## Why
Allowing a hostname must not bypass deny or review rules on its resolved IP addresses. Forwarding DNS resolution to an upstream proxy also requires checking whether those address restrictions can still be enforced.
## What changed
- Add `TcpUpstreamProxy` and `set_tcp_upstream_proxy` to require a configured HTTP `CONNECT` next hop for opaque SOCKS TCP traffic. Wait for a successful response before forwarding payloads and preserve bytes read past the response headers.
- Enforce resolved IP deny and review rules at direct connection time, carry destination-scoped authorization through HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM forwarding, and report blocked resolutions as policy denials.
- Recognize equivalent numeric IP spellings for restrictive rules. Permit remote TCP DNS only when local binding is allowed and no deny or review pattern can restrict IP addresses; reject upstream proxy loops.
- Restrict Linux proxy bridges to managed proxy environment keys and supplied loopback ports. Bound concurrent bridge workers and release them after connection failures while allowing queued responses to drain.
- Add test-only Linux DNS name mapping and SOCKS relay helpers with stable synthetic addresses and validation before opening upstream connections.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for CONNECT refusal and buffered tunnel data, resolved-address policy denials, approval handling across policy refreshes, equivalent IP literals, DNS mapping stability, rejected relay requests, and bridge cleanup after resets.
GitOrigin-RevId: bdd6e16de3373d0eb39995f689dad0230680b99e
## What changed
- Add `body_secret_substitution` actions to version 2 MITM configuration, replacing exact opaque placeholders with secrets from environment variables or files within the matching hook's scope.
- Bound body size, expansion, replacement count, and search work. Reject overlapping matches, compressed payloads, trailers, and supplied payload-integrity headers.
- Recompute `Content-Length` and substitute before SigV4 signing so signatures cover the transmitted body.
## Testing
Add coverage for markers split across chunks, expansion limits, invalid payloads, overlapping bindings, secret redaction, and search limits. Add a TLS forwarding test that verifies hook scope and independently checks the signature of the substituted body.
GitOrigin-RevId: fa95c9ae0c8fc8f695e03c0e87a0a4875d8418fd
## What changed
Add a test-only MITM CA constructor and local TLS origin fixtures to exercise AWS SigV4 forwarding:
- Check `aoss` payload hashes and credential replacement for GET and POST requests, while preserving unsigned requests and requests using another access key.
- Verify rejection of unsupported HTTP/1.1 framing and signing headers, and check the forwarded body, payload hash, and signed header presence at an HTTP/2 origin.
- Verify that draining signed request bodies releases buffering capacity before response headers arrive, allowing a ninth request to complete while eight responses remain pending.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4da0a77baace31486e77ad97d9581ec9f51bb34e
## Why
The network proxy previously required AWS signing requests to have an empty body or use `UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD`, preventing signing of nonempty payloads.
## What changed
- Buffer and hash request bodies before signing, then forward the original bytes.
- Add `max_body_bytes` with an 8 MiB default and a 16 MiB maximum, plus a 30-second body read timeout.
- Limit concurrent buffering to eight requests with a five-second capacity wait. Retain reservations while forwarded body data remains alive.
- Reject trailers and mismatched content lengths for buffered payloads while preserving streaming for explicitly unsigned payloads.
## Testing
Add coverage for payload hashing and forwarding, body limits and timeouts, fragmented body collection, and buffer reservation lifetimes. Extend signing tests for S3 path and query canonicalization, header replacement, and secret exclusion from trace logs.
GitOrigin-RevId: 48c18442fa90ae3efb1a4a99a168d07e1be2c496
## Why
Allow workloads to make AWS requests with placeholder credentials while keeping real AWS credentials in the trusted proxy process.
## What changed
- Add an `aws_sigv4` hook action with a placeholder access key ID, region, service, HTTPS port, and credential sources from proxy environment variables or files.
- Re-sign matching requests after network and hook authorization and header transformations, using the configured credentials and optional session token.
- Support empty payloads and explicitly unsigned payloads, including streaming unsigned S3 uploads. Reject selected requests with incompatible credential scopes, presigned URLs, unsupported streaming signatures, or ambiguous framing through the hook denial path.
- Mark generated credential headers as sensitive and suppress signing SDK trace events that could expose credentials.
## Testing
Add tests for the published AWS IAM signature vector, unsigned S3 uploads with a session token, and rejection of invalid transport, credential scopes, signing inputs, and unsupported bodies.
GitOrigin-RevId: ab4fbbc00ba40a5bb309add521fea6ee2ff6e79e
## Why
Credential substitution needs to authorize the destination and the original request before exposing host secrets. Project configuration must not redirect trusted credential policies, and older clients must reject scoped policies rather than silently apply unconditional injection.
## What changed
- Add hook `schemes` and `ports` constraints and an exact whole-header `placeholder` for secret substitution. Require `network.mitm.version = 2` for these options in permission profiles.
- Restrict placeholder substitution to HTTPS on port 443 and reject missing, mismatched, or duplicate placeholder headers.
- Reject project changes to trusted MITM definitions and their inheritance chains. Allow self-contained project header-stripping policies only when no trusted MITM policy exists.
- Reject ambiguous query values, value-constrained headers, and semicolon paths during authorization, and preserve case-sensitive extension methods.
- Mark resolved secret headers sensitive, reject secret injection into `User-Agent`, restrict substitution headers, and limit secret files to 64 KiB.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for scoped TOML resolution, legacy-format rejection, unknown fields, project policy restrictions, origin and placeholder denials, ambiguous request matching, secret redaction, and hook application after credential brokerage.
GitOrigin-RevId: 78dc115ab6c88c9a734377626429bc4840731f89
## Why
A credential bound to a host with MITM hooks could also be used at an alias without hooks, allowing the proxy to inject the real credential without enforcing hook policy.
## What changed
Reject requests to unhooked aliases when their selected brokered credentials are also bound to a hooked host. Check both HTTP forwarding and MITM requests before replacing dummy credentials, returning `403` with `blocked-by-mitm-hook` for denied requests.
Use the same destination and credential-selection rules for alias checks and injection, including configured URL prefixes, safe paths, equivalent credentials, merged Basic authentication fields, and environment scope.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for built-in and configured provider aliases, IPv6 destinations, credential selection, and unrelated credentials. Add an agent-started proxy test that verifies credential masking and alias denial.
GitOrigin-RevId: 12be41654761cedcf87b170f7661d6566f7a864e
## Why
Resolving unapproved hostnames discloses them to DNS even when the proxy ultimately rejects the request. Allowing local binding in a managed macOS sandbox also granted direct outbound access to port `53`.
## What changed
- Require an allowlist match or policy approval before resolving a hostname for address checks.
- Recheck baseline restrictions after local and remote policy approval so approval cannot bypass explicit denies or local/private address restrictions.
- Preserve DNS checks for inner HTTPS requests after an approved CONNECT, including hosts without a persisted allowlist entry.
- Remove the Seatbelt allowance for external DNS while retaining local binding and loopback proxy access.
## Testing
Add regression tests for zero DNS lookups on unapproved hosts, private-address rejection after approval, local and remote approval ordering, and DNS checks after approved CONNECT requests. Add a macOS Seatbelt child test that verifies external UDP and TCP port `53` access is denied while local binding and proxy connectivity remain available.
GitOrigin-RevId: 490790462c51928e831dd8375ac098bc3a257bac
## What changed
- Add optional `network.mitm_ca` configuration with `certificate_file` and
`private_key_file` for trusted proxy configuration. Require MITM to be enabled
and retain the generated CA when no external CA is configured.
- Validate absolute paths, regular files, file sizes, certificate/key matching,
and Unix private-key permissions. Reject symlinks on Unix, private keys embedded
in certificate files, and external private keys on non-Unix platforms.
- Store derived external-CA trust bundles in the proxy artifact directory,
include only certificates, and skip inherited generated bundles to avoid
retaining stale roots.
- Preserve MITM for external CAs when disabling credential brokerage. Reject
external CA configuration for remote execution, even when the proxy is disabled,
and reject unknown fields in `NetworkProxyConfig`.
- Default the upstream request version adapter to HTTP/1.1 and remove the request
URI from upstream request failure context.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for external CA configuration, mismatched keys, embedded
private keys, non-Unix rejection, trust-bundle placement and contents, stale-root
exclusion, credential-broker toggling, and remote configuration rejection.
GitOrigin-RevId: cb209295c19fbe53a9fa0194f11ff06acccabef6
## Why
Configured HTTP credential destinations need dummy credentials translated inside `CONNECT` and SOCKS5 tunnels, where credential interception previously detected only TLS.
## What changed
- Detect plaintext HTTP for configured credential destinations and proxy requests with URL-scoped credential substitution.
- Keep requests bound to the authorized tunnel destination, rejecting mismatched authorities and nested `CONNECT` requests.
- Support HTTP/2 clients and preserve HTTP upgrades, including `h2c`, and opaque traffic in full mode.
- Enforce limited-mode method restrictions on plaintext HTTP and reject upgrades and opaque traffic.
## Testing
Add end-to-end tests for both tunnel transports covering credential URL scope, request bodies, HTTP/2, destination mismatches, upgrades, lossless opaque forwarding, and limited-mode enforcement.
GitOrigin-RevId: 89262c996ea4ee156c628f9ed8e72b52504b2f6b
## What changed
Move TLS prefix detection into `brokered_tunnel` and carry explicit `BrokeredProtocols` requirements from the credential broker through HTTP `CONNECT` and SOCKS5 tunnel handling. Dispatch on `TunnelProtocol::Tls` or `TunnelProtocol::Opaque`, preserving the initial-read timeout, fragmented TLS header detection, and replay of all inspected bytes.
## Testing
Move the fragmented TLS regression test alongside the detector, retaining coverage for delayed header fragments and lossless prefix replay. Update broker and proxy assertions for the protocol-aware types.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6e5a92d8bdf6db5b59cff7f210c17b01d93ee23b
## What changed
- Add `credential_providers` configuration for environment variables, credential patterns, static or environment-derived URL prefixes, and bearer, token, Basic, or custom header authentication.
- Generate matching dummy credentials and restrict replacement to authorized schemes, hosts, ports, and path prefixes. Scope credentials and destination history to each environment.
- Preserve real credentials for destinations that bypass the proxy with `allow_local_binding`, while providing snapshot redaction and alias matching.
- Validate provider definitions and preserve unchanged providers across configuration reloads.
## Testing
Add coverage for dummy generation, authentication translation, URL restrictions, environment isolation, configuration reloads, and credential restoration for local proxy bypass.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5d60ecc684cf4e9aa7637af33af12179aa0c672a
## Why
With `allow_local_binding = false`, proxy-aware clients bypassed the managed
proxy for loopback and private IP targets. This prevented explicit local IP and
`localhost` allowlist entries from taking effect.
## What changed
- Route local targets through the managed proxy when local binding is disabled,
while preserving direct access when it is enabled.
- Allow a non-public connection only when its requested IP literal or
`localhost` target is explicitly permitted. Continue blocking private
addresses reached through unrelated hostnames.
- Bypass inherited upstream proxies for non-public targets so Codex applies the
local-target policy directly.
## Testing
Added connector, upstream proxy, environment override, and Linux sandbox
coverage for explicitly allowlisted loopback access.
GitOrigin-RevId: 35e0d73633d5051816e096bc5aa8d586aec5eea4
## Why
Codex child processes can inherit injectable local credentials directly,
which lets commands read and exfiltrate the real values. This
experimental slice keeps supported workflows working while moving those
credentials behind the managed network proxy.
This PR contains only the proxy-owned broker implementation. The Codex
config and runtime integration is stacked separately in #29752.
## What changed
- discover supported credentials during child setup, retain real values
only in the in-memory proxy broker, and replace them with shaped dummy
values
- require a presented dummy to select a stored credential and preserve
unrelated explicit authorization headers
- bind GitHub cloud, GitHub Enterprise, and OpenAI credentials to their
intended hosts
- inject credentials only into TLS traffic by default; plaintext
injection requires the explicit dangerous opt-in
- use TLS ClientHello routing for CONNECT so non-TLS protocols remain
opaque tunnels
- expose a pure API that identifies environment keys still holding
broker-generated dummies without mutating the caller's environment
## Scope
- supported credentials: `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`,
`GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, and `OPENAI_API_KEY`
- GitHub cloud credentials match `github.com`, `api.github.com`, and
`*.ghe.com`
- GitHub Enterprise credentials match only the normalized non-cloud
`GH_HOST`
- OpenAI API keys match only `api.openai.com`
- this does not cover SSH agents, kube client certificates, filesystem
secret discovery, or context-injected secret scrubbing
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy` (191 passed)
- focused opaque CONNECT, plaintext opt-in, dummy-selection, and
child-isolation regressions passed
- scoped Clippy check for `codex-network-proxy` passed
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
The managed MITM trust bundle must be readable by sandboxed commands.
Persisting its sibling CA private key under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy`
therefore requires a deny-read sandbox rule, but the Windows unelevated
backend rejects deny-read paths and WSL1's legacy Landlock path cannot
enforce that rule.
A persistent OS credential store also does not provide the same
cross-platform boundary from other processes running as the same user.
Keeping the signer inside the network proxy process avoids both
problems: ordinary sandbox setup stays independent of CA-key state, and
no private signing key is exposed through the filesystem or a persistent
credential record.
## What
- generate one managed CA per proxy process and retain its private
signer only in proxy memory
- emit only content-addressed public CA certificates and trust bundles
under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy`
- hold a cross-process lease for each active public certificate and
prune artifacts from inactive proxy processes
- keep all CA ownership in `codex-network-proxy`; no `codex-core` or
sandbox-policy changes
- validate generated trust-bundle paths by their content hash
- keep the public bundle readable by sandboxed commands on Windows,
WSL1, macOS, and Linux
The independent startup custom-CA follow-up is #29014.
## Validation
- `CODEX_HOME=/private/tmp/codex-test-home-network-proxy just test -p
codex-network-proxy` (179 tests)
- `just bazel-lock-check`
- `just fix -p codex-network-proxy`
- `just fmt`
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why
When Codex starts with a custom CA override such as
`SSL_CERT_FILE=/path/to/corp-ca.pem codex`, `rustls-native-certs` treats
that override as a replacement for the platform trust store. The managed
proxy then rewrites child CA variables to its generated bundle, so the
custom root or the ordinary platform roots can be lost. The proxy's
upstream TLS connector must trust the same roots or private and
corporate upstream certificates still fail after interception.
## What
- load platform-native roots without consulting inherited CA override
variables
- append certificates from the existing curated startup CA file
variables and `SSL_CERT_DIR`
- share those platform and startup roots with the MITM upstream rustls
connector
- exclude the Codex managed MITM CA from upstream trust
- normalize OpenSSL `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` blocks while dropping trailing
trust metadata
- skip an inherited current Codex-managed bundle so nested launches do
not duplicate it
- append the Codex managed MITM CA to the child-facing bundle
- copy certificate material only, so a private key or unrelated text
colocated in a startup file is never exposed through the public bundle
This is intentionally limited to CA paths present when Codex starts. It
does not parse inline shell assignments or add per-command bundle
materialization.
This changes only `codex-network-proxy` and dependency metadata; it does
not touch `codex-core` or sandbox orchestration.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-network-proxy`
- includes an end-to-end upstream TLS test using a server trusted only
by the startup custom CA
- `just fix -p codex-network-proxy`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Parent PR: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy request path.
3. This PR changes the user facing PermissionProfile TOML shape.
## Why
1. The broader goal is to make MITM clamping usable from the same
permission profile that already controls network behavior.
2. This PR is the config UX layer for the stack. It moves MITM policy
into `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` instead of exposing the flat
runtime shape to users.
3. The named hook and action tables belong here because users need
reusable policy blocks that are easy to review, while the proxy runtime
only needs a flat hook list.
4. This PR validates action refs during config parsing so mistakes in
the user facing policy fail before a proxy session starts.
5. Keeping the lowering here lets the proxy keep its simpler runtime
model and lets PermissionProfile remain the single source of network
permission policy.
## Summary
1. Keep MITM policy inside `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` so the
selected PermissionProfile owns network proxy policy.
2. Use named MITM hooks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.hooks.<name>]`.
3. Put host, methods, path prefixes, query, headers, body, and action
refs on the hook table.
4. Define reusable action blocks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.actions.<name>]`.
5. Represent action blocks with `NetworkMitmActionToml`, then lower them
into the proxy runtime action config.
6. Reject unknown refs, empty refs, and empty action blocks during
config parsing.
7. Keep the runtime hook model unchanged by lowering config into the
existing proxy hook list.
8. Preserve the #20659 activation fix for nested MITM policy.
## Example
```toml
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm]
enabled = true
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.hooks.github_write]
host = "api.github.com"
methods = ["POST", "PUT"]
path_prefixes = ["/repos/openai/"]
action = ["strip_auth"]
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.actions.strip_auth]
strip_request_headers = ["authorization"]
```
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the core MITM config parsing and validation tests.
3. Ran the core PermissionProfile MITM proxy activation tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
7. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
---------
Co-authored-by: Winston Howes <winston@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. This PR wires runtime enforcement.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. After the hook model exists, the proxy needs a separate behavior
change that can be tested at the request path.
2. This PR makes hooked HTTPS hosts require MITM, evaluates inner
requests after CONNECT, mutates headers for matching hooks, and blocks
hooked hosts when no hook matches.
3. It also fixes the activation path so a permission profile with MITM
hook policy starts the managed proxy.
4. Keeping this separate from #18868 lets reviewers focus on runtime
effects, telemetry, and request mutation.
## Summary
1. Store compiled MITM hooks in network proxy state.
2. Require MITM for hooked hosts even when network mode is full.
3. Evaluate inner HTTPS requests against host specific hooks.
4. Apply hook actions by replacing request headers before forwarding.
5. Block hooked hosts when no hook matches and record block telemetry.
6. Treat profile MITM hook policy as managed proxy policy so the proxy
starts when needed.
7. Keep the duplicate authorization header replacement and query
preserving request rebuild in this runtime PR.
8. Add runtime tests and README guidance for hook enforcement.
## Validation
1. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
2. Ran the hooked host CONNECT test.
3. Ran the authorization header replacement test.
4. Ran the core permission profile proxy activation test for MITM hooks.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Why
The proxy checks the requested host before opening the upstream
connection, but DNS can resolve an allowed hostname to a loopback,
private, or other non-public address after that first decision. Without
a final check on the actual socket target, a request that looks
acceptable at the hostname layer can still connect to a local service
once resolution completes.
## What changed
- add a shared TCP connector check for direct proxy egress
- use that path for HTTP, `CONNECT`, SOCKS5, and MITM upstream
connections
- keep configured upstream proxy hops on the existing proxy path
- add direct-connector coverage for allowed and rejected local targets
## Security impact
Direct proxy egress now rechecks the resolved socket address before
connecting, closing the gap between hostname policy evaluation and the
final network target.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>