Add opt-in transparent TCP routing for Linux sandboxes (#61372)

## Why

Native TCP clients need to reach managed network destinations without implementing proxy support themselves.

## What changed

- Add `--transparent-tcp` to the Linux sandbox command, using a bundled TCP stack, private TUN interface, and DNS stub to route native IPv4 and IPv6 connections through the attributed managed SOCKS proxy.
- Preserve original hostnames for proxy policy checks and cancel pending approval connections when their native sockets close.
- Expose `--linux-sandbox-transparent-tcp` and `--tcp-upstream-proxy` on `codex exec-server` for transparent routing and a mandatory HTTP CONNECT next hop without direct fallback.
- Require private network and PID namespaces, private procfs, system `bwrap`, and access to `/dev/net/tun`; reject incompatible launcher options and untrusted proxy ports.

## Testing

Add integration coverage for native hostname and IPv6 connections, SOCKS attribution, pending connection cancellation, policy denials, and filesystem and host-loopback isolation. Extend launcher and executor tests for option validation and managed-policy propagation.

GitOrigin-RevId: 96bd7726e5369efceb65320face56aa85ae3deb8
This commit is contained in:
viyatb-oai
2026-11-13 20:24:37 +00:00
committed by copyberry
parent 9e48702b3a
commit 7194b21776
40 changed files with 1637 additions and 188 deletions
+19 -3
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ pub async fn run_command_under_landlock(
loader_overrides: LoaderOverrides,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let LandlockCommand {
transparent_tcp,
sandbox_state,
permissions_profile,
config_profile: _,
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ pub async fn run_command_under_landlock(
command,
config_overrides,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
SandboxType::Landlock,
SandboxType::Landlock { transparent_tcp },
/*log_denials*/ false,
&[],
)
@@ -170,7 +171,9 @@ pub async fn run_command_under_windows_sandbox(
enum SandboxType {
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
Seatbelt,
Landlock,
Landlock {
transparent_tcp: bool,
},
Windows,
}
@@ -304,12 +307,21 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
config.effective_local_windows_sandbox_type()
};
let transparent_tcp = matches!(
sandbox_type,
SandboxType::Landlock {
transparent_tcp: true
}
);
let sandbox = match permission_profile.enforcement() {
SandboxEnforcement::Disabled | SandboxEnforcement::External if transparent_tcp => {
anyhow::bail!("--transparent-tcp requires a managed Linux sandbox");
}
SandboxEnforcement::Disabled | SandboxEnforcement::External => SandboxBackend::None,
SandboxEnforcement::Managed => match sandbox_type {
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
SandboxType::Seatbelt => SandboxBackend::MacosSeatbelt,
SandboxType::Landlock => SandboxBackend::LinuxSeccomp,
SandboxType::Landlock { .. } => SandboxBackend::LinuxSeccomp,
#[cfg(windows)]
SandboxType::Windows if windows_sandbox_type == WindowsMxc => WindowsMxc,
#[cfg(windows)]
@@ -386,6 +398,10 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
let manager = SandboxManager::for_inherited_terminal(allow_unix_sockets);
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos")))]
let manager = SandboxManager::new();
if transparent_tcp && network.is_none() {
anyhow::bail!("--transparent-tcp requires a managed network proxy");
}
let manager = manager.with_linux_sandbox_transparent_tcp(transparent_tcp);
let workspace_roots = sandbox_state.is_none().then(|| {
config
.permissions
+4
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ fn parse_absolute_path(raw: &str) -> Result<AbsolutePathBuf, String> {
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct LandlockCommand {
/// Route outbound TCP through the managed SOCKS proxy.
#[arg(long)]
pub transparent_tcp: bool,
#[command(flatten)]
pub sandbox_state: SandboxStateArgs,
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ Options:
[default: isolate]
--linux-sandbox-transparent-tcp
Route managed Linux sandbox TCP through the SOCKS proxy
--tcp-upstream-proxy <HOST:PORT>
Require this HTTP CONNECT proxy for raw TCP from the managed SOCKS
listener
--proxy-private-ips-via-upstream
Allow permitted private IP destinations to use the configured upstream
proxy. If no valid upstream proxy applies to the request protocol,