## Why
With the local model layer and app-server routing in place from PR1,
this PR moves the active TUI runtime onto app-server notifications. The
affected pieces share the same event flow, so the command surface,
session state, bottom-pane prompts, chat rendering, history/status
views, and tests move together to keep the stacked branch buildable.
This PR also removes the obsolete compatibility surface that is no
longer used after the migration. The proposed protocol-boundary verifier
layer was dropped from the stack; enforcing that final boundary will be
simpler once `codex-tui` no longer needs any `codex_protocol`
references.
This PR is part 2 of a 2-PR stack:
1. Add TUI-owned replacement models and extract app-server event
routing.
2. Move the active TUI flow to app-server notifications and delete
obsolete adapter code.
## What changed
- Rewired app command and session handling to use app-server request and
notification shapes.
- Moved approval overlays, request-user-input flows, MCP elicitation,
realtime events, and review commands onto the app-server-facing model
surface.
- Updated chat rendering, history cells, status views, multi-agent UI,
replay state, and TUI tests to use app-server notifications plus the
local models introduced in PR1.
- Deleted `codex-rs/tui/src/app/app_server_adapter.rs` and the
superseded `chatwidget/tests/background_events.rs` fixture path.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
- Top of stack: `cargo test -p codex-tui`
## Why
Fixes#19632.
When a delegated agent requests approval for an in-progress file change,
the parent TUI handles that request from an inactive thread. The app
server already sent the `FileChange` item with the proposed diff, but
the inactive-thread approval path was not recovering and rendering it
the same way as the active-thread path.
The result was an inconsistent approval prompt: main-thread edits show a
normal patch preview history item before the approval modal, while
delegated edits did not show that preview in the transcript flow.
## What Changed
- Recover buffered or historical `FileChange` item changes when building
inactive-thread file-change approval requests.
- Reuse the app-server file-change conversion helper for both live
transcript rendering and inactive-thread approvals.
- Render recovered delegated patches as a normal patch preview history
cell before the approval modal.
- Keep apply-patch approval modals focused on the decision prompt and
optional metadata; they do not render a synthetic command line or embed
the diff body.
## Manual Repro And Verification
I manually reproduced the issue using a file under `~/Desktop` so the
write would require approval.
Before the fix:
1. Ask the main thread: `Use apply_patch, not shell redirection or
Python, to create ~/Desktop/bug1.txt with three short lines.`
2. Observe the expected TUI shape: the transcript shows a normal patch
preview such as `• Added ~/Desktop/bug1.txt (+N -0)` above the approval
modal, and the modal contains only the approval prompt/options without a
synthetic command line.
3. Ask for the delegated path: `Spawn a worker. Have it use apply_patch,
not shell redirection or Python, to create ~/Desktop/bug1.txt with four
short lines.`
4. Observe the delegated approval is inconsistent: the parent view does
not render the proposed patch as the normal transcript preview before
the modal, so the diff context is missing from the stream or appears
inside the modal instead of in the history flow.
After the fix:
1. Repeat the delegated worker prompt with `apply_patch`.
2. Confirm the parent view renders the same normal patch preview history
cell (`• Added ~/Desktop/bug1.txt (+N -0)` plus the diff) immediately
before the approval modal.
3. Confirm the approval modal remains focused on the decision prompt.
For delegated approvals it may show the worker thread label, but it
should not show a `$ apply_patch` command line or embed the diff body in
the modal.
## Why
`item/permissions/requestApproval` sends a requested permission profile
to app-server clients. The core profile already stores filesystem
permissions as `entries`, but the v2 compatibility conversion used the
legacy `read`/`write` projection whenever possible and left `entries`
unset.
That made the request ambiguous for clients that consume the canonical
v2 shape: `permissions.fileSystem.entries` was missing even though
filesystem access was being requested. A client that rendered or echoed
grants from `entries` could treat the request as having no filesystem
permission entries, then return an empty or incomplete grant. The
app-server intersects responses with the original request, so omitted
filesystem permissions are denied.
## What Changed
- Populate `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions.entries` when converting
legacy read/write roots for request permission payloads, while
preserving `read` and `write` for compatibility.
- Mark `read` and `write` as transitional schema fields in the generated
app-server schema.
- Add regression coverage for the v2 conversion, the app-server
`item/permissions/requestApproval` round trip, and TUI app-server
approval conversion expectations.
- Refresh generated JSON and TypeScript schema fixtures.
## Verification
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_permissions_round_trip`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
converts_request_permissions_into_granted_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
resolves_permissions_and_user_input_through_app_server_request_id`
## Why
#18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
`PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
`glob_scan_max_depth`.
That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
permission entries look equivalent.
## What changed
- Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
- Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
not silently dropped.
- Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
`AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
- Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
merging, and intersection.
- Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* #18277
* #18276
* #18275
* __->__ #18713
## Why
`PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
## What changed
This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
`PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
full-disk legacy access.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
Addresses #16283
Problem: TUI app-server permission approvals could drop filesystem
grants because request and response payloads were round-tripped through
mismatched camelCase and snake_case JSON shapes.
Solution: Replace the lossy JSON round-trips with typed app-server/core
permission conversions so requested and granted permission profiles,
including filesystem paths and scope, are preserved end to end.
