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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Michael Bolin
|
3fd79b7986 |
app-server: use profile ids in v2 permission params (#23360)
## Why The v2 app-server permission profile fields are experimental, but the previous migration kept a legacy object payload for profile selection. That made clients aware of server-owned `activePermissionProfile` metadata such as `extends`, and it kept a `legacy_additional_writable_roots` path even though `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` now owns runtime workspace-root selection. This PR makes the client contract match the intended model: clients select a permission profile by id, and the server resolves and reports active profile provenance in response payloads. Follow-up to #22611. ## What Changed - Changed `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start` permission profile selection to plain profile id strings. - Changed `command/exec.permissionProfile` to a plain profile id string for the same client/server ownership split. - Removed `PermissionProfileSelectionParams` and the legacy `{ type: "profile", modifications: [...] }` compatibility deserializer. - Updated app-server, TUI, and `codex exec` call sites to send only ids, while keeping `activePermissionProfile` as server response metadata. - Updated app-server docs and schema fixtures for the revised `command/exec.permissionProfile` shape. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test -p codex-app-server` - `cargo test -p codex-exec` - `RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23360). * #23368 * __->__ #23360 |
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Michael Bolin
|
9025550709 |
app-server-protocol: remove PermissionProfile from API (#22924)
## Why The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally; exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand details that should remain implementation-level. The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type space and the core protocol model. Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so we don't need to be too finicky about these changes. ## What Changed - Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface, including generated schema and TypeScript exports. - Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to `ActivePermissionProfile`. - Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics. - Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims. |
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Michael Bolin
|
83bbb4f326 |
app-server: stop returning thread permission profiles (#22792)
## Why The app-server thread lifecycle API should no longer expose the full `PermissionProfile` value. After the permissions-profile migration, clients should round-trip only the active profile identity through `activePermissionProfile` and `permissions` when that identity is known. The full profile is server-side config. Treating a response-derived legacy sandbox projection as a new local profile can lose named-profile restrictions and accidentally widen permissions on the next turn. The legacy `sandbox` response field remains only as the compatibility/display fallback. ## What Changed - Removed `permissionProfile` from `ThreadStartResponse`, `ThreadResumeResponse`, and `ThreadForkResponse`. - Stopped populating that field in app-server thread start/resume/fork responses. - Updated embedded exec/TUI response mapping to derive display permission state from local config or the legacy sandbox fallback instead of a response profile value. - Added a TUI turn override shape that distinguishes preserving server permissions, selecting an active profile id, and sending a legacy sandbox for an explicit local override. - Preserved remote app-server permissions across turns by sending `permissions` only when an `activePermissionProfile` id is known, and otherwise sending no sandbox override unless the user selected a local override. - Kept embedded `thread/resume` hydration server-authored when `activePermissionProfile` is absent, which matches the live-thread attach path where the server ignores requested overrides. - Updated the app-server README to remove the obsolete lifecycle response `permissionProfile` reference. The remaining `permissionProfile` README references are request-side permission overrides. - Regenerated app-server JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures. - Kept the generated typed response enum exempt from `large_enum_variant`, matching the existing payload enum exemption after the lifecycle response variants shrank. ## How To Review Start with `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/thread.rs` to confirm the response shape, then check the response construction in `codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors`. The generated schema and TypeScript fixture changes are mechanical follow-through from the protocol removal. The TUI behavior is the delicate part: review `codex-rs/tui/src/app_server_session.rs` for response hydration and turn-start override projection, then `codex-rs/tui/src/app/thread_routing.rs` for the decision about whether the next turn should preserve the server snapshot, send an active profile id, or send a legacy sandbox for an explicit local override. ## Verification - `just write-app-server-schema` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol thread_lifecycle_responses_default_missing_optional_fields` - `cargo test -p codex-exec session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_permission_profile_from_config` - `cargo test -p codex-tui --lib thread_response` - `cargo test -p codex-tui turn_permissions_` - `cargo test -p codex-tui resume_response_restores_turns_from_thread_items` - `cargo test -p codex-analytics track_response_only_enqueues_analytics_relevant_responses` - `just fix -p codex-analytics` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-tui` - `just argument-comment-lint` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22792). * #22795 * __->__ #22792 |
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Michael Bolin
|
8a5306ff88 |
app-server: use permission ids and runtime workspace roots (#22611)
## Why This PR builds on [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) and is the app-server side of the migration from mutable per-turn `SandboxPolicy` replacement toward selecting immutable permission profiles by id plus mutable runtime workspace roots. Once permission profiles can carry their own immutable `workspace_roots`, app-server no longer needs to mutate the selected `PermissionProfile` just to represent thread-specific filesystem context. The mutable part now lives on the thread as explicit `runtimeWorkspaceRoots`, while `:workspace_roots` remains symbolic until the sandbox is realized for a turn. ## What Changed - Replaced the v2 permission-selection wrapper surface with plain profile ids for `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`. - Removed the API surface for profile modifications (`PermissionProfileSelectionParams`, `PermissionProfileModificationParams`, `ActivePermissionProfileModification`). - Added experimental `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` fields to the thread lifecycle and turn-start APIs. - Threaded runtime workspace roots through core session/thread snapshots, turn overrides, app-server request handling, and command execution permission resolution. - Kept session permission state symbolic so later runtime root updates and cwd-only implicit-root retargeting rebind `:workspace_roots` correctly. - Updated the embedded clients just enough to send and restore the new thread state. - Refreshed the generated schema/TypeScript artifacts and the app-server README to match the new contract. ## Verification Targeted coverage for this layer lives in: - `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/tests.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_start.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_resume.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs` - `codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs` The key regression checks exercise that: - `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` resolve against the effective cwd on thread start. - Profile-declared workspace roots are excluded from the runtime workspace roots returned by app-server. - A turn-level runtime workspace-root update persists onto the thread and is returned by `thread/resume`. - A named permission profile selected on one turn remains symbolic so a later runtime-root-only turn update changes the actual sandbox writes. - A cwd-only turn update retargets the implicit runtime cwd root while preserving additional runtime roots. - The protocol fixtures and generated client artifacts stay in sync with the string-based permission selection contract. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22611). * #22612 * __->__ #22611 |
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Michael Bolin
|
c25d905f61 |
permissions: support workspace roots in profiles (#22610)
## Why This is the configuration/model half of the alternative permissions migration we discussed as a comparison point for [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) and [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402). The old `workspace-write` model mixes three concerns that we want to keep separate: - reusable profile rules that should stay immutable once selected - user/runtime workspace roots from `cwd`, `--add-dir`, and legacy workspace-write config - internal Codex writable roots such as memories, which should not be shown as user workspace roots This PR gives permission profiles first-class `workspace_roots` so users can opt multiple repositories into the same `:workspace_roots` rules without using broad absolute-path write grants. It also starts separating the raw selected profile from the effective runtime profile by making `Permissions` expose explicit accessors instead of public mutable fields. A representative `config.toml` looks like this: ```toml default_permissions = "dev" [permissions.dev.workspace_roots] "~/code/openai" = true "~/code/developers-website" = true [permissions.dev.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" ".codex" = "read" ".git" = "read" ".vscode" = "read" ``` If Codex starts in `~/code/codex` with that profile selected, the effective workspace-root set becomes: - `~/code/codex` from the runtime `cwd` - `~/code/openai` from the profile - `~/code/developers-website` from the profile The `:workspace_roots` rules are materialized across each root, so `.git`, `.codex`, and `.vscode` stay scoped the same way everywhere. Runtime additions such as `--add-dir` can still layer on later stack entries without mutating the selected profile. ## Stack Shape This PR intentionally stops before the profile-identity cleanup in [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) so the base review stays focused on config loading, workspace-root materialization, and compatibility with legacy `workspace-write`. The representation in this PR is therefore transitional: `Permissions` carries enough state to distinguish the raw constrained profile from the effective runtime profile, and there are still call sites that must keep the active profile identity and constrained profile value in sync. The follow-up PR replaces that with a single resolved profile state (`ResolvedPermissionProfile` / `PermissionProfileState`) that keeps the profile id, immutable `PermissionProfile`, and profile-declared workspace roots together. That follow-up removes APIs such as `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` where separate arguments could drift out of sync. Downstream PRs then build on this base to switch app-server turn updates to profile ids plus runtime workspace roots and to finish the user-visible summary behavior. Reviewers should judge this PR as the workspace-roots foundation, not as the final in-memory shape of selected permission profiles. ## Review Guide Suggested review order: 1. Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs`. This is the main shape change in the base slice. `Permissions` now stores a private raw `Constrained<PermissionProfile>` plus runtime `workspace_roots`. Callers use `permission_profile()` when they need the raw constrained value and `effective_permission_profile()` when they need a materialized runtime profile. As noted above, [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) replaces this transitional shape with a resolved profile state that keeps identity and profile data together. 2. Review `codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs` and `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs`. These add `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]`, resolve enabled entries relative to the policy cwd, and keep `:workspace_roots` deny-read glob patterns symbolic until the actual roots are known. 3. Review `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` and `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`. These add the policy/profile materialization helpers that expand exact `:workspace_roots` entries and scoped deny-read globs over every workspace root. This is also where `ActivePermissionProfileModification` is removed from the core model. 4. Review the legacy bridge in `Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides` and `Config::set_legacy_sandbox_policy`. This is where legacy `workspace-write` roots become runtime workspace roots, while Codex internal writable roots stay internal and do not appear as user-facing workspace roots. 5. Then skim downstream call sites. The interesting pattern is raw-vs-effective access: state/proxy/bwrap paths keep the raw constrained profile, while execution, summaries, and user-visible status use the effective profile and workspace-root list. ## What Changed - added `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` to the config model and schema - added runtime `workspace_roots` state to `Config`/`Permissions` and `ConfigOverrides` - made `Permissions` profile fields private and replaced direct mutation with accessors/setters - added `PermissionProfile` and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for materializing `:workspace_roots` exact paths and deny-read globs across all roots - moved legacy additional writable roots into runtime workspace-root state instead of active profile modifications - removed `ActivePermissionProfileModification` and its app-server protocol/schema export - updated sandbox/status summary paths so internal writable roots are not reported as user workspace roots ## Verification Strategy The targeted tests cover the behavior at the layers where regressions are most likely: - `codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs` verifies config loading, legacy workspace-root seeding, effective profile materialization, and memory-root handling. - `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs` verifies profile `workspace_roots` parsing and `:workspace_roots` scoped/glob compilation. - `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` unit tests verify exact and glob materialization over multiple workspace roots. - `codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs` and `codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs` verify the user-facing summaries show effective workspace roots and hide internal writes. I also ran `cargo check --tests` locally after the latest stack refresh to catch cross-crate API breakage from the private-field/accessor changes. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22610). * #22612 * #22611 * #22683 * __->__ #22610 |
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Michael Bolin
|
01d93fd9fc |
permissions: canonicalize workspace_roots and danger-full-access names (#22624)
## Why This is a small precursor to the larger permissions-migration work. Both the comparison stack in [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) / [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402) and the alternate stack in [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) / [#22611](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22611) / [#22612](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22612) are easier to review if the terminology is already settled underneath them. Because `:project_roots` and `:danger-no-sandbox` have not shipped as stable user-facing surface area, carrying them forward as aliases would just add more migration logic to the later stacks. This PR removes that ambiguity now so the follow-on work can rely on one spelling for each built-in concept. ## What Changed - renamed the config-facing special filesystem key from `:project_roots` to `:workspace_roots` - dropped unpublished `:project_roots` parsing support in `core/src/config/permissions.rs`, so new config only recognizes `:workspace_roots` - renamed the built-in full-access permission profile id from `:danger-no-sandbox` to `:danger-full-access` - dropped unpublished `:danger-no-sandbox` support entirely, including the old active-profile canonicalization path, and added explicit rejection coverage for the legacy id - introduced shared built-in permission-profile id constants in `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs` - updated `core`, `app-server`, and `tui` call sites that special-case built-in profiles to use the shared constants and canonical ids - updated tests and the Linux sandbox README to use `:workspace_roots` / `:danger-full-access` ## Verification I focused verification on the three places this rename can regress: config parsing, active-profile identity surfaced back out of `core`, and user/server call sites that special-case built-in profiles. Targeted checks: - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_table` - `config::tests::default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications` - `config::tests::default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile` - `config::tests::legacy_danger_no_sandbox_is_rejected` - `workspace_root` filtered `codex-core` tests - `request_processors::thread_processor::thread_processor_tests::thread_processor_behavior_tests::requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` - `suite::v2::turn_start::turn_start_rejects_invalid_permission_selection_before_starting_turn` - `status::tests::status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions` - `status::tests::status_permissions_full_disk_managed_with_network_is_danger_full_access` - `app_server_session::tests::embedded_turn_permissions_use_active_profile_selection` |
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Felipe Coury
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e16b4e46d4 | fix(tui): handle hidden app git directives (#21946) | ||
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Eric Traut
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c03eb20d8d |
Fix side conversation config inheritance (#22106)
Addresses #22101 ## Why Side conversations are ephemeral forks of the active thread, but `/side` was building its fork config from the app-level config after refreshing it from disk. If the parent thread had runtime settings that differed from the current persisted defaults, such as a changed model, reasoning effort, permissions, reviewer, or fast-mode selection, the side conversation could start with different behavior than its parent. ## What changed - Build side fork config from the active parent `ChatWidget` config, then overlay the parent thread's effective model, reasoning effort, service tier, and fast-mode opt-out state. - Forward model reasoning summary, verbosity, personality, web search mode, and service-tier overrides through TUI app-server start/resume/fork lifecycle params. - Add focused tests for parent runtime inheritance, side developer guardrail preservation, and lifecycle param forwarding. |
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rhan-oai
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21295f47e2 |
[codex-tui] pass thread source for tui threads (#21401)
## Summary - mark TUI-created thread starts and forks with explicit `thread_source = user` - add focused coverage for embedded and remote lifecycle request builders ## Why Thread analytics now consume an explicit thread-level source classification instead of inferring it from `session_source`. The TUI still omitted that field, so TUI-created interactive threads would continue to land as `null` even after the new analytics plumbing shipped. ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-tui app_server_session --lib` |
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pakrym-oai
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2004173cd7 |
Move message history out of core (#21278)
## Why Message history was implemented inside `codex-core` and surfaced through core protocol ops and `SessionConfiguredEvent` fields even though the current consumer is TUI-local prompt recall. That made core own UI history persistence and exposed `history_log_id` / `history_entry_count` through surfaces that app-server and other clients do not need. This change moves message history persistence out of core and keeps the recall plumbing local to the TUI. ## What changed - Added a new `codex-message-history` crate for appending, looking up, trimming, and reading metadata from `history.jsonl`. - Removed core protocol history ops/events: `AddToHistory`, `GetHistoryEntryRequest`, and `GetHistoryEntryResponse`. - Removed `history_log_id` and `history_entry_count` from `SessionConfiguredEvent` and updated exec/MCP/test fixtures accordingly. - Updated the TUI to dispatch local app events for message-history append/lookup and keep its persistent-history metadata in TUI session state. ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-message-history -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-exec event_processor_with_json_output` - `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server outgoing_message` - `cargo test -p codex-tui` - `just fix -p codex-message-history -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-exec -p codex-mcp-server` |
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Ahmed IbrahimandCodex
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be1d3cff93 |
2- Use string service tiers in session protocol (#20971)
## Summary - break service tier session/op/app-server protocol fields from the closed enum to string tier ids - send the service tier string directly through model requests, prewarm, compaction, memories, and TUI/app-server turn starts - regenerate app-server protocol JSON/TypeScript schemas, removing the standalone ServiceTier TS enum ## Verification - just fmt - cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui - just write-app-server-schema --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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jif-oai
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5ecff05196 |
feat(app-server): move v2 sessionId onto Thread (#21336)
## Why `session_id` and `thread_id` are separate identities after #20437, but app-server only surfaced `sessionId` on the `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, and `thread/fork` response envelopes. Other thread-bearing surfaces such as `thread/list`, `thread/read`, `thread/started`, `thread/rollback`, `thread/metadata/update`, and `thread/unarchive` either lacked the grouping key or forced clients to special-case those three responses. Making `sessionId` part of the reusable `Thread` payload gives every v2 API surface one place to expose session-tree identity. ## Mental model 1. thread.sessionId lives on `Thread` 2. It is a view/runtime identity for the current live session tree, not durable stored lineage metadata 3. When app-server has a live loaded thread, it copies the real value from core’s session_configured.session_id 4. When it only has stored/unloaded data, it falls back to thread.sessionId = thread.id ## What changed - Added `sessionId` to the v2 [`Thread`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/8fc9e9b4cf81b6f61d432e71f1eb266f6f104b63/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/thread_data.rs#L105-L109). - Removed the duplicate top-level `sessionId` fields from `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, and `thread/fork`; clients should now read `response.thread.sessionId`. - Populated `thread.sessionId` when building live thread responses, replaying loaded threads, and returning stored-thread summaries so the field is present across start, resume, fork, list, read, rollback, metadata-update, unarchive, and `thread/started` paths. See [`load_thread_from_resume_source_or_send_internal`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/8fc9e9b4cf81b6f61d432e71f1eb266f6f104b63/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_processor.rs#L2824-L2918) and [`thread_from_stored_thread`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/8fc9e9b4cf81b6f61d432e71f1eb266f6f104b63/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_processor.rs#L3671-L3719). - Preserved the stored-thread fallback: if a thread has not been loaded into a live session tree yet, `thread.sessionId` falls back to `thread.id`; once the thread is live again, the field reports the active session tree root. - Regenerated the JSON/TypeScript schemas and updated the app-server README examples to show [`thread.sessionId`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/8fc9e9b4cf81b6f61d432e71f1eb266f6f104b63/codex-rs/app-server/README.md#L306-L310) on the thread object. |
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jif-oaiandCodex
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a98623511b |
feat: add session_id (#20437)
## Summary Related to https://openai.slack.com/archives/C095U48JNL9/p1777537279707449 TLDR: We update the meaning of session ids and thread ids: * thread_id stays as now * session_id become a shared id between every thread under a /root thread (i.e. every sub-agent share the same session id) This PR introduces an explicit `SessionId` and threads it through the protocol/client boundary so `session_id` and `thread_id` can diverge when they need to, while preserving compatibility for older serialized `session_configured` events. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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rhan-oai
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b3d4f1a9f0 |
[codex-analytics] rework thread_source for thread analytics (#20949)
## Summary - make `thread_source` an explicit optional thread-level field on `thread/start`, `thread/fork`, and returned thread payloads - persist `thread_source` in rollout/session metadata so resumed live threads retain the original value - replace the old best-effort `session_source` -> `thread_source` mapping with an explicit caller-supplied analytics classification ## Why Before this change, analytics `thread_source` was populated by a best-effort mapping from `session_source`. `session_source` describes the runtime/client surface, not the actual thread-level origin, so that projection was not accurate enough to distinguish cases such as `user`, `subagent`, `memory_consolidation`, and future thread origins reliably. Making `thread_source` explicit keeps one thread-level analytics field while letting callers provide the real classification directly instead of recovering it indirectly from `session_source`. ## Impact For new analytics events, `thread_source` now reflects the explicit thread-level classification supplied by the caller rather than an inferred value derived from `session_source`. Existing protocol fields remain optional; callers that omit `threadSource` now produce `null` instead of a best-effort inferred value. ## Validation - `just write-app-server-schema` - `cargo test -p codex-analytics -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol --no-run` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol generated_ts_optional_nullable_fields_only_in_params` - `cargo test -p codex-analytics thread_initialized_event_serializes_expected_shape` - `cargo test -p codex-core resume_stopped_thread_from_rollout_preserves_thread_source` |
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rhan-oai
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9e0c191c13 |
add turn items view to app-server turns (#21063)
## Why `Turn.items` currently overloads an empty array to mean either that no items exist or that the server intentionally did not load them for this response. That ambiguity blocks future lazy-loading work where clients need to distinguish unloaded, summary, and fully hydrated turn payloads. ## What changed - add a new `TurnItemsView` enum with `notLoaded`, `summary`, and `full` variants - add required `itemsView` metadata to app-server `Turn` payloads - mark reconstructed persisted history as `full` and live shell-style turn payloads as `notLoaded` - keep current `thread/turns/list` behavior unchanged and document that it still returns `full` turns today - regenerate the JSON and TypeScript protocol fixtures ## Verification - `just write-app-server-schema` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_read_can_include_turns` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_turns_list_can_page_backward_and_forward` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_resume_rejects_history_when_thread_is_running` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-app-server` - `just fmt` |
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Ahmed IbrahimandCodex
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9d579813bb |
1- Add model service tiers metadata (#20969)
## Why The model list needs to carry display-ready service tier metadata so clients can render tier choices with stable IDs, names, and descriptions. A raw speed-tier string list is not enough for richer UI copy or future tier labels. ## What changed - Added `ModelServiceTier` to shared model metadata with string `id`, `name`, and `description` fields. - Added `service_tiers` to `ModelInfo` and `ModelPreset`, preserving empty defaults for older cached model payloads. - Exposed `serviceTiers` on app-server v2 `Model` responses and threaded it through TUI app-server model conversion. - Marked legacy `additional_speed_tiers` / `additionalSpeedTiers` metadata as deprecated in source and generated schema output. - Regenerated app-server protocol JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures, including `ModelServiceTier.ts`. ## Verification - Ran `just write-app-server-schema`. - Did not run local tests per repo instruction; relying on PR CI. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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jif-oai
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0b04d1b3cc |
feat: export and replay effective config locks (#20405)
## Why For reproducibility. A hand-written `config.toml` is not enough to recreate what a Codex session actually ran with because layered config, CLI overrides, defaults, feature aliases, resolved feature config, prompt setup, and model-catalog/session values can all affect the final runtime behavior. This PR adds an effective config lockfile path: one run can export the resolved session config, and a later run can replay that lockfile and fail early if the regenerated effective config drifts. ## What Changed - Add a dedicated `ConfigLockfileToml` wrapper with top-level lockfile metadata plus the replayable config: ```toml version = 1 codex_version = "..." [config] # effective ConfigToml fields ``` - Keep lockfile metadata out of regular `ConfigToml`; replay loads `ConfigLockfileToml` and then uses its nested `config` as the authoritative config layer. - Add `debug.config_lockfile.export_dir` to write `<thread_id>.config.lock.toml` when a root session starts. - Add `debug.config_lockfile.load_path` to replay a saved lockfile and validate the regenerated session lockfile against it. - Add `debug.config_lockfile.allow_codex_version_mismatch` to optionally tolerate Codex binary version drift while still comparing the rest of the lockfile. - Add `debug.config_lockfile.save_fields_resolved_from_model_catalog` so lock creation can either save model-catalog/session-resolved fields or intentionally leave those fields dynamic. - Build lockfiles from the effective config plus resolved runtime values such as model selection, reasoning settings, prompts, service tier, web search mode, feature states/config, memories config, skill instructions, and agent limits. - Materialize feature aliases and custom feature config into the lockfile so replay compares canonical resolved behavior instead of user-authored alias shape. - Strip profile/debug/file-include/environment-specific inputs from generated lockfiles so they contain replayable values rather than the inputs that produced those values. - Surface JSON-RPC server error code/data in app-server client and TUI bootstrap errors so config-lock replay failures include the actual TOML diff. - Regenerate the config schema for the new debug config keys. ## Review Notes The main flow is split across these files: - `config/src/config_toml.rs`: lockfile/debug TOML shapes. - `core/src/config/mod.rs`: loading `debug.config_lockfile.*`, replaying a lockfile as a config layer, and preserving the expected lockfile for validation. - `core/src/session/config_lock.rs`: exporting the current session lockfile and materializing resolved session/config values. - `core/src/config_lock.rs`: lockfile parsing, metadata/version checks, replay comparison, and diff formatting. ## Usage Export a lockfile from a normal session: ```sh codex -c 'debug.config_lockfile.export_dir="/tmp/codex-locks"' ``` Export a lockfile without saving model-catalog/session-resolved fields: ```sh codex -c 'debug.config_lockfile.export_dir="/tmp/codex-locks"' \ -c 'debug.config_lockfile.save_fields_resolved_from_model_catalog=false' ``` Replay a saved lockfile in a later session: ```sh codex -c 'debug.config_lockfile.load_path="/tmp/codex-locks/<thread_id>.config.lock.toml"' ``` If replay resolves to a different effective config, startup fails with a TOML diff. To tolerate Codex binary version drift during replay: ```sh codex -c 'debug.config_lockfile.load_path="/tmp/codex-locks/<thread_id>.config.lock.toml"' \ -c 'debug.config_lockfile.allow_codex_version_mismatch=true' ``` ## Limitations This does not support custom rules/network policies. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core config_lock` - `cargo test -p codex-config` - `cargo test -p codex-thread-manager-sample` |
||
|
Owen Lin
|
5de7992ee5 |
fix(tui): set persist_extended_history: false (#20502)
Large rollouts are no good. This updates the TUI to behave the same as the Codex App, which is also turning it off. |
||
|
Eric Traut
|
f2bc2f26a9 |
Remove core protocol dependency [2/2] (#20325)
## Why With the local model layer and app-server routing in place from PR1, this PR moves the active TUI runtime onto app-server notifications. The affected pieces share the same event flow, so the command surface, session state, bottom-pane prompts, chat rendering, history/status views, and tests move together to keep the stacked branch buildable. This PR also removes the obsolete compatibility surface that is no longer used after the migration. The proposed protocol-boundary verifier layer was dropped from the stack; enforcing that final boundary will be simpler once `codex-tui` no longer needs any `codex_protocol` references. This PR is part 2 of a 2-PR stack: 1. Add TUI-owned replacement models and extract app-server event routing. 2. Move the active TUI flow to app-server notifications and delete obsolete adapter code. ## What changed - Rewired app command and session handling to use app-server request and notification shapes. - Moved approval overlays, request-user-input flows, MCP elicitation, realtime events, and review commands onto the app-server-facing model surface. - Updated chat rendering, history cells, status views, multi-agent UI, replay state, and TUI tests to use app-server notifications plus the local models introduced in PR1. - Deleted `codex-rs/tui/src/app/app_server_adapter.rs` and the superseded `chatwidget/tests/background_events.rs` fixture path. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests` - Top of stack: `cargo test -p codex-tui` |
||
|
Ahmed IbrahimandCodex
|
8a97f3cf03 |
realtime: rename provider session ids (#20361)
## Summary Codex is repurposing `session` to mean a thread group, so the realtime provider session id should no longer use `session_id` / `sessionId` in Codex-facing protocol payloads. This PR renames that provider-specific field to `realtime_session_id` / `realtimeSessionId` and intentionally breaks clients that still send the old field names. ## What Changed - Renamed realtime provider session fields in `ConversationStartParams`, `RealtimeConversationStartedEvent`, and `RealtimeEvent::SessionUpdated`. - Renamed app-server v2 realtime request and notification fields to `realtimeSessionId`. - Removed legacy serde aliases for `session_id` / `sessionId`; clients must send the new names. - Propagated the rename through core realtime startup, app-server adapters, codex-api websocket handling, and TUI realtime state. - Regenerated app-server protocol schema/TypeScript outputs and updated app-server README examples. - Kept upstream Realtime API concepts unchanged: provider `session.id` parsing and `x-session-id` headers still use the upstream wire names. ## Testing - CI is running on the latest pushed commit. - Earlier local verification on this PR: - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `CODEX_SKIP_VENDORED_BWRAP=1 cargo test -p codex-core realtime_conversation` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `CODEX_SKIP_VENDORED_BWRAP=1 cargo test -p codex-app-server realtime_conversation` - attempted `CODEX_SKIP_VENDORED_BWRAP=1 cargo test -p codex-tui` (local linker bus error while linking the test binary) --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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|
Michael Bolin
|
ac4332c05b | permissions: expose active profile metadata (#20095) | ||
|
Michael Bolin
|
891722849d |
core tests: submit turns with permission profiles (#20010)
## Summary
- Add `PermissionProfile`-based turn submission helpers to
`core_test_support`, while keeping the legacy `SandboxPolicy` helper for
tests that intentionally exercise legacy fallback behavior.
- Switch the default `TestCodex::submit_turn()` path to send a real
`PermissionProfile` plus the required legacy compatibility projection in
`Op::UserTurn`.
- Migrate straightforward app/search/shell/truncation tests from
`SandboxPolicy::{DangerFullAccess, ReadOnly}` to
`PermissionProfile::{Disabled, read_only}`.
- Add a TUI compatibility projection helper for legacy app-server fields
so non-legacy writable roots are preserved instead of being downgraded
to read-only.
- Fix remote start/resume/fork sandbox-mode projection to classify any
managed profile with writable roots as workspace-write, not only
profiles that can write `cwd`.
- Reduce `SandboxPolicy` references in `codex-rs/core/tests` from 47
files to 41 files without changing production behavior.
## Testing
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
compatibility_profile_preserves_unbridgeable_write_roots`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
sandbox_mode_preserves_non_cwd_write_roots_for_remote_sessions`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p core_test_support`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
|
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
3b74a4d3b1 |
tui: use permission profiles for sandbox state (#20008)
## Summary - Move TUI permission state from legacy `SandboxPolicy` values to canonical `PermissionProfile` values across presets, app events, chat widget state, app commands, thread routing, and cached thread session state. - Keep app-server compatibility boundaries explicit: embedded sessions send `permissionProfile`, while remote sessions send only a legacy `sandbox` projection and fall back to read-only when a custom profile cannot be projected. - Update status/add-dir UI summaries and snapshots to render the active permission profile, including workspace profiles selected by the new built-in defaults. ## Verification - `rg '\bSandboxPolicy\b' codex-rs/tui -n` returns no matches. - `cargo test -p codex-tui` - `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests` - `cargo test -p codex-tui additional_dirs` - `just fmt` - `just fix -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/20008). * #20041 * #20040 * #20037 * #20035 * #20034 * #20033 * #20032 * #20030 * #20028 * #20027 * #20026 * #20024 * #20021 * #20018 * #20016 * #20015 * #20013 * #20011 * #20010 * __->__ #20008 |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
341550c275 |
permissions: store thread sessions as profiles (#19776)
## Why After thread sessions have a required `PermissionProfile`, the TUI no longer needs to cache a separate legacy `SandboxPolicy` in `ThreadSessionState`. Keeping the legacy field would reintroduce two permission authorities in the session cache and make later replay/switching logic easier to get wrong. This PR keeps legacy app-server compatibility at the ingestion boundary: old `sandbox` response values are still accepted, but they are immediately converted to a cwd-anchored profile. ## What Changed - Removes `ThreadSessionState.sandbox_policy`. - Updates active-session permission syncing to write only the current `PermissionProfile`. - Updates thread-read/replay/test fixtures to use profiles as the cached session permission source. - Leaves legacy `sandbox` fields in app-server request/response protocol paths unchanged; those are compatibility boundaries and are converted before entering cached TUI state. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_session_state::tests --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui inactive_thread_started_notification_initializes_replay_session --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_events --lib` - `just fix -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19776). * #19900 * #19899 * __->__ #19776 |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
af95662a70 |
permissions: require profiles in TUI thread state (#19773)
## Why `ThreadSessionState` is the TUI's cached view of an app-server session. To make `PermissionProfile` the canonical runtime permissions model, cached thread sessions need to always have a profile instead of treating the profile as an optional supplement to a legacy `sandbox` response field. The main compatibility concern is older app-server v2 lifecycle responses that only include `sandbox` and omit `permissionProfile`: - `thread/start` -> `ThreadStartResponse.sandbox` - `thread/resume` -> `ThreadResumeResponse.sandbox` - `thread/fork` -> `ThreadForkResponse.sandbox` Those responses must still hydrate correctly when the TUI is pointed at an older app-server. This PR converts the legacy `sandbox` value into a `PermissionProfile` immediately at response ingestion time, using the response `cwd`, so cached sessions do not carry an optional profile that can later reinterpret cwd-bound grants against a different thread cwd. This fallback is intentionally boundary compatibility. The follow-up PRs in this stack continue the cleanup by making `SessionConfiguredEvent` profile-only, deriving sandbox projections from snapshots only when an API still needs them, and then removing `sandbox_policy` from `ThreadSessionState`. ## What Changed - Makes `ThreadSessionState.permission_profile` required. - Converts legacy app-server response `sandbox` values into a `PermissionProfile` at ingestion time using the response cwd. - Ensures `thread/read` hydration does not reuse a primary session profile that may be anchored to a different cwd; it uses the active widget permission settings for the read thread fallback instead of reusing cached primary-session permissions. - Keeps the app-server request path unchanged: embedded sessions send profiles, while remote sessions continue using legacy sandbox overrides for compatibility. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_read --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui permission_settings_sync_preserves_active_profile_only_rules --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui resume_response_restores_turns_from_thread_items --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_session_state::tests --lib` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19773). * #19900 * #19899 * #19776 * #19775 * #19774 * __->__ #19773 |
||
|
Won Park
|
8033b6a449 |
Add /auto-review-denials retry approval flow (#19058)
## Why Auto-review can deny an action that the user later decides they want to retry. Today there is no TUI surface for selecting a recent denial and sending explicit approval context back into the session, so users have to restate intent manually and the retry can be reviewed without the original denied action context. This adds a narrow TUI-driven path for approving a recent denied action while still keeping the retry inside the normal auto-review flow. ## What Changed - Added `/auto-review-denials` to open a picker of recent denied auto-review actions. - Added a small in-memory TUI store for the 10 most recent denied auto-review events. - Selecting a denial sends the structured denied event back through the existing core/app-server op path. - Core now injects a developer message containing the approved action JSON rather than the full assessment event. - Auto-review transcript collection now preserves this specific approval developer message so follow-up review sessions can see the user approval context. - Added TUI snapshot/unit coverage for the picker and approval dispatch path. - Added core coverage for retaining the approval developer message in the auto-review transcript. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core collect_guardian_transcript_entries_keeps_manual_approval_developer_message` - `cargo test -p codex-tui auto_review_denials` - `cargo test -p codex-tui approving_recent_denial_emits_structured_core_op_once` ## Notes This intentionally keeps retries going through auto-review. The approval signal is context for the exact previously denied action, not a blanket bypass for similar future actions. |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
0d8cdc0510 |
permissions: centralize legacy sandbox projection (#19734)
## Why The remaining migration work still needs `SandboxPolicy` at a few compatibility boundaries, but those projections should come from one canonical path. Keeping ad hoc legacy projections scattered through app-server, CLI, and config code makes it easy for behavior to drift as `PermissionProfile` gains fidelity that the legacy enum cannot represent. ## What Changed - Adds `Permissions::legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd)` and `Config::legacy_sandbox_policy()` as the compatibility projection from the canonical `PermissionProfile`. - Adds `Permissions::can_set_legacy_sandbox_policy()` so legacy inputs are checked after they are converted into profile semantics. - Updates app-server command handling, Windows sandbox setup, session configuration, and sandbox summaries to use the centralized projection helper. - Leaves `SandboxPolicy` in place only for boundary inputs/outputs that still speak the legacy abstraction. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-config -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-app-server -p codex-cli -p codex-tui` - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions_selection_history_snapshot_full_access_to_default -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions_selection_sends_approvals_reviewer_in_override_turn_context -- --nocapture` - `bazel test //codex-rs/tui:tui-unit-tests-bin --test_arg=permissions_selection_history_snapshot_full_access_to_default --test_output=errors` - `bazel test //codex-rs/tui:tui-unit-tests-bin --test_arg=permissions_selection_sends_approvals_reviewer_in_override_turn_context --test_output=errors` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19734). * #19737 * #19736 * #19735 * __->__ #19734 |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
4d7ce3447d |
permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)
## Why This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the runtime-config change needed a fresh PR. `PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231 because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External` enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime profiles such as direct write roots. The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions model migration. ## What Changed - Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and `SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state, while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection. - Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections synchronized. - Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through `SandboxPolicy` exactly. - Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions. - Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when command/session profiles are narrowed. - Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and `PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy defaults. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots` - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * #19392 * __->__ #19606 |
||
|
Eric Traut
|
f1c963d77e |
Add goal TUI UX (5 / 5) (#18077)
Adds the TUI user experience for goals on top of the core runtime from PR 4. ## Why Users need a direct TUI control surface for long-running goals. The UI should make the current goal visible, support common goal actions without waiting for a model turn, and avoid confusing end-of-turn notifications while an active goal is immediately continuing. ## What changed - Added `/goal` summary rendering for the current goal, including active, paused, budget-limited, and complete states. - Added `/goal <objective>` creation/replacement through the app-server goal API rather than a model prompt. - Added `/goal clear`, `/goal pause`, and `/goal unpause` command variants. - Added a confirmation menu when the user enters a new goal while another goal already exists. - Updated `/goal` help and summary tip text so it reflects the supported command variants without advertising slash-command token budgets. - Added footer/statusline goal indicators, including elapsed time and token budget display when a budget exists from API/tool-created goals. - Consumes goal updated/cleared notifications so the TUI stays in sync with external app-server changes. - Suppresses end-of-turn desktop notifications only when a goal is still active and follow-up work is expected. - Preserves slash-command history behavior and avoids leaking queued `/goal` state into unrelated submissions. ## Verification - Added TUI unit and snapshot coverage for goal command availability, summary rendering, control commands, replacement menu behavior, status/footer display, notification handling, and command history. |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
13e0ec1614 |
permissions: make legacy profile conversion cwd-free (#19414)
## Why The profile conversion path still required a `cwd` even when it was only translating a legacy `SandboxPolicy` into a `PermissionProfile`. That made profile producers invent an ambient `cwd`, which is exactly the anchoring we are trying to remove from permission-profile data. A legacy workspace-write policy can be represented symbolically instead: `:cwd = write` plus read-only `:project_roots` metadata subpaths. This PR creates that cwd-free base so the rest of the stack can stop threading cwd through profile construction. Callers that actually need a concrete runtime filesystem policy for a specific cwd still have an explicitly named cwd-bound conversion. ## What Changed - `PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` now takes only `&SandboxPolicy`. - `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy` is now the symbolic, cwd-free projection for profiles. - The old concrete projection is retained as `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd` for runtime/boundary code that must materialize legacy cwd behavior. - Workspace-write profiles preserve `CurrentWorkingDirectory` and `ProjectRoots` special entries instead of materializing cwd into absolute paths. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics --tests` - `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-exec-server -p codex-tui -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-analytics` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19414). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * #19392 * #19391 * __->__ #19414 |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
4816b89204 |
permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.
The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
Managed {
file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
Disabled,
External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
}
```
This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.
## How Existing Modeling Maps
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:
- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.
## What Changed
- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.
## Compatibility
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
## Verification
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
|
||
|
Celia Chen
|
432771c5fd |
feat: expose AWS account state from account/read (#19048)
## Why AWS/Bedrock mode currently reports `account: null` with `requiresOpenaiAuth: false` from `account/read`. That suppresses the OpenAI-auth requirement, but it does not let app clients distinguish AWS auth from any other non-OpenAI custom provider. For the prototype AWS provider UX, clients need a simple provider-derived signal so they can suppress ChatGPT/API-key login and token-refresh paths without hardcoding Bedrock checks. ## What changed - Adds an `aws` variant to the v2 `Account` protocol union. - Adds `ProviderAccountKind` to `codex-model-provider` so the runtime provider owns the app-visible account classification. - Makes Amazon Bedrock return `ProviderAccountKind::Aws` from the model-provider layer. - Updates app-server `account/read` to map `ProviderAccountKind` to the existing `GetAccountResponse` wire shape. - Preserves the existing `account: null, requiresOpenaiAuth: false` behavior for other non-OpenAI providers. - Regenerates the app-server protocol schema fixtures. - Adds coverage for provider account classification and for the Amazon Bedrock `account/read` response. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-model-provider` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server get_account_with_aws_provider` ## Notes I attempted `just bazel-lock-update` and `just bazel-lock-check`, but both are blocked in my local environment because `bazel` is not installed. |
||
|
Michael Bolin
|
5c239ad748 |
tui: sync session permission profiles (#18284)
## Why Once `SessionConfigured` carries the active `PermissionProfile`, the TUI must treat that as authoritative session state. Otherwise the widget can keep stale local permission details after a session is configured or resumed. The TUI also keeps a local `Config` copy used for later operations, so session-sourced profiles and subsequent local sandbox changes need to keep the derived split runtime permissions in sync. Because this PR may land before the follow-up user-turn profile plumbing, embedded app-server turns also need a standalone path for carrying local runtime sandbox overrides. ## What changed - Sync the chat widget runtime filesystem/network permissions from `SessionConfigured.permission_profile`, with the legacy `sandbox_policy` as the fallback. - Recompute split runtime permissions whenever the TUI applies or carries forward a local sandbox-policy override. - Mark feature-driven Auto-review sandbox changes as runtime sandbox overrides so the standalone embedded turn-start profile path is used even without the follow-up user-turn profile PR. - Send a turn-start `permissionProfile` for embedded, non-ExternalSandbox turns when the TUI has a runtime sandbox override; remote and ExternalSandbox turns keep using the legacy sandbox field. - Extend coverage for profile sync, local sandbox changes, ExternalSandbox fallback, feature-driven sandbox overrides, and turn-start permission override selection. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-tui update_feature_flags_enabling_guardian_selects_auto_review` - `cargo test -p codex-tui turn_start_permission_overrides_send_profiles_only_for_embedded_runtime_overrides` - `cargo test -p codex-tui permission_settings_sync` - `cargo test -p codex-tui session_configured_external_sandbox_keeps_external_runtime_policy` - `cargo test -p codex-tui session_configured_syncs_widget_config_permissions_and_cwd` - `just fix -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18284). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * __->__ #18284 |
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Michael Bolin
|
bc083e4713 |
clients: send permission profiles to app-server (#18280)
## Why After app-server can accept `PermissionProfile`, first-party clients should stop preferring legacy sandbox fields when canonical permission information is available. This keeps the migration moving without removing legacy compatibility yet. The client side still has mixed surfaces during the stack: embedded thread start/resume/fork and exec initial turns can derive a profile directly from local config, while TUI remote sessions and some turn-start paths only have a legacy/server-context-safe sandbox projection. Those paths keep sending legacy sandbox fields rather than synthesizing or sending lossy/local-only profiles. ## What changed - Sends `permissionProfile` from exec and embedded TUI thread start/resume/fork requests when config has a representable profile. - Keeps legacy sandbox fallback for external sandbox policies, TUI remote thread lifecycle requests, and TUI turn-start requests that do not yet carry the active profile. - Sends the actual config-derived `permissionProfile` for exec initial turns instead of rebuilding one from the legacy sandbox projection. - Stores response `permissionProfile` as optional in TUI session state so external sandbox responses and compatibility payloads preserve `null`. - Updates tests for request construction and response mapping. ## Verification - `cargo check --tests -p codex-tui -p codex-exec` - `cargo test -p codex-tui app_server_session -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-exec thread_start_params -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-tui app_server_session::tests::thread_lifecycle_params -- --nocapture` - `just fix -p codex-tui -p codex-exec` - `just fix -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18280). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * __->__ #18280 |
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Michael Bolin
|
18a26d7bbc |
app-server: accept permission profile overrides (#18279)
## Why `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands. This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as `**/*.env = deny`. ## What changed - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`. - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread resume requests. - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox projection used by existing execution paths. - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests. - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides. - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures and regression coverage. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures` - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * __->__ #18279 |
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|
Won Park
|
11e5af53c4 |
Add plumbing to approve stored Auto-Review denials (#18955)
## Summary
This adds the structural plumbing needed for an app-server client to
approve a previously denied Guardian review and carry that approval
context into the next model turn.
This PR does not add the actual `/auto-review-denials` tool
## What Changed
- Added app-server v2 RPC `thread/approveGuardianDeniedAction`.
- Added generated JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures for
`ThreadApproveGuardianDeniedAction*`.
- Added core `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction`.
- Added a core handler that validates the event is a denied Guardian
assessment and injects a developer message containing the stored denial
event JSON.
- Queues the approval context for the next turn if there is no active
turn yet.
- Added the TUI app-server bridge so `Op::ApproveGuardianDeniedAction {
event }` is routed to the app-server request.
## What This Does Not Do
- Does not add `/auto-review-denials`.
- Does not add chat widget recent-denial state.
- Does not add popup/list UI.
- Does not add a product-facing denial lookup/store.
- Does not change where Guardian denials are originally emitted or
persisted.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-tui thread_approve_guardian_denied_action`
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Michael Bolin
|
5eab9ff8ca |
app-server: expose thread permission profiles (#18278)
## Why The `PermissionProfile` migration needs app-server clients to see the same constrained permission model that core is using at runtime. Before this PR, thread lifecycle responses only exposed the legacy `SandboxPolicy` shape, so clients still had to infer active permissions from sandbox fields. That makes downstream resume, fork, and override flows harder to make `PermissionProfile`-first. External sandbox policies are intentionally excluded from this canonical view. External enforcement cannot be round-tripped as a `PermissionProfile`, and exposing a lossy root-write profile would let clients accidentally change sandbox semantics if they echo the profile back later. ## What changed - Adds the app-server v2 `PermissionProfile` wire shape, including filesystem permissions and glob scan depth metadata. - Adds `PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions` so the profile response does not expose active network state through the older additional-permissions naming. - Returns `permissionProfile` from thread start, resume, and fork responses when the active sandbox can be represented as a `PermissionProfile`. - Keeps legacy `sandbox` in those responses for compatibility and documents `permissionProfile` as canonical when present. - Makes lifecycle `permissionProfile` nullable and returns `null` for `ExternalSandbox` to avoid exposing a lossy profile. - Regenerates the app-server JSON schema and TypeScript fixtures. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server thread_response_permission_profile_omits_external_sandbox -- --nocapture` - `cargo check --tests -p codex-analytics -p codex-exec -p codex-tui` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-analytics -p codex-exec -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18278). * #18279 * __->__ #18278 |
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|
efrazer-oai
|
69c8913e24 |
feat: add explicit AgentIdentity auth mode (#18785)
## Summary This PR adds `CodexAuth::AgentIdentity` as an explicit auth mode. An AgentIdentity auth record is a standalone `auth.json` mode. When `AuthManager::auth().await` loads that mode, it registers one process-scoped task and stores it in runtime-only state on the auth value. Header creation stays synchronous after that because the task is initialized before callers receive the auth object. This PR also removes the old feature flag path. AgentIdentity is selected by explicit auth mode, not by a hidden flag or lazy mutation of ChatGPT auth records. Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes ## Design Decisions - AgentIdentity is a real auth enum variant because it can be the only credential in `auth.json`. - The process task is ephemeral runtime state. It is not serialized and is not stored in rollout/session data. - Account/user metadata needed by existing Codex backend checks lives on the AgentIdentity record for now. - `is_chatgpt_auth()` remains token-specific. - `uses_codex_backend()` is the broader predicate for ChatGPT-token auth and AgentIdentity auth. ## Stack 1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert 2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity crate 3. This PR: explicit AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation 4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend auth callsites through AuthProvider 5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY` ## Testing Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI. |
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starr-openaiandCodex
|
1d4cc494c9 |
Add turn-scoped environment selections (#18416)
## Summary - add experimental turn/start.environments params for per-turn environment id + cwd selections - pass selections through core protocol ops and resolve them with EnvironmentManager before TurnContext creation - treat omitted selections as default behavior, empty selections as no environment, and non-empty selections as first environment/cwd as the turn primary ## Testing - ran `just fmt` - ran `just write-app-server-schema` - not run: unit tests for this stacked PR --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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|
Eric Traut
|
b8e78e8869 |
Use app server metadata for fork parent titles (#18632)
## Problem The TUI resolved fork parent titles from local CODEX_HOME metadata, which could show missing or stale titles when app-server metadata is authoritative. This is a lingering bug left over from the migration of the TUI to the app-server interface. I found it when I asked Codex to review all places where the TUI code was still directly accessing the local CODEX_HOME. ## Solution Route fork parent title metadata through the app-server session state and render only that supplied title, with focused snapshot coverage for stale local metadata. ## Testing I manually tested by renaming a thread then forking it and confirming that the "forked from" message indicated the parent thread's name. |
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Eric Traut
|
95dafbc7b5 |
Add /side conversations (#18190)
The TUI supports long-running turns and agent threads, but quick side questions have required interrupting the main flow or manually forking/navigating threads. This PR adds a guarded `/side` flow so users can ask brief side-conversation questions in an ephemeral fork while keeping the primary thread focused. This also helps address the feature request in #18125. The implementation creates one side conversation at a time, lets `/side` open either an empty side thread or immediately submit `/side <question>`, and returns to the parent with Esc or Ctrl+C. Side conversations get hidden developer guardrails that treat inherited history as reference-only and steer the model away from workspace mutations unless explicitly requested in the side conversation. The TUI hides most slash commands while side mode is active, leaving only `/copy`, `/diff`, `/mention`, and `/status` available there. |
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alexsong-oaiandEric Traut
|
93ff798e5b |
[TUI] add external config migration prompt when start TUI (#17891)
- add a TUI startup migration prompt for external agent config - support migrating external configs including config, skills, AGENTS.md and plugins - gate the prompt behind features.external_migrate (default false) <img width="1037" height="480" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-14 at 9 29 14 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6060849b-03cb-429a-9c13-c7bb46ad2e65" /> <img width="713" height="183" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-14 at 9 29 26 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d13f177e-d4c4-479c-8736-ef29636081e1" /> --------- Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com> |
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|
richardopenai
|
139fa8b8f2 |
[codex] Propagate rate limit reached type (#18227)
## Summary First PR in the split from #17956. - adds the core/app-server `RateLimitReachedType` shape - maps backend `rate_limit_reached_type` into Codex rate-limit snapshots - carries the field through app-server notifications/responses and generated schemas - updates existing constructors/tests for the new optional field ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-backend-client` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server rate_limits` - `cargo test -p codex-tui workspace_` - `cargo test -p codex-tui status_` - `just fmt` - `just fix -p codex-backend-client` - `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-app-server` - `just fix -p codex-tui` |
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sashank-oaiandCodex
|
22f7ef1cb7 |
[codex] Revoke ChatGPT tokens on logout (#17825)
## Summary This changes Codex logout so managed ChatGPT auth is revoked against AuthAPI before local auth state is removed. CLI logout, TUI `/logout`, and the app-server account logout path now use the token-revoking logout flow instead of only deleting `auth.json` / credential store state. ## Root Cause Logout previously cleared only local auth storage. That removed Codex's local credentials but did not ask the backend to invalidate the refresh/access token state associated with a managed ChatGPT login. ## Behavior For managed ChatGPT auth, logout sends the stored refresh token to `https://auth.openai.com/oauth/revoke` with `token_type_hint: refresh_token` and the Codex OAuth client id, then deletes all local auth stores after revocation succeeds. If only an access token is available, it falls back to revoking that access token. API key auth and externally supplied `chatgptAuthTokens` are still only cleared locally because Codex does not own a refresh token for those modes. Revocation failures are fail-closed: if Codex cannot load stored auth or the backend revoke call fails, logout returns an error and leaves local auth in place so the user can retry instead of silently clearing local state while backend tokens remain valid. ## Validation ran local version of `codex-cli` with staging overrides/harness for auth ran `codex login` then `codex logout`: saw auth.json clear and backend revocation endpoints were called ``` POST /oauth/revoke status: 200 revoking access token should clear auth session clearing auth session due to token revocation successfully revoked session and access token CANONICAL-API-LINE Response: status='200' method='POST' path='/oauth/revoke ``` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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|
Eric Traut
|
4cd85b28d2 |
Fix MCP startup cancellation through app server (#18078)
Addresses https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/17143 Problem: TUI interrupts without an active turn stopped cancelling slow MCP startup after routing through the app-server APIs. Solution: Route no-active-turn interrupts through app-server as startup cancels, acknowledge them immediately, and emit cancelled MCP startup updates. Testing: I manually confirmed that MCP cancellation didn't work prior to this PR and works after the fix was in place. |
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|
jif-oai
|
da86cedbd4 |
feat: reset memories button (#17937)
<img width="720" height="175" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-15 at 14 35 02" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/041d73ff-8c16-42a9-8e92-c245805084f0" /> |
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jif-oai
|
9402347f34 |
feat: memories menu (#17632)
Add menu that: 1. If memories feature is not enabled, propose to enable it 2. Let you choose if you want to generate memories and to use memories |
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pakrym-oai
|
dd1321d11b |
Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)
Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code. |
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|
Ahmed Ibrahim
|
2f6fc7c137 |
Add realtime output modality and transcript events (#17701)
- Add outputModality to thread/realtime/start and wire text/audio output selection through app-server, core, API, and TUI.\n- Rename the realtime transcript delta notification and add a separate transcript done notification that forwards final text from item done without correlating it with deltas. |
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|
pakrym-oai
|
0c8f3173e4 |
[codex] Remove unused Rust helpers (#17146)
## Summary Removes high-confidence unused Rust helper functions and exports across `codex-tui`, `codex-shell-command`, and utility crates. The cleanup includes dead TUI helper methods, unused path/string/elapsed/fuzzy-match utilities, an unused Windows PowerShell lookup helper, and the unused terminal palette version counter. This keeps the remaining public surface smaller without changing behavior. ## Validation - `just fmt` - `cargo test -p codex-tui -p codex-shell-command -p codex-utils-elapsed -p codex-utils-fuzzy-match -p codex-utils-string -p codex-utils-path` - `just fix -p codex-tui -p codex-shell-command -p codex-utils-elapsed -p codex-utils-fuzzy-match -p codex-utils-string -p codex-utils-path` - `git diff --check` |