mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-11-16 22:00:36 +00:00
Merge origin/main into exec-server-sandbox-0403
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,15 +1,33 @@
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use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::process::Command;
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use std::process::Output;
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const SYSTEM_BWRAP_PROGRAM: &str = "bwrap";
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const MISSING_BWRAP_WARNING: &str = concat!(
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"Codex could not find bubblewrap on PATH. ",
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"Install bubblewrap with your OS package manager. ",
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"See the sandbox prerequisites: ",
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"https://developers.openai.com/codex/concepts/sandboxing#prerequisites. ",
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"Codex will use the vendored bubblewrap in the meantime.",
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);
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const USER_NAMESPACE_WARNING: &str =
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"Codex's Linux sandbox uses bubblewrap and needs access to create user namespaces.";
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const USER_NAMESPACE_FAILURES: [&str; 4] = [
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"loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR",
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"loopback: Failed RTM_NEWLINK",
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"setting up uid map: Permission denied",
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"No permissions to create a new namespace",
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];
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pub fn system_bwrap_warning(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> Option<String> {
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if !should_warn_about_system_bwrap(sandbox_policy) {
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return None;
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}
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system_bwrap_warning_for_lookup(find_system_bwrap_in_path())
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let system_bwrap_path = find_system_bwrap_in_path();
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system_bwrap_warning_for_path(system_bwrap_path.as_deref())
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}
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fn should_warn_about_system_bwrap(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> bool {
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@@ -19,14 +37,42 @@ fn should_warn_about_system_bwrap(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> bool {
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)
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}
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fn system_bwrap_warning_for_lookup(system_bwrap_path: Option<PathBuf>) -> Option<String> {
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match system_bwrap_path {
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Some(_) => None,
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None => Some(
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"Codex could not find system bubblewrap on PATH. Please install bubblewrap with your package manager. Codex will use the vendored bubblewrap in the meantime."
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.to_string(),
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),
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fn system_bwrap_warning_for_path(system_bwrap_path: Option<&Path>) -> Option<String> {
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let Some(system_bwrap_path) = system_bwrap_path else {
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return Some(MISSING_BWRAP_WARNING.to_string());
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};
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if !system_bwrap_has_user_namespace_access(system_bwrap_path) {
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return Some(USER_NAMESPACE_WARNING.to_string());
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}
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None
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}
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fn system_bwrap_has_user_namespace_access(system_bwrap_path: &Path) -> bool {
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let output = match Command::new(system_bwrap_path)
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.args([
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"--unshare-user",
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"--unshare-net",
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"--ro-bind",
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"/",
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"/",
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"/bin/true",
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])
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.output()
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{
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Ok(output) => output,
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Err(_) => return true,
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};
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output.status.success() || !is_user_namespace_failure(&output)
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}
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fn is_user_namespace_failure(output: &Output) -> bool {
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let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
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USER_NAMESPACE_FAILURES
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.iter()
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.any(|failure| stderr.contains(failure))
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}
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pub fn find_system_bwrap_in_path() -> Option<PathBuf> {
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@@ -6,30 +6,42 @@ use tempfile::tempdir;
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#[test]
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fn system_bwrap_warning_reports_missing_system_bwrap() {
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let warning = system_bwrap_warning_for_lookup(/*system_bwrap_path*/ None)
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.expect("missing system bwrap should emit a warning");
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assert!(warning.contains("could not find system bubblewrap"));
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assert_eq!(
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system_bwrap_warning_for_path(/*system_bwrap_path*/ None),
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Some(MISSING_BWRAP_WARNING.to_string())
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn system_bwrap_warning_skips_too_old_system_bwrap() {
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fn system_bwrap_warning_reports_user_namespace_failures() {
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for failure in USER_NAMESPACE_FAILURES {
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let fake_bwrap = write_fake_bwrap(&format!(
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r#"#!/bin/sh
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echo '{failure}' >&2
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exit 1
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"#
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));
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let fake_bwrap_path: &Path = fake_bwrap.as_ref();
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assert_eq!(
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system_bwrap_warning_for_path(Some(fake_bwrap_path)),
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Some(USER_NAMESPACE_WARNING.to_string()),
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"{failure}",
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn system_bwrap_warning_skips_unrelated_bwrap_failures() {
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let fake_bwrap = write_fake_bwrap(
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r#"#!/bin/sh
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if [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
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echo 'usage: bwrap [OPTION...] COMMAND'
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exit 0
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fi
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echo 'bwrap: Unknown option --argv0' >&2
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exit 1
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"#,
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);
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let fake_bwrap_path: &Path = fake_bwrap.as_ref();
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assert_eq!(
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system_bwrap_warning_for_lookup(Some(fake_bwrap_path.to_path_buf())),
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None,
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"Do not warn even if bwrap does not support `--argv0`",
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);
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assert_eq!(system_bwrap_warning_for_path(Some(fake_bwrap_path)), None);
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}
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#[test]
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@@ -102,5 +114,5 @@ fn write_named_fake_bwrap_in(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
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fs::write(&path, "#!/bin/sh\n").expect("write fake bwrap");
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let permissions = fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755);
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fs::set_permissions(&path, permissions).expect("chmod fake bwrap");
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path
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fs::canonicalize(path).expect("canonicalize fake bwrap")
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}
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@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ fn transform_additional_permissions_preserves_denied_entries() {
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canonicalize(temp_dir.path()).expect("canonicalize temp dir"),
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)
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.expect("absolute temp dir");
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let allowed_path = workspace_root.join("allowed").expect("allowed path");
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let denied_path = workspace_root.join("denied").expect("denied path");
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let allowed_path = workspace_root.join("allowed");
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let denied_path = workspace_root.join("denied");
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let exec_request = manager
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.transform(
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SandboxCommand {
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@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ fn root_write_policy_with_carveouts_still_uses_platform_sandbox() {
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let blocked = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
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"blocked",
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std::env::current_dir().expect("current dir"),
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)
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.expect("blocked path");
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);
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let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Special {
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@@ -317,8 +316,8 @@ fn merge_file_system_policy_with_additional_permissions_preserves_unreadable_roo
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canonicalize(temp_dir.path()).expect("canonicalize temp dir"),
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)
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.expect("absolute temp dir");
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let allowed_path = cwd.join("allowed").expect("allowed path");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied").expect("denied path");
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let allowed_path = cwd.join("allowed");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied");
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let merged_policy = merge_file_system_policy_with_additional_permissions(
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&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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@@ -361,7 +360,7 @@ fn effective_file_system_sandbox_policy_returns_base_policy_without_additional_p
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canonicalize(temp_dir.path()).expect("canonicalize temp dir"),
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)
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.expect("absolute temp dir");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied").expect("denied path");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied");
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let base_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Special {
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@@ -388,8 +387,8 @@ fn effective_file_system_sandbox_policy_merges_additional_write_roots() {
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canonicalize(temp_dir.path()).expect("canonicalize temp dir"),
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)
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.expect("absolute temp dir");
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let allowed_path = cwd.join("allowed").expect("allowed path");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied").expect("denied path");
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let allowed_path = cwd.join("allowed");
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let denied_path = cwd.join("denied");
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let base_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Special {
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@@ -92,6 +92,12 @@
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; Needed for python multiprocessing on MacOS for the SemLock
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(allow ipc-posix-sem)
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; Needed for PyTorch/libomp on macOS to register OpenMP runtimes.
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(allow ipc-posix-shm-read-data
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ipc-posix-shm-write-create
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ipc-posix-shm-write-unlink
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(ipc-posix-name-regex #"^/__KMP_REGISTERED_LIB_[0-9]+$"))
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(allow mach-lookup
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(global-name "com.apple.PowerManagement.control")
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)
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@@ -60,6 +60,19 @@ fn base_policy_allows_node_cpu_sysctls() {
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn base_policy_allows_kmp_registration_shm_read_create_and_unlink() {
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let expected = r##"(allow ipc-posix-shm-read-data
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ipc-posix-shm-write-create
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ipc-posix-shm-write-unlink
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(ipc-posix-name-regex #"^/__KMP_REGISTERED_LIB_[0-9]+$"))"##;
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assert!(
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MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY.contains(expected),
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"base policy must allow only KMP registration shm read/create/unlink:\n{MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY}"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn create_seatbelt_args_routes_network_through_proxy_ports() {
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let policy = dynamic_network_policy(
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