diff --git a/codex-rs/tui/src/lib.rs b/codex-rs/tui/src/lib.rs
index 0ec8998d77..bd789e0c3c 100644
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/lib.rs
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ mod notifications;
 #[cfg(any(not(debug_assertions), test))]
 mod npm_registry;
 pub(crate) mod onboarding;
+mod osc_text;
 mod oss_selection;
 mod pager_overlay;
 mod permission_compat;
diff --git a/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text.rs b/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..024d738d50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+//! Sanitization for untrusted terminal-title and tab-status OSC text.
+
+/// Whether a control or invisible formatting character is unsafe in OSC text.
+pub(crate) fn is_disallowed_osc_text_char(ch: char) -> bool {
+    if ch.is_control() {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    matches!(
+        ch,
+        '\u{00AD}'
+            | '\u{034F}'
+            | '\u{061C}'
+            | '\u{180E}'
+            | '\u{200B}'..='\u{200F}'
+            | '\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}'
+            | '\u{2060}'..='\u{206F}'
+            | '\u{FE00}'..='\u{FE0F}'
+            | '\u{FEFF}'
+            | '\u{FFF9}'..='\u{FFFB}'
+            | '\u{1BCA0}'..='\u{1BCA3}'
+            | '\u{E0100}'..='\u{E01EF}'
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "osc_text_tests.rs"]
+mod tests;
diff --git a/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text_tests.rs b/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text_tests.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd67415180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/osc_text_tests.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+use super::is_disallowed_osc_text_char;
+
+#[test]
+fn rejects_controls_bidi_and_invisible_format_chars() {
+    for ch in [
+        '\x07', '\x1b', '\u{009b}', '\n', '\u{202E}', '\u{2066}', '\u{200F}', '\u{061C}',
+        '\u{200B}', '\u{FEFF}',
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            is_disallowed_osc_text_char(ch),
+            "expected {ch:?} to be disallowed"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn allows_ordinary_text() {
+    for ch in ['a', 'Z', '0', ' ', '/', '.', '\u{2026}', '\u{00E9}'] {
+        assert!(
+            !is_disallowed_osc_text_char(ch),
+            "expected {ch:?} to be allowed"
+        );
+    }
+}
diff --git a/codex-rs/tui/src/terminal_title.rs b/codex-rs/tui/src/terminal_title.rs
index c21e6b8bc4..88030f502f 100644
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/terminal_title.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/terminal_title.rs
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ fn sanitize_terminal_title(title: &str) -> String {
             continue;
         }
 
-        if is_disallowed_terminal_title_char(ch) {
+        if crate::osc_text::is_disallowed_osc_text_char(ch) {
             continue;
         }
 
@@ -145,37 +145,6 @@ fn sanitize_terminal_title(title: &str) -> String {
     sanitized
 }
 
-/// Returns whether `ch` should be dropped from terminal-title output.
-///
-/// This includes both plain control characters and a curated set of invisible
-/// formatting codepoints. The bidi entries here cover the Trojan-Source-style
-/// text-reordering controls that can make a title render misleadingly relative
-/// to its underlying byte sequence.
-fn is_disallowed_terminal_title_char(ch: char) -> bool {
-    if ch.is_control() {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // Strip Trojan-Source-related bidi controls plus common non-rendering
-    // formatting characters so title text cannot smuggle terminal control
-    // semantics or visually misleading content.
-    matches!(
-        ch,
-        '\u{00AD}'
-            | '\u{034F}'
-            | '\u{061C}'
-            | '\u{180E}'
-            | '\u{200B}'..='\u{200F}'
-            | '\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}'
-            | '\u{2060}'..='\u{206F}'
-            | '\u{FE00}'..='\u{FE0F}'
-            | '\u{FEFF}'
-            | '\u{FFF9}'..='\u{FFFB}'
-            | '\u{1BCA0}'..='\u{1BCA3}'
-            | '\u{E0100}'..='\u{E01EF}'
-    )
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::MAX_TERMINAL_TITLE_CHARS;