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Make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess
## What
This change introduces a new `ReadOnlyAccess` model and threads it through
sandbox policy consumers so read access is explicit instead of implicit.
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` to protocol:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Changed `SandboxPolicy` shape:
- `ReadOnly` is now `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite` now carries `read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess`
- Kept existing behavior for now by defaulting to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`
in constructors and current config/app-server mappings.
- Added helper methods to compute effective readable roots (including optional
platform defaults + cwd) and to detect full read access.
- Updated seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by emitting
scoped `(allow file-read* ...)` entries when full read access is not granted.
- Updated Linux backends (`bwrap`, legacy landlock path) to fail closed with an
explicit `UnsupportedOperation` when restricted read access is requested but
not yet implemented there.
- Updated Windows sandbox backends (standard, elevated, and runner paths) to
fail closed in the same way for restricted read access.
- Updated all call sites/tests/pattern matches for the new structured variants
and regenerated app-server protocol schema/types.
## Why
The previous `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` implied full-disk read access and left
no way to express a narrower read surface.
This refactor establishes the policy model needed to support user-configurable
read restrictions in a follow-up without changing current runtime behavior.
It also ensures we do not silently ignore future restricted-read policies on
platform backends that do not support them yet. Failing closed keeps sandbox
semantics predictable and avoids accidental over-permission.
## Compatibility and rollout notes
- Existing behavior is preserved by default (`FullAccess`).
- Existing config/app-server flows continue to serialize/deserialize cleanly.
- New schema artifacts are included to keep generated protocol outputs in sync.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Targeted crate/test runs were executed during development for protocol/core/
sandbox-related crates.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@ fn create_bwrap_flags(
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/// 4. `--dev-bind /dev/null /dev/null` preserves the common sink even under a
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/// read-only root.
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fn create_filesystem_args(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
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if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
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return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(
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"Restricted read-only access is not yet supported by the Linux bubblewrap backend."
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.to_string(),
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));
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}
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let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
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ensure_mount_targets_exist(&writable_roots)?;
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@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
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}
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if apply_landlock_fs && !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
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if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
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return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(
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"Restricted read-only access is not supported by the legacy Linux Landlock filesystem backend."
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.to_string(),
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));
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}
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let writable_roots = sandbox_policy
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.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
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.into_iter()
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@@ -70,9 +77,6 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
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install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots)?;
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}
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// TODO(ragona): Add appropriate restrictions if
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// `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `false`.
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Ok(())
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}
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@@ -222,11 +226,11 @@ mod tests {
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#[test]
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fn restricted_network_policy_always_installs_seccomp() {
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assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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false
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));
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assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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true
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));
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}
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@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ mod tests {
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fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
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let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
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vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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Path::new("/"),
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BwrapOptions {
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mount_proc: true,
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@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ mod tests {
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fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
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let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
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vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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Path::new("/"),
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BwrapOptions {
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mount_proc: true,
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@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ mod tests {
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fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {
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let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
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vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
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Path::new("/"),
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BwrapOptions {
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mount_proc: true,
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@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ async fn run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
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.iter()
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.map(|p| AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(p.as_path()).unwrap())
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.collect(),
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read_only_access: Default::default(),
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network_access: false,
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// Exclude tmp-related folders from writable roots because we need a
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// folder that is writable by tests but that we intentionally disallow
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