diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs index aa7ff96818..e574be6a0e 100644 --- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs +++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs @@ -340,6 +340,13 @@ mod tests { args.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect() } + fn assert_unsafe_parsed_command(words: &[&str]) { + assert!( + !is_safe_powershell_command(&vec_str(words)), + "expected parsed command {words:?} to require approval", + ); + } + #[test] fn recognizes_safe_powershell_wrappers() { assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ @@ -441,136 +448,69 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn rejects_git_global_override_options() { - let Some(pwsh) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() else { - return; - }; - - let pwsh: String = pwsh.as_path().to_str().unwrap().into(); - for script in [ - "git -c core.pager=cat show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --config-env core.pager=PAGER show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --config-env=core.pager=PAGER show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --git-dir .evil-git diff HEAD~1..HEAD", - "git --git-dir=.evil-git diff HEAD~1..HEAD", - "git --work-tree . status", - "git --work-tree=. status", - "git --exec-path .git/helpers show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --exec-path=.git/helpers show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --namespace attacker show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --namespace=attacker show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --super-prefix attacker/ show HEAD:foo.rs", - "git --super-prefix=attacker/ show HEAD:foo.rs", + for words in [ + &["git", "-c", "core.pager=cat", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &[ + "git", + "--config-env", + "core.pager=PAGER", + "show", + "HEAD:foo.rs", + ][..], + &[ + "git", + "--config-env=core.pager=PAGER", + "show", + "HEAD:foo.rs", + ][..], + &["git", "--git-dir", ".evil-git", "diff", "HEAD~1..HEAD"][..], + &["git", "--git-dir=.evil-git", "diff", "HEAD~1..HEAD"][..], + &["git", "--work-tree", ".", "status"][..], + &["git", "--work-tree=.", "status"][..], + &["git", "--exec-path", ".git/helpers", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &["git", "--exec-path=.git/helpers", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &["git", "--namespace", "attacker", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &["git", "--namespace=attacker", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &["git", "--super-prefix", "attacker/", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], + &["git", "--super-prefix=attacker/", "show", "HEAD:foo.rs"][..], ] { - assert!( - !is_safe_command_windows(&[ - pwsh.clone(), - "-NoLogo".to_string(), - "-NoProfile".to_string(), - "-Command".to_string(), - script.to_string(), - ]), - "expected {script:?} to require approval due to unsafe git global option", - ); + assert_unsafe_parsed_command(words); } } #[test] - fn rejects_powershell_commands_with_side_effects() { - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-NoLogo", - "-Command", - "Remove-Item foo.txt", - ]))); + fn rejects_parsed_powershell_commands_with_side_effects() { + for words in [ + &["Remove-Item", "foo.txt"][..], + &["rg", "--pre", "cat"][..], + &["Set-Content", "foo.txt", "hello"][..], + &["Out-File", "y"][..], + &["Write-Output", "(Set-Content", "foo6.txt", "abc)"][..], + &["Write-Host", "(Remove-Item", "foo.txt)"][..], + &["Get-Content", "(New-Item", "bar.txt)"][..], + ] { + assert_unsafe_parsed_command(words); + } + } - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-NoProfile", - "-Command", - "rg --pre cat", - ]))); - - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "Set-Content foo.txt 'hello'", - ]))); - - // Redirections are blocked - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", + #[test] + fn rejects_parser_only_powershell_side_effect_patterns() { + for script in [ "echo hi > out.txt", - ]))); - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", "Get-Content x | Out-File y", - ]))); - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", "Write-Output foo 2> err.txt", - ]))); - - // Call operator is blocked - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", "& Remove-Item foo", - ]))); - - // Chained safe + unsafe must fail - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", "Get-ChildItem; Remove-Item foo", - ]))); - // Nested unsafe cmdlet inside safe command must fail - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "Write-Output (Set-Content foo6.txt 'abc')", - ]))); - // Additional nested unsafe cmdlet examples must fail - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "Write-Host (Remove-Item foo.txt)", - ]))); - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "Get-Content (New-Item bar.txt)", - ]))); - - // Unsafe @ expansion. - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "ls @(calc.exe)" - ]))); - - // Unsupported constructs that the AST parser refuses (no fallback to manual splitting). - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "ls && pwd" - ]))); - - // Sub-expressions are rejected even if they contain otherwise safe commands. - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "Write-Output $(Get-Content foo)" - ]))); - - // Empty words from the parser (e.g. '') are rejected. - assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[ - "powershell.exe", - "-Command", - "''" - ]))); + "ls @(calc.exe)", + "ls && pwd", + "Write-Output $(Get-Content foo)", + "''", + ] { + assert!( + !is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&["powershell.exe", "-Command", script,])), + "expected {script:?} to require approval", + ); + } } #[test]