diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
index 8c424c541c..c400712b55 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
@@ -2051,6 +2051,57 @@ fn vec_str(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
     items.iter().map(std::string::ToString::to_string).collect()
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn ripgrep_pre_processor_requires_approval_in_sandboxed_exec() {
+    for command in [
+        vec_str(&["rg", "--pre=./pre.sh", "needle", "input.txt"]),
+        vec_str(&["/bin/zsh", "-lc", r"rg --pre\=./pre.sh needle input.txt"]),
+    ] {
+        assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
+            ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
+                policy_src: None,
+                command,
+                approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
+                sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
+                file_system_sandbox_policy: workspace_write_file_system_sandbox_policy(),
+                sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
+                prefix_rule: None,
+            },
+            ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
+                reason: None,
+                proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec_str(&[
+                    "rg",
+                    "--pre=./pre.sh",
+                    "needle",
+                    "input.txt",
+                ]))),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn ripgrep_pre_processor_is_forbidden_when_exec_cannot_ask() {
+    let command = vec_str(&["rg", "--pre=./pre.sh", "needle", "input.txt"]);
+    assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
+        ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
+            policy_src: None,
+            command,
+            approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
+            sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: workspace_write_file_system_sandbox_policy(),
+            sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
+            prefix_rule: None,
+        },
+        ExecApprovalRequirement::Forbidden {
+            reason: "`rg '--pre=./pre.sh' needle input.txt` rejected: blocked by policy"
+                .to_string(),
+        },
+    )
+    .await;
+}
+
 /// Note this test behaves differently on Windows because it exercises an
 /// `if cfg!(windows)` code path in render_decision_for_unmatched_command().
 #[tokio::test]
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
index fef98e8362..bcd92bf04f 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 use crate::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
+use crate::command_safety::ripgrep::RipgrepArgCase;
+use crate::command_safety::ripgrep::ripgrep_command_can_execute_arbitrary_command;
 use std::path::Path;
 #[cfg(windows)]
 #[path = "windows_dangerous_commands.rs"]
@@ -143,14 +145,20 @@ pub(crate) fn find_git_subcommand<'a>(
 }
 
 fn is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(command: &[String]) -> bool {
-    let cmd0 = command.first().map(String::as_str);
+    let cmd0 = command
+        .first()
+        .and_then(|command| executable_name_lookup_key(command));
 
-    match cmd0 {
+    match cmd0.as_deref() {
         Some("rm") => matches!(command.get(1).map(String::as_str), Some("-f" | "-rf")),
 
         // for sudo <cmd> simply do the check for <cmd>
         Some("sudo") => is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(&command[1..]),
 
+        Some("rg") => {
+            ripgrep_command_can_execute_arbitrary_command(command, RipgrepArgCase::Sensitive)
+        }
+
         // ── anything else ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
         _ => false,
     }
@@ -174,6 +182,34 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(command_might_be_dangerous(&vec_str(&["rm", "-f", "/"])));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn ripgrep_pre_processor_is_dangerous() {
+        for command in [
+            vec_str(&["rg", "--pre", "./pre.sh", "needle", "input.txt"]),
+            vec_str(&["rg", "--pre=./pre.sh", "needle", "input.txt"]),
+            vec_str(&["/usr/bin/rg", "--hostname-bin=./hostname.sh", "needle"]),
+            vec_str(&["zsh", "-lc", r"rg --pre\=./pre.sh needle input.txt"]),
+            vec_str(&["/bin/zsh", "-lc", "rg --pre=./pre.sh needle input.txt"]),
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                command_might_be_dangerous(&command),
+                "expected {command:?} to be dangerous",
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ripgrep_search_zip_is_not_dangerous() {
+        assert!(!command_might_be_dangerous(&vec_str(&[
+            "rg",
+            "--search-zip",
+            "needle",
+        ])));
+        assert!(!command_might_be_dangerous(&vec_str(&[
+            "rg", "-z", "needle",
+        ])));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn direct_powershell_words_reuse_windows_dangerous_detection() {
         let command = vec_str(&["Remove-Item", "test", "-Force"]);
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/ripgrep.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/ripgrep.rs
index 0a2bb2fab1..bcb685c1f5 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/ripgrep.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/ripgrep.rs
@@ -14,23 +14,42 @@ pub(crate) fn is_safe_ripgrep_command(command: &[String], arg_case: RipgrepArgCa
         .any(|arg| is_unsafe_ripgrep_arg(arg, arg_case))
 }
 
+pub(crate) fn ripgrep_command_can_execute_arbitrary_command(
+    command: &[String],
+    arg_case: RipgrepArgCase,
+) -> bool {
+    command.iter().skip(1).map(String::as_str).any(|arg| {
+        let normalized = normalized_long_arg(arg, arg_case);
+        ripgrep_arg_can_execute_arbitrary_command(normalized.as_ref())
+    })
+}
+
 fn is_unsafe_ripgrep_arg(arg: &str, arg_case: RipgrepArgCase) -> bool {
     let normalized = normalized_long_arg(arg, arg_case);
+    if ripgrep_arg_can_execute_arbitrary_command(normalized.as_ref()) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     match normalized.as_ref() {
+        // Calls out to other decompression tools, so do not auto-approve
+        // out of an abundance of caution.
+        "--search-zip" => true,
+        _ => {
+            normalized.starts_with("--search-zip=")
+                || ripgrep_short_options_contain_search_zip(arg, arg_case)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn ripgrep_arg_can_execute_arbitrary_command(normalized_arg: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        normalized_arg,
         // Takes an arbitrary command that is executed for each match.
         "--pre"
         // Takes a command that can be used to obtain the local hostname.
         | "--hostname-bin"
-        // Calls out to other decompression tools, so do not auto-approve
-        // out of an abundance of caution.
-        | "--search-zip" => true,
-        _ => {
-            normalized.starts_with("--pre=")
-                || normalized.starts_with("--hostname-bin=")
-                || normalized.starts_with("--search-zip=")
-                || ripgrep_short_options_contain_search_zip(arg, arg_case)
-        }
-    }
+    ) || normalized_arg.starts_with("--pre=")
+        || normalized_arg.starts_with("--hostname-bin=")
 }
 
 fn normalized_long_arg(arg: &str, arg_case: RipgrepArgCase) -> Cow<'_, str> {