This commit is contained in:
Roy Han
2026-03-31 15:07:23 -07:00
1807 changed files with 41233 additions and 163241 deletions
+57
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,66 @@ pub enum PlanType {
Plus,
Pro,
Team,
#[serde(rename = "self_serve_business_usage_based")]
#[ts(rename = "self_serve_business_usage_based")]
SelfServeBusinessUsageBased,
Business,
#[serde(rename = "enterprise_cbp_usage_based")]
#[ts(rename = "enterprise_cbp_usage_based")]
EnterpriseCbpUsageBased,
Enterprise,
Edu,
#[serde(other)]
Unknown,
}
impl PlanType {
pub fn is_team_like(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Team | Self::SelfServeBusinessUsageBased)
}
pub fn is_business_like(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Business | Self::EnterpriseCbpUsageBased)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::PlanType;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn usage_based_plan_types_use_expected_wire_names() {
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&PlanType::SelfServeBusinessUsageBased)
.expect("self-serve business usage based should serialize"),
"\"self_serve_business_usage_based\""
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&PlanType::EnterpriseCbpUsageBased)
.expect("enterprise cbp usage based should serialize"),
"\"enterprise_cbp_usage_based\""
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::from_str::<PlanType>("\"self_serve_business_usage_based\"")
.expect("self-serve business usage based should deserialize"),
PlanType::SelfServeBusinessUsageBased
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::from_str::<PlanType>("\"enterprise_cbp_usage_based\"")
.expect("enterprise cbp usage based should deserialize"),
PlanType::EnterpriseCbpUsageBased
);
}
#[test]
fn plan_family_helpers_group_usage_based_variants_with_existing_plans() {
assert_eq!(PlanType::Team.is_team_like(), true);
assert_eq!(PlanType::SelfServeBusinessUsageBased.is_team_like(), true);
assert_eq!(PlanType::Business.is_team_like(), false);
assert_eq!(PlanType::Business.is_business_like(), true);
assert_eq!(PlanType::EnterpriseCbpUsageBased.is_business_like(), true);
assert_eq!(PlanType::Team.is_business_like(), false);
}
}
+78
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@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
use std::num::NonZeroU64;
use std::time::Duration;
use strum_macros::Display;
use strum_macros::EnumIter;
use ts_rs::TS;
@@ -261,6 +264,81 @@ pub enum ForcedLoginMethod {
Api,
}
const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 5_000;
const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_AUTH_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS: u64 = 300_000;
/// Configuration for obtaining a provider bearer token from a command.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema)]
#[schemars(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct ModelProviderAuthInfo {
/// Command to execute. Bare names are resolved via `PATH`; paths are resolved against `cwd`.
pub command: String,
/// Command arguments.
#[serde(default)]
pub args: Vec<String>,
/// Maximum time to wait for the token command to exit successfully.
#[serde(default = "default_provider_auth_timeout_ms")]
pub timeout_ms: NonZeroU64,
/// Maximum age for the cached token before rerunning the command.
#[serde(default = "default_provider_auth_refresh_interval_ms")]
pub refresh_interval_ms: NonZeroU64,
/// Working directory used when running the token command.
#[serde(default = "default_provider_auth_cwd")]
#[schemars(skip_serializing_if = "is_default_provider_auth_cwd")]
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
}
impl ModelProviderAuthInfo {
pub fn timeout(&self) -> Duration {
Duration::from_millis(self.timeout_ms.get())
}
pub fn refresh_interval(&self) -> Duration {
Duration::from_millis(self.refresh_interval_ms.get())
}
}
fn default_provider_auth_timeout_ms() -> NonZeroU64 {
non_zero_u64(
DEFAULT_PROVIDER_AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS,
"model_providers.<id>.auth.timeout_ms",
)
}
fn default_provider_auth_refresh_interval_ms() -> NonZeroU64 {
non_zero_u64(
DEFAULT_PROVIDER_AUTH_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS,
"model_providers.<id>.auth.refresh_interval_ms",
)
}
fn non_zero_u64(value: u64, field_name: &str) -> NonZeroU64 {
match NonZeroU64::new(value) {
Some(value) => value,
None => panic!("{field_name} must be non-zero"),
}
}
fn default_provider_auth_cwd() -> AbsolutePathBuf {
let deserializer = serde::de::value::StrDeserializer::<serde::de::value::Error>::new(".");
if let Ok(cwd) = AbsolutePathBuf::deserialize(deserializer) {
return cwd;
}
match AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(err) => panic!("provider auth cwd must resolve: {err}"),
}
}
fn is_default_provider_auth_cwd(path: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> bool {
path == &default_provider_auth_cwd()
}
/// Represents the trust level for a project directory.
/// This determines the approval policy and sandbox mode applied.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Display, JsonSchema, TS)]
-20
View File
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use ts_rs::TS;
/// Base namespace for custom prompt slash commands (without trailing colon).
/// Example usage forms constructed in code:
/// - Command token after '/': `"{PROMPTS_CMD_PREFIX}:name"`
/// - Full slash prefix: `"/{PROMPTS_CMD_PREFIX}:"`
pub const PROMPTS_CMD_PREFIX: &str = "prompts";
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct CustomPrompt {
pub name: String,
pub path: PathBuf,
pub content: String,
pub description: Option<String>,
pub argument_hint: Option<String>,
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ mod tests {
panic!("expected hook prompt message");
};
let parsed = parse_hook_prompt_message(None, &content).expect("parsed hook prompt");
let parsed = parse_hook_prompt_message(/*id*/ None, &content).expect("parsed hook prompt");
assert_eq!(parsed.fragments, original);
}
-1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ pub use agent_path::AgentPath;
pub use thread_id::ThreadId;
pub mod approvals;
pub mod config_types;
pub mod custom_prompts;
pub mod dynamic_tools;
pub mod items;
pub mod mcp;
+60 -34
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use codex_utils_image::PromptImageMode;
use codex_utils_image::load_for_prompt_bytes;
use codex_utils_template::Template;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Deserializer;
use serde::Serialize;
@@ -30,6 +32,19 @@ use schemars::JsonSchema;
use crate::mcp::CallToolResult;
static SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS_TEMPLATE: LazyLock<Template> = LazyLock::new(|| {
Template::parse(SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS.trim_end())
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("danger-full-access sandbox template must parse: {err}"))
});
static SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE_TEMPLATE: LazyLock<Template> = LazyLock::new(|| {
Template::parse(SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE.trim_end())
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("workspace-write sandbox template must parse: {err}"))
});
static SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY_TEMPLATE: LazyLock<Template> = LazyLock::new(|| {
Template::parse(SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY.trim_end())
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("read-only sandbox template must parse: {err}"))
});
/// Controls the per-command sandbox override requested by a shell-like tool call.
#[derive(
Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS,
@@ -583,11 +598,14 @@ impl DeveloperInstructions {
fn sandbox_text(mode: SandboxMode, network_access: NetworkAccess) -> DeveloperInstructions {
let template = match mode {
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS.trim_end(),
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite => SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE.trim_end(),
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY.trim_end(),
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => &*SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS_TEMPLATE,
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite => &*SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE_TEMPLATE,
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => &*SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY_TEMPLATE,
};
let text = template.replace("{network_access}", &network_access.to_string());
let network_access = network_access.to_string();
let text = template
.render([("network_access", network_access.as_str())])
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("sandbox template must render: {err}"));
DeveloperInstructions::new(text)
}
@@ -1654,6 +1672,14 @@ mod tests {
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `read-only`: The sandbox only permits reading files. Network access is restricted."
)
);
let danger_full_access: DeveloperInstructions = SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess.into();
assert_eq!(
danger_full_access,
DeveloperInstructions::new(
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `danger-full-access`: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is enabled."
)
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1668,7 +1694,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: false,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: false,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1698,8 +1724,8 @@ mod tests {
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
&PathBuf::from("/tmp"),
false,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ false,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("Network access is enabled."));
@@ -1725,7 +1751,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: false,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: false,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1746,7 +1772,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: false,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: true,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1766,7 +1792,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: false,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: true,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1786,7 +1812,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: true,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: false,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1806,7 +1832,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: false,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: true,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1828,7 +1854,7 @@ mod tests {
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: true,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: true,
},
None,
/*writable_roots*/ None,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
@@ -1842,8 +1868,8 @@ mod tests {
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
ApprovalsReviewer::GuardianSubagent,
&Policy::empty(),
false,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ false,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -1857,8 +1883,8 @@ mod tests {
AskForApproval::Never,
ApprovalsReviewer::GuardianSubagent,
&Policy::empty(),
false,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ false,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -1909,8 +1935,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ true,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -1943,8 +1969,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ true,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -1958,8 +1984,8 @@ mod tests {
"- `mcp_elicitations`",
],
&[],
true,
false,
/*include_shell_permission_request_instructions*/ true,
/*include_request_permissions_tool_section*/ false,
)
);
}
@@ -1976,8 +2002,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
false,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ false,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -1991,8 +2017,8 @@ mod tests {
"- `mcp_elicitations`",
],
&[],
false,
false,
/*include_shell_permission_request_instructions*/ false,
/*include_request_permissions_tool_section*/ false,
)
);
}
@@ -2009,8 +2035,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
true,
true,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ true,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ true,
)
.into_text();
assert!(allowed.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
@@ -2025,8 +2051,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
true,
true,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ true,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ true,
)
.into_text();
assert!(!rejected.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
@@ -2045,8 +2071,8 @@ mod tests {
}),
ApprovalsReviewer::User,
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
/*exec_permission_approvals_enabled*/ true,
/*request_permissions_tool_enabled*/ false,
)
.into_text();
@@ -2626,7 +2652,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(
content.get(3),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: local_image_open_tag_text(2),
text: local_image_open_tag_text(/*label_number*/ 2),
})
);
assert!(matches!(
+17 -8
View File
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ mod tests {
default_verbosity: None,
apply_patch_tool_type: None,
web_search_tool_type: WebSearchToolType::Text,
truncation_policy: TruncationPolicyConfig::bytes(10_000),
truncation_policy: TruncationPolicyConfig::bytes(/*limit*/ 10_000),
supports_parallel_tool_calls: false,
supports_image_detail_original: false,
context_window: None,
@@ -606,7 +606,10 @@ mod tests {
model.get_model_instructions(Some(Personality::None)),
"Hello\n"
);
assert_eq!(model.get_model_instructions(None), "Hello\n");
assert_eq!(
model.get_model_instructions(/*personality*/ None),
"Hello\n"
);
let model_no_personality = test_model(Some(ModelMessages {
instructions_template: Some("Hello\n{{ personality }}".to_string()),
@@ -628,7 +631,10 @@ mod tests {
model_no_personality.get_model_instructions(Some(Personality::None)),
"Hello\n"
);
assert_eq!(model_no_personality.get_model_instructions(None), "Hello\n");
assert_eq!(
model_no_personality.get_model_instructions(/*personality*/ None),
"Hello\n"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -651,7 +657,7 @@ mod tests {
fn get_personality_message_returns_default_when_personality_is_none() {
let personality_template = personality_variables();
assert_eq!(
personality_template.get_personality_message(None),
personality_template.get_personality_message(/*personality*/ None),
Some("default".to_string())
);
}
@@ -672,7 +678,7 @@ mod tests {
Some(String::new())
);
assert_eq!(
personality_variables.get_personality_message(None),
personality_variables.get_personality_message(/*personality*/ None),
Some("default".to_string())
);
@@ -694,7 +700,7 @@ mod tests {
Some(String::new())
);
assert_eq!(
personality_variables.get_personality_message(None),
personality_variables.get_personality_message(/*personality*/ None),
Some("default".to_string())
);
@@ -715,7 +721,10 @@ mod tests {
personality_variables.get_personality_message(Some(Personality::None)),
Some(String::new())
);
assert_eq!(personality_variables.get_personality_message(None), None);
assert_eq!(
personality_variables.get_personality_message(/*personality*/ None),
None
);
}
#[test]
@@ -763,7 +772,7 @@ mod tests {
availability_nux: Some(ModelAvailabilityNux {
message: "Try Spark.".to_string(),
}),
..test_model(None)
..test_model(/*spec*/ None)
});
assert_eq!(
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1268,7 +1268,10 @@ mod tests {
fn unknown_special_paths_are_ignored_by_legacy_bridge() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(":future_special_path", None),
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(
":future_special_path",
/*subpath*/ None,
),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}]);
@@ -1 +1 @@
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `danger-full-access`: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is {network_access}.
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `danger-full-access`: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is {{network_access}}.
@@ -1 +1 @@
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `read-only`: The sandbox only permits reading files. Network access is {network_access}.
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `read-only`: The sandbox only permits reading files. Network access is {{network_access}}.
@@ -1 +1 @@
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in `cwd` and `writable_roots`. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is {network_access}.
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in `cwd` and `writable_roots`. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is {{network_access}}.
+20 -20
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ use crate::config_types::Personality;
use crate::config_types::ReasoningSummary as ReasoningSummaryConfig;
use crate::config_types::ServiceTier;
use crate::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use crate::custom_prompts::CustomPrompt;
use crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem;
use crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallRequest;
use crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolResponse;
@@ -451,9 +450,6 @@ pub enum Op {
/// enable/disable state) without restarting the thread.
ReloadUserConfig,
/// Request the list of available custom prompts.
ListCustomPrompts,
/// Request the list of skills for the provided `cwd` values or the session default.
ListSkills {
/// Working directories to scope repo skills discovery.
@@ -512,6 +508,15 @@ pub enum Op {
ListModels,
}
impl From<Vec<UserInput>> for Op {
fn from(value: Vec<UserInput>) -> Self {
Op::UserInput {
items: value,
final_output_json_schema: None,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct InterAgentCommunication {
pub author: AgentPath,
@@ -586,7 +591,6 @@ impl Op {
Self::ListMcpTools => "list_mcp_tools",
Self::RefreshMcpServers { .. } => "refresh_mcp_servers",
Self::ReloadUserConfig => "reload_user_config",
Self::ListCustomPrompts => "list_custom_prompts",
Self::ListSkills { .. } => "list_skills",
Self::Compact => "compact",
Self::DropMemories => "drop_memories",
@@ -1361,9 +1365,6 @@ pub enum EventMsg {
/// List of MCP tools available to the agent.
McpListToolsResponse(McpListToolsResponseEvent),
/// List of custom prompts available to the agent.
ListCustomPromptsResponse(ListCustomPromptsResponseEvent),
/// List of skills available to the agent.
ListSkillsResponse(ListSkillsResponseEvent),
@@ -3101,12 +3102,6 @@ impl fmt::Display for McpAuthStatus {
}
}
/// Response payload for `Op::ListCustomPrompts`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ListCustomPromptsResponseEvent {
pub custom_prompts: Vec<CustomPrompt>,
}
/// Response payload for `Op::ListSkills`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ListSkillsResponseEvent {
@@ -4290,7 +4285,7 @@ mod tests {
}),
};
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(false);
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(/*show_raw_agent_reasoning*/ false);
assert_eq!(legacy_events.len(), 1);
match &legacy_events[0] {
EventMsg::WebSearchBegin(event) => assert_eq!(event.call_id, "search-1"),
@@ -4306,7 +4301,11 @@ mod tests {
item: TurnItem::UserMessage(UserMessageItem::new(&[])),
};
assert!(event.as_legacy_events(false).is_empty());
assert!(
event
.as_legacy_events(/*show_raw_agent_reasoning*/ false)
.is_empty()
);
}
#[test]
@@ -4323,7 +4322,7 @@ mod tests {
}),
};
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(false);
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(/*show_raw_agent_reasoning*/ false);
assert_eq!(legacy_events.len(), 1);
match &legacy_events[0] {
EventMsg::ImageGenerationBegin(event) => assert_eq!(event.call_id, "ig-1"),
@@ -4345,7 +4344,7 @@ mod tests {
}),
};
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(false);
let legacy_events = event.as_legacy_events(/*show_raw_agent_reasoning*/ false);
assert_eq!(legacy_events.len(), 1);
match &legacy_events[0] {
EventMsg::ImageGenerationEnd(event) => {
@@ -4760,8 +4759,9 @@ mod tests {
total_tokens: 10,
});
let info = TokenUsageInfo::new_or_append(&initial, &last, None)
.expect("new_or_append should return info");
let info =
TokenUsageInfo::new_or_append(&initial, &last, /*model_context_window*/ None)
.expect("new_or_append should return info");
assert_eq!(info.model_context_window, Some(258_400));
}