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Preserve unparsed shell wrappers in exec policy (#39588)
## Why Reducing a heredoc shell script to its inner executable lets a prefix rule for that executable apply to the entire wrapper, even though the full script was not parsed as a plain command. ## What changed - Fall back to evaluating the complete shell wrapper when plain-command parsing fails, including for heredoc scripts. - Keep these commands sandboxed when only the inner executable is allowed. - Propose the full wrapper as the exec policy amendment when approval is needed. ## Testing Added exec policy, Unix escalation, and approval scenario coverage for unparsed and heredoc shell wrappers. GitOrigin-RevId: 8f65133acb6b7c638263917e1d9137e45990772c
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@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
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use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::merge_permission_profiles;
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use codex_sandboxing::record_filesystem_sandbox_violation;
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use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
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use codex_shell_command::bash::parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix;
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use codex_shell_escalation::EscalateServer;
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use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationDecision;
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use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationExecution;
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@@ -681,10 +680,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
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sandbox_permissions,
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enable_shell_wrapper_parsing,
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} = context;
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let CandidateCommands {
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commands,
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used_complex_parsing,
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} = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {
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let commands = if enable_shell_wrapper_parsing {
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// In this codepath, the first argument in `commands` could be a bare
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// name like `find` instead of an absolute path like `/usr/bin/find`.
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// It could also be a shell built-in like `echo`.
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@@ -692,10 +688,7 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
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} else {
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// In this codepath, `commands` has a single entry where the program
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// is always an absolute path.
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CandidateCommands {
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commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],
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used_complex_parsing: false,
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}
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vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]
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};
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let fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {
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@@ -706,7 +699,6 @@ fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
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permission_profile: &permission_profile,
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windows_sandbox_level,
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sandbox_permissions,
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used_complex_parsing,
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command_origin: crate::exec_policy::ExecPolicyCommandOrigin::Generic,
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},
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)
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@@ -730,39 +722,24 @@ struct InterceptedExecPolicyContext {
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enable_shell_wrapper_parsing: bool,
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}
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struct CandidateCommands {
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commands: Vec<Vec<String>>,
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used_complex_parsing: bool,
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}
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fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(
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program: &AbsolutePathBuf,
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argv: &[String],
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) -> CandidateCommands {
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) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
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if let [_, flag, script] = argv {
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let shell_command = [
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program.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
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flag.clone(),
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script.clone(),
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];
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if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command) {
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return CandidateCommands {
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commands,
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used_complex_parsing: false,
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};
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}
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if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&shell_command) {
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return CandidateCommands {
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commands: vec![single_command],
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used_complex_parsing: true,
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};
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if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command)
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&& !commands.is_empty()
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{
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return commands;
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}
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}
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CandidateCommands {
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commands: vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)],
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used_complex_parsing: false,
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}
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vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)]
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}
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struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {
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@@ -257,13 +257,24 @@ fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_parses_plain_shell_wrappers() {
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);
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assert_eq!(
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candidate_commands.commands,
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candidate_commands,
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vec![
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vec!["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
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vec!["pwd".to_string()],
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]
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);
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assert!(!candidate_commands.used_complex_parsing);
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}
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#[test]
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fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_preserves_unparsed_shell_wrappers() {
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let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(host_absolute_path(&["bin", "bash"])).unwrap();
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for script in ["", " \n\t", "cat <<'EOF'\nhello\nEOF"] {
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let argv = ["not-bash".into(), "-lc".into(), script.into()];
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assert_eq!(
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commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(&program, &argv),
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vec![join_program_and_argv(&program, &argv)]
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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