diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
index d092666369..d805cb0990 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
 use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
 use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;
+use codex_shell_command::split_powershell_command_sequence;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use shlex::try_join as shlex_try_join;
 
@@ -705,6 +706,12 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy(command: &[String]) -> (Vec<Vec<String>>, bool) {
         return (commands, false);
     }
 
+    if let Some(commands) = split_powershell_command_sequence(command)
+        && !commands.is_empty()
+    {
+        return (commands, false);
+    }
+
     if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(command) {
         return (vec![single_command], true);
     }
diff --git a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
index 2db07a0fce..a87f1f10a4 100644
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy_tests.rs
@@ -674,6 +674,23 @@ fn commands_for_exec_policy_falls_back_for_whitespace_shell_script() {
     assert_eq!(commands_for_exec_policy(&command), (vec![command], false));
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn commands_for_exec_policy_splits_powershell_command() {
+    let command = vec![
+        "pwsh".to_string(),
+        "-Command".to_string(),
+        "git add -A".to_string(),
+    ];
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        commands_for_exec_policy(&command),
+        (
+            vec![vec!["git".to_string(), "add".to_string(), "-A".to_string(),]],
+            false,
+        )
+    );
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn ignore_user_config_keeps_user_policy_files() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     let temp = tempdir()?;
@@ -1637,6 +1654,32 @@ prefix_rule(pattern=["bash"], decision="allow")
     .await;
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn powershell_command_bypasses_sandbox_when_inner_command_matches_policy_allow() {
+    let policy_src = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["git", "add"], decision="allow")"#;
+
+    assert_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(
+        ExecApprovalRequirementScenario {
+            policy_src: Some(policy_src.to_string()),
+            command: vec![
+                "pwsh".to_string(),
+                "-Command".to_string(),
+                "git add -A".to_string(),
+            ],
+            approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
+            sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: workspace_write_file_system_sandbox_policy(),
+            sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
+            prefix_rule: None,
+        },
+        ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
+            bypass_sandbox: true,
+            proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .await;
+}
+
 fn derive_requested_execpolicy_amendment_for_test(
     prefix_rule: Option<&Vec<String>>,
     matched_rules: &[RuleMatch],
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs
index b6c5d863bd..112f52d8d9 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
 /// On Windows, we conservatively allow only clearly read-only PowerShell invocations
 /// that match a small safelist. Anything else (including direct CMD commands) is unsafe.
 pub fn is_safe_command_windows(command: &[String]) -> bool {
-    if let Some(commands) = try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command) {
+    if let Some(commands) = split_powershell_command_sequence(command) {
         commands
             .iter()
             .all(|cmd| is_safe_powershell_command(cmd.as_slice()))
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ pub fn is_safe_command_windows(command: &[String]) -> bool {
 
 /// Returns each command sequence if the invocation starts with a PowerShell binary.
 /// For example, the tokens from `pwsh Get-ChildItem | Measure-Object` become two sequences.
-fn try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
+pub fn split_powershell_command_sequence(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
     let (exe, rest) = command.split_first()?;
     if is_powershell_executable(exe) {
         parse_powershell_invocation(exe, rest)
diff --git a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
index 1d9e302a4e..6250217b48 100644
--- a/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/shell-command/src/lib.rs
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ pub mod powershell;
 
 pub use command_safety::is_dangerous_command;
 pub use command_safety::is_safe_command;
+pub use command_safety::windows_safe_commands::split_powershell_command_sequence;