Make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess

## What

This change introduces a new `ReadOnlyAccess` model and threads it through
sandbox policy consumers so read access is explicit instead of implicit.

- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` to protocol:
  - `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
  - `FullAccess`
- Changed `SandboxPolicy` shape:
  - `ReadOnly` is now `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
  - `WorkspaceWrite` now carries `read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess`
- Kept existing behavior for now by defaulting to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`
  in constructors and current config/app-server mappings.
- Added helper methods to compute effective readable roots (including optional
  platform defaults + cwd) and to detect full read access.
- Updated seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by emitting
  scoped `(allow file-read* ...)` entries when full read access is not granted.
- Updated Linux backends (`bwrap`, legacy landlock path) to fail closed with an
  explicit `UnsupportedOperation` when restricted read access is requested but
  not yet implemented there.
- Updated Windows sandbox backends (standard, elevated, and runner paths) to
  fail closed in the same way for restricted read access.
- Updated all call sites/tests/pattern matches for the new structured variants
  and regenerated app-server protocol schema/types.

## Why

The previous `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` implied full-disk read access and left
no way to express a narrower read surface.

This refactor establishes the policy model needed to support user-configurable
read restrictions in a follow-up without changing current runtime behavior.

It also ensures we do not silently ignore future restricted-read policies on
platform backends that do not support them yet. Failing closed keeps sandbox
semantics predictable and avoids accidental over-permission.

## Compatibility and rollout notes

- Existing behavior is preserved by default (`FullAccess`).
- Existing config/app-server flows continue to serialize/deserialize cleanly.
- New schema artifacts are included to keep generated protocol outputs in sync.

## Validation

- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Targeted crate/test runs were executed during development for protocol/core/
  sandbox-related crates.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-02-11 12:38:15 -08:00
parent 87279de434
commit d5815087df
85 changed files with 1825 additions and 305 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ pub fn builtin_approval_presets() -> Vec<ApprovalPreset> {
label: "Read Only",
description: "Codex can read files in the current workspace. Approval is required to edit files or access the internet.",
approval: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
sandbox: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
},
ApprovalPreset {
id: "auto",
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
pub fn summarize_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> String {
match sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => "danger-full-access".to_string(),
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => "read-only".to_string(),
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => "read-only".to_string(),
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { network_access } => {
let mut summary = "external-sandbox".to_string();
if matches!(network_access, NetworkAccess::Enabled) {
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ pub fn summarize_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> String {
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
read_only_access: _,
} => {
let mut summary = "workspace-write".to_string();
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ mod tests {
let writable_root = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(root).unwrap();
let summary = summarize_sandbox_policy(&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![writable_root.clone()],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,