining compatibility with metadata that omits an issuer.
- Keep stored OAuth credentials readable and avoid requiring reauthorization after transient refresh failures.
## Testing
- Add coverage for legacy elicitation round trips, OAuth discovery variants, callback issuer validation, credential migration, and refresh failures.
GitOrigin-RevId: 756197d26f3fd347c28c400228f6b3d06ed493b7
## Why
Refreshing MCP runtime state should not restart an unchanged, ready server or
relist its tools.
## What changed
- Reconcile refreshed MCP configuration against the published connection set
and reuse connections whose transport, environment, authentication, OAuth
credentials, and client capabilities are unchanged.
- Keep tool filters, timeouts, metadata, and plugin provenance in the published
server view so those settings can change without reconnecting.
- Update elicitation authority in place for reused connections, and reconnect
when connection-defining inputs or live OAuth credentials change.
## Testing
Added coverage for unchanged-server reuse, view-only and elicitation-policy
updates, connection identity changes, OAuth credential changes, and avoiding
redundant tool listing.
GitOrigin-RevId: f04f5db5fbdde127b6a14f6aa9673112c0b557e7
## What changed
- Extend the lock-contention test helper with a callback that runs while the
aggregate store lock is held.
- Use a scoped worker thread and return its result directly after releasing the
lock.
- Reuse the helper for concurrent update tests covering both file and secrets
credential stores.
GitOrigin-RevId: 74b8b5370456e90ecd39fc2af2f0853594ca4f60
## Why
Concurrent Codex processes can otherwise refresh the same rotating token, and a
cancelled or partially persisted refresh can leave durable and in-memory MCP
credentials out of sync.
## What changed
- Serialize each credential's read-refresh-write transaction across processes,
reread the authoritative store after locking, and adopt credentials refreshed
by another process.
- Keep refresh persistence running after caller cancellation, bound lock and
provider waits independently, and preserve omitted refresh tokens and scopes.
- Fail MCP startup and operations when refresh or persistence fails instead of
continuing with stale credentials, while requiring reauthorization for
missing, unusable, or rejected refresh tokens.
- Exclude OAuth refresh time from the MCP initialization timeout.
## Testing
Add coverage for lock contention, concurrent refreshes, rejected and missing
credentials, storage failures, caller cancellation, and provider timeouts.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4d29b879bec646d2ceb922b526dc793b1a1f5423
[Codex Thread
019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6)
## Stack
Review and merge in order. Every layer is independently correct and
documents its safe stopping point.
1. [openai/codex#30292](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30292) —
aggregate File/Secrets store locking
2. [openai/codex#30293](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30293) —
resolve and lifecycle-pin the exact OAuth store
3. [openai/codex#30416](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30416) —
serialized authoritative refresh transaction
4. [openai/codex#30294](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30294) —
Codex-owned transport refresh and one-shot 401 recovery
5. [openai/codex#30295](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30295) —
login/logout transaction serialization
6. [openai/codex#30296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30296) —
diagnostic-only Auto store drift reporting
**This PR is layer 2.**
## Why
`Auto` is keyring-first with a File fallback, but re-evaluating that
policy during transport reconstruction or persistence can make one MCP
client read from one store and later write to another. With rotating
refresh tokens, the second store may contain an older token. This layer
makes the source selected at client startup explicit and keeps that
authority stable for the client lifecycle.
## What this PR does
- Keeps `resolve_oauth_tokens_from_store_policy` as the single
configured-policy entry point and returns both credentials and the
concrete File or Keyring source that supplied them.
- Puts exact `load`, `save`, and `delete` operations on
`ResolvedOAuthCredentialStore`, making “resolve configured policy” and
“use the selected authority” distinct at call sites.
- Pins the first concrete source in `pinned_credential_store` in the
transport recipe, so initialization retries and session reconstruction
cannot re-evaluate `Auto` and adopt another store.
- Gives `OAuthPersistor` the resolved store and keeps subsequent
persistence and removal on that authority.
- Uses a typed keyring-load error to distinguish aggregate-store
coordination failures from ordinary backend failures; a coordination
failure is surfaced instead of triggering File fallback.
- Keeps login-time `Auto` behavior unchanged: prefer Keyring, fall back
to File when unavailable, and clean up legacy File state after a
successful keyring save.
- Adds structured server/backend context when fallback cleanup fails.
## Explicit decisions and non-goals
- The selection is lifecycle-local and in memory. This PR does not add a
durable backend selector, migration, reconciliation registry, or global
source of truth outside `CODEX_HOME`.
- `Auto` may choose File at the start of a later process if keyring
availability changes. Once this client resolves, a selected-store
failure is returned instead of hot-switching.
- Different `CODEX_HOME` instances remain independent even when they can
access the same Direct keyring credential.
- Cross-process refresh serialization is intentionally not part of this
layer.
## Safe stopping point
This PR can merge alone. A single MCP client no longer hot-switches
credential stores across transport rebuilds or persistence. Two
processes can still refresh the same selected credential concurrently
until layer 3.
## Review size
The net layer is 9 files, +668/−144. The production change remains
focused on store resolution and lifecycle pinning; the largest follow-up
is integration coverage that drives real session recovery.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (99 passed; 5 expected skips)
- Real-client 404 recovery coverage with different Keyring and File
tokens; captured bearer headers prove the stale File token is never sent
- Mutation check: removing the lifecycle pin makes that integration
regression fail by observing the stale File token
[Codex Thread
019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6)
## Stack
Review and merge in order. Every layer is independently correct and
documents its safe stopping point.
1. [openai/codex#30292](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30292) —
aggregate File/Secrets store locking
2. [openai/codex#30293](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30293) —
resolve and lifecycle-pin the exact OAuth store
3. [openai/codex#30416](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30416) —
serialized authoritative refresh transaction
4. [openai/codex#30294](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30294) —
Codex-owned transport refresh and one-shot 401 recovery
5. [openai/codex#30295](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30295) —
login/logout transaction serialization
6. [openai/codex#30296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30296) —
diagnostic-only Auto store drift reporting
**This PR is layer 1.**
## Why
MCP OAuth credentials stored in File or Secrets share one aggregate map.
Concurrent read-modify-write operations for different MCP servers can
both read the same snapshot and let the later write discard the earlier
update. That is a correctness problem independent of refresh-token
rotation.
## What this PR does
- Adds a bounded cross-process lock around aggregate File and Secrets
loads, saves, and deletes.
- Distinguishes aggregate-lock failures from Secrets backend
unavailability, so Auto can fall back only for the latter and cannot
bypass serialization by reading or writing File.
- Keeps Direct keyring operations outside this lock because they are
already per credential.
- Releases the Secrets aggregate lock before legacy File cleanup so
cross-store cleanup cannot create nested aggregate-lock ordering.
- Tests actual contention by waiting for an observed `WouldBlock`,
rather than assuming a sleeping worker reached the lock.
- Tests load and save with only the Secrets lock path broken while
fallback File remains readable and writable.
## Decisions and non-goals
- This lock protects aggregate-store read-modify-write integrity only.
It does not choose a credential authority or serialize an OAuth refresh
transaction.
- The lock is scoped to the active `CODEX_HOME`, matching the aggregate
files it protects.
- Lock waits are bounded, and coordination failures are surfaced rather
than treated as evidence that Secrets is unavailable.
## Safe stopping point
This PR can merge alone. It prevents lost updates and partial aggregate
reads. Auto can still resolve again during a client lifecycle until
layer 2, and concurrent refreshes remain possible until layer 3.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (96 passed; expected environment
skips)
- Focused aggregate File/Secrets lock contention and Auto fallback tests