diff --git a/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs b/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs
index f467074828..4303ba537c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs
@@ -179,8 +179,11 @@ pub(crate) fn thread_response_sandbox_policy(
     permission_profile: &codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy {
+    let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
     let sandbox_policy = codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
         permission_profile,
+        &file_system_policy,
+        permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
         cwd,
     );
     sandbox_policy.into()
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs
index b3f9cb0e2e..5b4e92380e 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs
@@ -115,8 +115,11 @@ impl TryStartTurnIfIdleError {
 
 impl ThreadConfigSnapshot {
     pub fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
+        let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
         codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
             &self.permission_profile,
+            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            self.permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
             self.cwd.as_path(),
         )
     }
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
index fd74fcf2d2..1f06eb8668 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
@@ -449,7 +449,13 @@ impl Permissions {
     /// Legacy compatibility projection derived from the canonical profile.
     pub fn legacy_sandbox_policy(&self, cwd: &Path) -> SandboxPolicy {
         let permission_profile = self.materialized_permission_profile();
-        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(&permission_profile, cwd)
+        let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+            &permission_profile,
+            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
+            cwd,
+        )
     }
 
     /// Check whether a legacy sandbox policy can be applied to this permission
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
index 8e87528df0..e050552246 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
@@ -31,18 +31,19 @@ use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
 use codex_protocol::exec_output::ExecToolCallOutput;
 use codex_protocol::exec_output::StreamOutput;
 use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::Event;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecCommandOutputDeltaEvent;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecOutputStream;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
-use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use codex_utils_pty::DEFAULT_OUTPUT_BYTES_CAP;
 use codex_utils_pty::process_group::kill_child_process_group;
@@ -418,17 +419,22 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
         exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
         exec_req.network.is_some(),
     );
+    let sandbox_policy = exec_req.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
     exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             exec_req.sandbox,
-            &exec_req.permission_profile,
+            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_cwd,
             use_windows_elevated_backend,
         )
     } else {
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             exec_req.sandbox,
-            &exec_req.permission_profile,
+            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_cwd,
             exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
         )
@@ -998,28 +1004,34 @@ async fn exec(
 }
 
 #[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
-fn permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
-    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+fn should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+    sandbox: SandboxType,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
 ) -> bool {
-    match permission_profile {
-        PermissionProfile::Managed { file_system, .. } => {
-            !file_system.to_sandbox_policy().has_full_disk_write_access()
-        }
-        PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. } => false,
-    }
+    sandbox == SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken
+        && file_system_sandbox_policy.kind == FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted
+        && !matches!(
+            sandbox_policy,
+            SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. }
+        )
 }
 
 #[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
 pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
 ) -> Option<String> {
     if windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated {
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             sandbox,
-            permission_profile,
+            sandbox_policy,
+            file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_policy_cwd,
             windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         )
@@ -1027,7 +1039,9 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
     } else {
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             sandbox,
-            permission_profile,
+            sandbox_policy,
+            file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_policy_cwd,
             windows_sandbox_level,
         )
@@ -1037,7 +1051,9 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
 
 pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
 ) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1047,22 +1063,25 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
-        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
-
     let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
         .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
 
-    if permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile)
-        && !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
+    if should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+        sandbox,
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+    ) && !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
     {
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
-        let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
+    if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+        sandbox,
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+    ) {
         return Err(format!(
-            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
+            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
             file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
         ));
     }
@@ -1071,7 +1090,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     // but its WRITE_RESTRICTED token does not make capability SID deny-read ACEs
     // participate in read access checks. Read restrictions therefore require the
     // elevated backend, even when the filesystem root remains readable.
-    if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
+    if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
         return Err(
             "windows unelevated restricted-token sandbox cannot enforce split filesystem read restrictions directly; refusing to run unsandboxed"
                 .to_string(),
@@ -1079,7 +1098,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     }
 
     let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
     )?;
     if !additional_deny_read_paths.is_empty() {
@@ -1089,11 +1108,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
         );
     }
 
-    let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-        permission_profile,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
-    );
-    let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let split_writable_roots =
         file_system_sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
@@ -1189,7 +1204,9 @@ fn windows_policy_has_root_read_access(
 
 pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     use_windows_elevated_backend: bool,
 ) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1197,19 +1214,19 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
-        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
-
-    if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
-        let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
+    if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+        sandbox,
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+    ) {
         return Err(format!(
-            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
+            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
             file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
         ));
     }
 
     let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
     )?;
 
@@ -1225,11 +1242,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
         .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let normalize_path = |path: PathBuf| dunce::canonicalize(&path).unwrap_or(path);
-    let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-        permission_profile,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
-    );
-    let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
         .iter()
         .map(|root| normalize_path(root.root.to_path_buf()))
@@ -1251,7 +1264,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     // whether the baseline still reads from the filesystem root and only needs
     // additional deny ACLs layered on top.
     let split_has_root_read_access =
-        windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+        windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let read_roots_override = if split_has_root_read_access {
         None
     } else {
@@ -1316,14 +1329,6 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     }))
 }
 
-fn permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile) -> &'static str {
-    match permission_profile {
-        PermissionProfile::Managed { .. } => "Managed",
-        PermissionProfile::Disabled => "Disabled",
-        PermissionProfile::External { .. } => "External",
-    }
-}
-
 fn has_reopened_writable_descendant(
     writable_roots: &[codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot],
 ) -> bool {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
index 84dfaba5d7..1c71d02651 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
@@ -379,18 +379,34 @@ async fn process_exec_tool_call_preserves_full_buffer_capture_policy() -> Result
 
 #[test]
 fn windows_restricted_token_skips_external_sandbox_policies() {
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
-        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
+        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
     };
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
 
-    assert!(!permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
+    assert_eq!(
+        should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+        ),
+        false
+    );
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_supports_read_only_profiles() {
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
+fn windows_restricted_token_runs_for_legacy_restricted_policies() {
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
 
-    assert!(permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
+    assert_eq!(
+        should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+        ),
+        true
+    );
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -411,64 +427,39 @@ fn windows_proxy_enforcement_uses_elevated_backend() {
 
 #[test]
 fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_network_only_restrictions() {
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
+        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
+    };
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted();
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
             unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
                 SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-                &permission_profile,
+                &policy,
+                &file_system_policy,
+                NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
                 &sandbox_policy_cwd,
                 WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
             ),
             Some(
-                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
+                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
             )
         );
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_managed_root_write_profiles() {
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
-        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
-            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
-                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
-            },
-            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
-        },
-    ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
+fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
-            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
-        ),
-        Some(
-            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Restricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed"
-                .to_string()
-        )
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_allows_read_only_profiles() {
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
-    let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
-
-    assert_eq!(
-        unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
-            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -477,19 +468,22 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_allows_read_only_profiles() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_allows_workspace_write_profiles() {
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
-        &[],
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
-        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
-    );
+fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -505,21 +499,22 @@ fn windows_elevated_allows_split_restricted_read_policies() {
     )
     .expect("absolute docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
+        network_access: false,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         ),
@@ -532,6 +527,12 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -549,15 +550,13 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -573,6 +572,12 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -588,15 +593,13 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -615,6 +618,12 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
         .abs();
     let docs = cwd.join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -635,20 +644,17 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
-    // The workspace-write compatibility projection already protects top-level
-    // `.codex`, so the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only
-    // docs carveout.
+    // The legacy workspace-write root already protects top-level `.codex`, so
+    // the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only docs carveout.
     let expected_deny_write_paths = vec![docs];
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -670,6 +676,12 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
         .abs();
     let blocked = cwd.join("blocked");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(blocked.as_path()).expect("create blocked");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -690,15 +702,13 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -715,6 +725,9 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
+        network_access: false,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path {
@@ -724,15 +737,13 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -752,6 +763,12 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -775,15 +792,13 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -806,6 +821,12 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
     let blocked = temp_dir.path().join("blocked");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
     let expected_blocked = dunce::canonicalize(&blocked).expect("canonical blocked");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -829,15 +850,13 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -865,6 +884,12 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
     let secret = temp_dir.path().join("app").join(".env");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(secret.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
     std::fs::write(&secret, "secret").expect("write secret");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -887,15 +912,13 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -918,6 +941,12 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     let nested = docs.join("nested");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("create nested");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -948,15 +977,13 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
         },
     ]);
-    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        &file_system_policy,
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &permission_profile,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         ),
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
index 8a2a2849fd..f853ea3ba6 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 pub use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxExecRequest;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
+use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
@@ -100,6 +102,15 @@ impl ExecRequest {
         }
     }
 
+    pub(crate) fn compatibility_sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
+        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+            &self.permission_profile,
+            &self.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            self.network_sandbox_policy,
+            self.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
+        )
+    }
+
     pub(crate) fn from_sandbox_exec_request(
         request: SandboxExecRequest,
         options: ExecOptions,
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
index 122ff6aeb9..6c7c20b314 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
@@ -150,11 +150,17 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
     }
 
     pub(super) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
-        let permission_profile = self.permission_profile();
-        codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-            &permission_profile,
-            &self.cwd,
-        )
+        self.permission_profile()
+            .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(&self.cwd)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+                let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+                codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+                    self.permission_profile_state.permission_profile(),
+                    &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+                    self.network_sandbox_policy(),
+                    &self.cwd,
+                )
+            })
     }
 
     pub(super) fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
index 5f52912d59..ba70cfa35d 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
@@ -125,8 +125,12 @@ impl TurnContext {
     }
 
     pub(crate) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
+        let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+        let network_sandbox_policy = self.network_sandbox_policy();
         compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
             &self.permission_profile,
+            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
             #[allow(deprecated)]
             &self.cwd,
         )
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs
index a23a1d749e..a2c4ebe597 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ pub enum StdioPolicy {
     Inherit,
 }
 
-/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the exec params and sandbox settings,
+/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the ExecParams and SandboxPolicy,
 /// ensuring the args and environment variables used to create the `Command`
 /// (and `Child`) honor the configuration.
 ///
diff --git a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
index 39ef358f8c..bd8f6d9b98 100644
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
@@ -290,18 +290,19 @@ impl SandboxManager {
 
 pub fn compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
     permissions: &PermissionProfile,
+    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> SandboxPolicy {
     permissions
         .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd)
         .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
-            let (file_system_policy, network_policy) = permissions.to_runtime_permissions();
             compatibility_workspace_write_policy(file_system_policy, network_policy, cwd)
         })
 }
 
 fn compatibility_workspace_write_policy(
-    file_system_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
     network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> SandboxPolicy {