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dev/efrazer/app-server-queue-4-dispatch
7
Commits
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986c60467b |
windows-sandbox: pass workspace roots to runner (#24108)
## Why #23813 switches the Windows sandbox runner path to `PermissionProfile`, but it still left one runtime anchor for resolving symbolic `:workspace_roots` entries. That is not enough once a turn has multiple effective workspace roots: exact entries and deny globs under `:workspace_roots` need to be materialized for every runtime root before the command runner chooses token mode or builds ACL plans. ## What Changed - Replaces the Windows runner/setup `permission_profile_cwd` plumbing with `workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>`. - Resolves Windows-local `PermissionProfile` data with `materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(...)` instead of the single-cwd helper. - Threads `Config::effective_workspace_roots()` through core execution, unified exec, TUI setup/read-grant flows, app-server setup, app-server `command/exec`, and `debug sandbox` on Windows. - Preserves those workspace roots through the zsh-fork escalation executor instead of rebuilding them from `sandbox_policy_cwd`. - Makes `ExecRequest::new(...)` and the remaining `build_exec_request(...)` helper path take `windows_sandbox_workspace_roots` explicitly so new call sites cannot silently fall back to `vec![cwd]`. - Clarifies the `debug sandbox` non-Windows comment: remaining cwd-dependent resolution still uses `sandbox_policy_cwd`, while `:workspace_roots` entries are already materialized from config roots. - Updates elevated runner IPC `SpawnRequest` to send `workspace_roots` and bumps the framed IPC protocol version to `3` for the payload shape change. - Adds Windows-local resolver coverage for expanding exact and glob `:workspace_roots` entries across multiple roots, plus core helper coverage proving explicit roots are preserved. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-cli -p codex-app-server` - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-core unix_escalation` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server windows_sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-tui windows_sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox` - `just test -p codex-core unified_exec` - `just test -p codex-core build_exec_request_preserves_windows_workspace_roots` - `env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING just test -p codex-app-server --lib command_exec` - `just test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `just test -p codex-exec sandbox` - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-windows-sandbox` A local macOS cross-check with `cargo check --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc ...` did not reach crate Rust code because native dependencies require Windows SDK headers (`windows.h` / `assert.h`) in this environment; Windows CI remains the real target validation. Two local targeted filters compile but do not run assertions on macOS: `env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING just test -p codex-app-server --lib command_exec_processor` matched zero tests, and `just test -p codex-linux-sandbox landlock` matched zero tests because the landlock suite is Linux-only. |
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0a6bc4e687 |
windows-sandbox: remove SandboxPolicy runner plumbing (#23813)
## Why The Windows sandbox runner still carried the old `SandboxPolicy` compatibility path even though core now computes `PermissionProfile`. That meant Windows command-runner execution could only see the legacy projection, so profile-only filesystem rules such as deny globs were not part of the runner input. ## What Changed - Removed the Windows-local `SandboxPolicy` parser/export and deleted `windows-sandbox-rs/src/policy.rs`. - Changed restricted-token capture/session setup, elevated setup, world-writable audit, read-root grant, and command-runner session APIs to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the profile cwd. - Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to version 2 because `SpawnRequest` now carries `permission_profile` / `permission_profile_cwd` instead of the legacy `policy_json_or_preset` / `sandbox_policy_cwd` fields. - Updated core exec, unified exec, debug-sandbox, TUI setup/grant flows, and app-server setup to pass the actual effective `PermissionProfile`. - Left regression coverage asserting the old IPC policy fields are absent and the runner serializes tagged `PermissionProfile` JSON. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server request_processors::windows_sandbox_processor` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-cli -p codex-tui` - `just fix -p codex-cli -p codex-tui` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-tui` - `rg "\\bSandboxPolicy\\b" codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` returned no matches. Note: `cargo test -p codex-cli` was attempted but did not reach crate tests because local disk filled while compiling dependencies (`No space left on device`). The targeted clippy pass compiled the affected CLI/TUI surfaces afterward. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23813). * #24108 * __->__ #23813 |
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c9ff067e31 |
windows-sandbox: add profile-native elevated APIs (#23714)
## Why This is the next step after #23167 in the Windows sandbox `PermissionProfile` migration. The elevated Windows backend still exposed policy-string entry points, which forced callers to pass a compatibility `SandboxPolicy` before the command-runner IPC could receive a profile. Adding profile-native APIs first keeps the core switch in the next PR small: reviewers can see that the Windows crate can prepare elevated setup, capability SIDs, and runner IPC from a resolved `PermissionProfile` without changing core behavior yet. ## What - Adds `ElevatedSandboxProfileCaptureRequest` and `run_windows_sandbox_capture_for_permission_profile_elevated` for one-shot elevated capture. - Adds `spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated_for_permission_profile` for unified exec sessions. - Factors elevated spawn prep through `prepare_elevated_spawn_context_for_permissions`, so both new APIs operate from `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` directly. - Keeps the existing legacy policy-string APIs as adapters for callers that have not moved yet. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23714). * #23715 * __->__ #23714 |
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896ee672cc |
windows-sandbox: feed setup from resolved permissions (#23167)
## Why This is the next step in the Windows sandbox migration away from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` abstraction. #22923 moved write-root and token decisions onto `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, but setup and identity still accepted `SandboxPolicy` and converted internally. This PR pushes that conversion outward so the setup path consumes the resolved Windows permission view directly. ## What Changed - Changed `SandboxSetupRequest` to carry `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` instead of `SandboxPolicy` plus policy cwd. - Updated setup refresh/elevation and identity credential preparation to use resolved permissions for read roots, write roots, network identity, and deny-write payload planning. - Removed the production `allow.rs` legacy wrapper; allow-path computation now takes resolved permissions directly. - Added a permissions-based world-writable audit entry point while keeping the existing legacy wrapper for compatibility. - Updated legacy ACL setup and the core Windows setup bridge to construct resolved permissions at the boundary. - Hardened the Windows sandbox integration test helper staging so Bazel retries can reuse an already-staged helper if a prior sandbox helper process still has the executable open. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all --no-run` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `just fix -p codex-core` - Attempted `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, but the local machine is missing `x86_64-w64-mingw32-clang`; Windows CI should cover that target. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23167). * #23715 * #23714 * __->__ #23167 |
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e1ec0eee5f |
windows-sandbox: drive write roots from resolved permissions (#22923)
## Why This is the third PR in the Windows sandbox `SandboxPolicy` -> `PermissionProfile` migration stack. #22896 introduced `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, and #22918 moved elevated runner IPC to carry `PermissionProfile`. This PR starts moving the remaining setup/spawn helpers away from asking legacy enum questions like “is this `WorkspaceWrite`?” and toward resolved runtime permission questions like “does this profile require write capability roots?” ## What changed - Added resolved-permissions helpers for network identity and write-capability detection. - Moved setup write-root gathering to operate on `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, with the legacy `SandboxPolicy` wrapper left in place for existing call sites. - Updated identity setup, elevated capture setup, and world-writable audit denies to use resolved write roots. - Updated spawn preparation to carry resolved permissions in `SpawnContext` and use them for network blocking, setup write roots, elevated capability SID selection, and legacy capability roots. - Removed a now-unused legacy write-root helper. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox` - Existing stack checks are green on #22896 and #22918; CI has started for this PR. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22923). * #23715 * #23714 * #23167 * __->__ #22923 |
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729bdf3c8d |
windows-sandbox: send permission profiles to elevated runner (#22918)
## Why This is the next PR in the Windows sandbox migration stack after #22896. The bottom PR introduces a Windows-local resolved permissions helper while existing callers still start from legacy `SandboxPolicy`. This PR moves the elevated runner IPC boundary to `PermissionProfile`, which makes the direction of the stack visible without changing the public core call sites yet. Because that changes the CLI-to-command-runner message shape, the framed IPC protocol version is bumped in the same PR so the boundary change is explicit. ## What changed - Replaced elevated IPC `policy_json_or_preset`/`sandbox_policy_cwd` fields with `permission_profile`/`permission_profile_cwd`. - Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to `IPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2` and switched parent/runner frames to use the shared constant. - Converted the parent elevated paths from the parsed legacy policy into a materialized `PermissionProfile` before sending the runner request. - Added `WindowsSandboxTokenMode` resolution for managed `PermissionProfile` values and made the runner choose read-only vs writable-root capability tokens from that resolved profile. - Rejected disabled, external, unrestricted, and full-disk-write profiles before token selection. - Added IPC JSON coverage for tagged `PermissionProfile` payloads and token-mode unit coverage for the resolved permission helper. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc --tests` was attempted locally but blocked before crate type-checking because the macOS compiler environment lacks Windows C headers such as `windows.h` and `assert.h`; GitHub Windows CI is the required verification for the runner path. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22918). * #23715 * #23714 * #23167 * #22923 * __->__ #22918 |
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2b4898cc47 |
windows-sandbox: add resolved permissions helper (#22896)
## Why The Windows sandbox migration away from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` abstraction needs a small local bridge before IPC and core wiring can move to `PermissionProfile`. Leaf helpers currently branch directly on `WorkspaceWrite`, which spreads legacy assumptions through path planning and token setup code. This PR introduces a Windows-local resolved permissions view so those helpers can ask Windows-specific questions about runtime filesystem/network permissions without matching on the legacy policy enum everywhere. ## What changed - Added `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` in `windows-sandbox-rs/src/resolved_permissions.rs`, with legacy `SandboxPolicy` constructors for the current call sites. - Moved `allow.rs` writable-root and read-only-subpath planning onto the resolved permissions type. - Preserved Windows `TEMP`/`TMP` writable-root behavior when the effective policy includes writable tmpdir access. - Avoided resolving Unix `:slash_tmp` or parent-process `TMPDIR` while computing Windows writable roots. - Reused the shared allow-path result for setup write-root gathering and routed network-block selection through the resolved abstraction. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox` - GitHub CI restarted on the amended commit; Windows Bazel is the required signal for the Windows-only code paths. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22896). * #23715 * #23714 * #23167 * #22923 * #22918 * __->__ #22896 |