git-utils: scope config authorization to apply operations

This commit is contained in:
Chris Bookholt
2026-07-02 06:16:32 -07:00
parent 53519625bd
commit 30d7a76254
17 changed files with 1364 additions and 329 deletions
+107 -73
View File
@@ -13,11 +13,10 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
use crate::FsmonitorOverride;
use crate::apply_output::parse_git_apply_output;
use crate::git_command::GitRunner;
use crate::git_config_sources::ensure_no_worktree_config_sources;
use crate::patch_paths::extract_effective_paths_from_patch;
use crate::patch_paths::stage_effective_paths;
use crate::guarded_config::GuardedGitConfig;
use crate::patch_paths::extract_effective_paths_from_patch_guarded;
use crate::patch_paths::stage_effective_paths_guarded;
use crate::safe_git::DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH;
use crate::safe_git::ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters;
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::safe_git::isolate_git_command_environment;
@@ -47,29 +46,27 @@ pub struct ApplyGitResult {
/// When [`ApplyGitRequest::preflight`] is `true`, this behaves like `git apply --check` and
/// leaves the working tree untouched while still parsing the command output for diagnostics.
pub fn apply_git_patch(req: &ApplyGitRequest) -> io::Result<ApplyGitResult> {
let cfg_parts = configured_git_config_parts();
// Construct from the caller's exact route before canonicalization so
// repository authority retains lexical enclosing worktrees.
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&req.cwd)?;
let mut cfg_parts = configured_git_config_parts();
ensure_no_worktree_config_sources(&git, &req.cwd, &cfg_parts)?;
let requested_cwd = std::fs::canonicalize(&req.cwd)?;
let git_root = resolve_git_root(&git, &req.cwd, &cfg_parts)?;
if git_root != requested_cwd {
ensure_no_worktree_config_sources(&git, &git_root, &cfg_parts)?;
}
let expected_root = crate::get_git_repo_root(&requested_cwd)
.ok_or_else(|| io::Error::other("not a Git repository"))
.and_then(std::fs::canonicalize)?;
let mut config = GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, &expected_root, cfg_parts)?;
resolve_git_root(&config, &requested_cwd)?;
// Write unified diff into a temporary file
let (tmpdir, patch_path) = write_temp_patch(&req.diff)?;
// Keep tmpdir alive until function end to ensure the file exists
let _guard = tmpdir;
let patch_paths =
extract_effective_paths_from_patch(&git, &git_root, &patch_path, req.revert, &cfg_parts)?;
let filter_guard =
ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters(&git, &git_root, &patch_paths, &cfg_parts)?;
cfg_parts.extend(safe_git_config_parts());
cfg_parts.extend_from_slice(filter_guard.git_config_args());
let patch_paths = extract_effective_paths_from_patch_guarded(&config, &patch_path, req.revert)?;
config.authorize_filter_paths(&patch_paths)?;
if req.revert && !req.preflight {
// Stage WT paths first to avoid index mismatch on revert.
stage_effective_paths(&git, &git_root, &patch_paths, &cfg_parts)?;
stage_effective_paths_guarded(&config, &patch_paths)?;
}
// Build git args
@@ -87,8 +84,8 @@ pub fn apply_git_patch(req: &ApplyGitRequest) -> io::Result<ApplyGitResult> {
check_args.push("-R".to_string());
}
check_args.push(patch_path.to_string_lossy().to_string());
let rendered = render_command_for_log(&git_root, &cfg_parts, &check_args);
let (c_code, c_out, c_err) = run_git(&git, &git_root, &cfg_parts, &check_args)?;
let rendered = config.render_command_for_log(&check_args)?;
let (c_code, c_out, c_err) = run_guarded_apply(&config, &check_args)?;
let (mut applied_paths, mut skipped_paths, mut conflicted_paths) =
parse_git_apply_output(&c_out, &c_err);
applied_paths.sort();
@@ -108,8 +105,8 @@ pub fn apply_git_patch(req: &ApplyGitRequest) -> io::Result<ApplyGitResult> {
});
}
let cmd_for_log = render_command_for_log(&git_root, &cfg_parts, &args);
let (code, stdout, stderr) = run_git(&git, &git_root, &cfg_parts, &args)?;
let cmd_for_log = config.render_command_for_log(&args)?;
let (code, stdout, stderr) = run_guarded_apply(&config, &args)?;
let (mut applied_paths, mut skipped_paths, mut conflicted_paths) =
parse_git_apply_output(&stdout, &stderr);
@@ -131,18 +128,10 @@ pub fn apply_git_patch(req: &ApplyGitRequest) -> io::Result<ApplyGitResult> {
})
}
fn resolve_git_root(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
git_config_args: &[String],
) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
let requested_cwd = std::fs::canonicalize(cwd)?;
let mut command = git.command_for_cwd(&requested_cwd)?;
command
.args(git_config_args)
.arg("rev-parse")
.arg("--show-toplevel");
let out = git.output(command)?;
fn resolve_git_root(config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>, requested_cwd: &Path) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
let mut command = config.rev_parse_command()?;
command.arg("--show-toplevel");
let out = command.output()?;
let code = out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
if code != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
@@ -153,18 +142,7 @@ fn resolve_git_root(
}
let reported_root = PathBuf::from(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim());
let root = std::fs::canonicalize(&reported_root)?;
let expected_root = crate::get_git_repo_root(&requested_cwd)
.ok_or_else(|| {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
format!(
"refusing to apply a patch because Git resolved worktree {} without a .git marker above requested cwd {}",
root.display(),
requested_cwd.display()
),
)
})
.and_then(std::fs::canonicalize)?;
let expected_root = config.canonical_root();
if root != expected_root {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
@@ -221,6 +199,32 @@ pub(crate) fn run_git(
Ok((code, stdout, stderr))
}
fn run_guarded_apply(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
args: &[String],
) -> io::Result<(i32, String, String)> {
let Some((subcommand, args)) = args.split_first() else {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"missing guarded Git subcommand",
));
};
if subcommand != "apply" {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"unexpected guarded Git subcommand",
));
}
let mut command = config.apply_command()?;
command.args(args);
let output = command.output()?;
Ok((
output.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).into_owned(),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).into_owned(),
))
}
pub(crate) fn safe_git_config_parts() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"-c".to_string(),
@@ -230,33 +234,6 @@ pub(crate) fn safe_git_config_parts() -> Vec<String> {
]
}
fn quote_shell(s: &str) -> String {
let simple = s
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || "-_.:/@%+".contains(c));
if simple {
s.to_string()
} else {
format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', "'\\''"))
}
}
fn render_command_for_log(cwd: &Path, git_cfg: &[String], args: &[String]) -> String {
let mut parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
parts.push("git".to_string());
for a in git_cfg {
parts.push(quote_shell(a));
}
for a in args {
parts.push(quote_shell(a));
}
format!(
"(cd {} && {})",
quote_shell(&cwd.display().to_string()),
parts.join(" ")
)
}
#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
#[path = "apply_transport_tests.rs"]
mod transport_tests;
@@ -268,6 +245,8 @@ mod filter_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::guarded_config::config_source_authorization_count;
use crate::guarded_config::reset_config_source_authorization_count;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::Mutex;
@@ -412,7 +391,9 @@ mod tests {
revert: false,
preflight: false,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let r = apply_git_patch(&req).expect("run apply");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(r.exit_code, 0, "exit code 0");
// File exists now
assert!(root.join("hello.txt").exists());
@@ -541,6 +522,41 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!marker.exists(), "enclosing Git shim must not run");
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn apply_uses_physical_repository_for_symlinked_nested_cwd() {
let _g = env_lock().lock().unwrap();
let fixture = tempfile::tempdir().expect("fixture");
let outer = fixture.path().join("outer");
let target = fixture.path().join("target");
let nested = target.join("nested");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&outer).expect("outer");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("nested");
let (outer_init, _, outer_error) = run(&outer, &["git", "init", "-q"]);
assert_eq!(outer_init, 0, "outer init: {outer_error}");
let (target_init, _, target_error) = run(&target, &["git", "init", "-q"]);
assert_eq!(target_init, 0, "target init: {target_error}");
let lexical_cwd = outer.join("linked-nested");
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&nested, &lexical_cwd).expect("nested cwd symlink");
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let result = apply_git_patch(&ApplyGitRequest {
cwd: lexical_cwd,
diff: "diff --git a/physical.txt b/physical.txt\nnew file mode 100644\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/physical.txt\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+physical\n".to_string(),
revert: false,
preflight: false,
})
.expect("apply through symlinked nested cwd");
assert_eq!(result.exit_code, 0);
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(
read_file_normalized(&target.join("physical.txt")),
"physical\n"
);
assert!(!outer.join("physical.txt").exists());
}
#[test]
fn apply_modify_conflict() {
let _g = env_lock().lock().unwrap();
@@ -599,7 +615,9 @@ mod tests {
revert: false,
preflight: false,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let res_apply = apply_git_patch(&apply_req).expect("apply ok");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(res_apply.exit_code, 0, "forward apply succeeded");
let after_apply = read_file_normalized(&root.join("file.txt"));
assert_eq!(after_apply, "ORIG\n");
@@ -611,7 +629,9 @@ mod tests {
revert: true,
preflight: false,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let res_revert = apply_git_patch(&revert_req).expect("revert ok");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(res_revert.exit_code, 0, "revert apply succeeded");
let after_revert = read_file_normalized(&root.join("file.txt"));
assert_eq!(after_revert, "orig\n");
@@ -648,7 +668,9 @@ mod tests {
revert: true,
preflight: true,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let res_preflight = apply_git_patch(&preflight_req).expect("preflight ok");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(res_preflight.exit_code, 0, "revert preflight succeeded");
let (_code_after, staged_after, _stderr_after) =
run(root, &["git", "diff", "--cached", "--name-only"]);
@@ -678,7 +700,9 @@ diff --git a/ghost.txt b/ghost.txt\n--- a/ghost.txt\n+++ b/ghost.txt\n@@ -1,1 +1
revert: false,
preflight: true,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let r1 = apply_git_patch(&req1).expect("preflight apply");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_ne!(r1.exit_code, 0, "preflight reports failure");
assert!(
!root.join("ok.txt").exists(),
@@ -696,7 +720,9 @@ diff --git a/ghost.txt b/ghost.txt\n--- a/ghost.txt\n+++ b/ghost.txt\n@@ -1,1 +1
revert: false,
preflight: false,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let r2 = apply_git_patch(&req2).expect("direct apply");
assert_eq!(config_source_authorization_count(), 1);
assert_ne!(r2.exit_code, 0, "apply is expected to fail overall");
assert!(
!r2.cmd_for_log.contains("--check"),
@@ -724,7 +750,13 @@ diff --git a/ghost.txt b/ghost.txt\n--- a/ghost.txt\n+++ b/ghost.txt\n@@ -1,1 +1
revert,
preflight,
};
reset_config_source_authorization_count();
let error = apply_git_patch(&request).expect_err("reject configured filter");
assert_eq!(
config_source_authorization_count(),
1,
"{revert} {preflight}"
);
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::Unsupported);
assert!(!configured_filter_ran(root));
assert_eq!(read_file_normalized(&root.join("file.txt")), "orig\n");
@@ -812,8 +844,10 @@ diff --git a/ghost.txt b/ghost.txt\n--- a/ghost.txt\n+++ b/ghost.txt\n@@ -1,1 +1
assert_eq!(config_code, 0, "configure core.worktree: {config_err}");
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&attacker).expect("trusted Git");
let guarded = GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, &attacker, Vec::new())
.expect("authorize attacker repository config");
let error =
resolve_git_root(&git, &attacker, &[]).expect_err("reject redirected worktree");
resolve_git_root(&guarded, &attacker).expect_err("reject redirected worktree");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
assert!(error.to_string().contains("instead of expected worktree"));
}
@@ -553,6 +553,38 @@ fn command_scoped_offpath_filter_is_neutralized_after_local_config() {
);
}
#[test]
fn filter_override_rejects_process_temp_directory_inside_worktree() {
let root_name = "CODEX_GIT_UTILS_WORKTREE_TMP_ROOT";
if let Some(root) = std::env::var_os(root_name) {
let root = std::path::PathBuf::from(root);
let error = apply_git_patch(&request(
&root, /*revert*/ false, /*preflight*/ true,
))
.expect_err("reject worktree-owned filter override");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
assert!(!configured_filter_ran(&root));
return;
}
let repo = init_repo();
let root = repo.path();
configure_filter(root, "demo");
let worktree_temp = root.join("process-temp");
std::fs::create_dir(&worktree_temp).expect("worktree temp directory");
run_isolated_test(
"apply::filter_tests::filter_override_rejects_process_temp_directory_inside_worktree",
&[
(root_name, root.as_os_str()),
("TMPDIR", worktree_temp.as_os_str()),
#[cfg(windows)]
("TEMP", worktree_temp.as_os_str()),
#[cfg(windows)]
("TMP", worktree_temp.as_os_str()),
],
);
}
#[test]
fn apply_neutralizes_filter_activated_for_racy_offpath_by_same_patch() {
for (name, command) in [
+5 -1
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ pub(crate) enum GitReadError {
InvalidRepositoryMetadata { path: PathBuf, reason: String },
#[error("{path:?} is not a Git repository")]
NotRepository { path: PathBuf },
#[error("invalid Git configuration environment: {reason}")]
InvalidConfigEnvironment { reason: String },
}
impl GitReadError {
@@ -59,7 +61,9 @@ impl GitReadError {
Self::UnprovenPrimaryAuthority { .. } | Self::UnsafeRepositoryMetadata { .. } => {
std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied
}
Self::InvalidRepositoryMetadata { .. } => std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
Self::InvalidRepositoryMetadata { .. } | Self::InvalidConfigEnvironment { .. } => {
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData
}
}
}
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ pub(crate) fn classify_sentinel_filter_probes(
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn sentinel_filter_probe_config_args(
neutralization_args: &[String],
driver: &str,
+17
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use std::process::Command;
use std::process::Stdio;
use crate::errors::GitReadError;
use crate::git_config_environment::GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot;
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::git_executable::git_executable_name;
use crate::git_executable::harden_git_launch_environment;
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ pub(crate) struct GitRunner {
argv0: PathBuf,
safe_path: std::ffi::OsString,
authority: RepositoryAuthority,
config_environment: GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot,
}
/// A Git command that can only be spawned through [`GitRunner::output`],
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ impl GitRunner {
command.current_dir(parent);
}
harden_git_launch_environment(&mut command, &self.safe_path);
self.config_environment.apply_to(&mut command);
GitCommand { inner: command }
}
@@ -119,6 +122,14 @@ impl GitRunner {
.ensure_config_source_is_not_worktree_controlled(path, description)
}
pub(crate) fn ensure_active_worktree_root(&self, root: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
self.authority.ensure_active_worktree_root(root)
}
pub(crate) fn config_environment_value(&self, name: &str) -> Option<&OsStr> {
self.config_environment.value(name)
}
pub(crate) fn output(&self, mut command: GitCommand) -> io::Result<std::process::Output> {
self.revalidate_active_repository_metadata()?;
isolate_git_command_environment(&mut command.inner);
@@ -137,12 +148,18 @@ impl GitRunner {
) -> Result<Self, GitReadError> {
authority.ensure_primary_authority()?;
let selected = select_git_executable(&authority, search_path)?;
let config_environment = GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot::capture().map_err(|error| {
GitReadError::InvalidConfigEnvironment {
reason: error.to_string(),
}
})?;
Ok(Self {
executable: selected.executable,
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
argv0: selected.argv0,
safe_path: selected.safe_path,
authority,
config_environment,
})
}
}
@@ -52,6 +52,95 @@ fn run_git_stdout(cwd: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> String {
.to_string()
}
#[test]
fn runner_binds_config_environment_across_ambient_mutation() {
const CHILD: &str = "CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_CHILD";
if std::env::var_os(CHILD).is_none() {
let fixture = tempfile::tempdir().expect("fixture");
let repo = fixture.path().join("repo");
let safe_home = fixture.path().join("safe-home");
let malicious_home = repo.join("malicious-home");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo).expect("repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&safe_home).expect("safe home");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&malicious_home).expect("malicious home");
run_git(&repo, &["init", "-q"]);
std::fs::write(
safe_home.join(".gitconfig"),
"[codex]\n\tbound = safe-home\n",
)
.expect("safe home config");
let malicious_global = repo.join("malicious.gitconfig");
std::fs::write(&malicious_global, "[codex]\n\tbound = malicious\n")
.expect("malicious global config");
std::fs::write(
malicious_home.join(".gitconfig"),
"[codex]\n\tbound = malicious-home\n",
)
.expect("malicious home config");
let mut command = Command::new(std::env::current_exe().expect("test executable"));
isolate_git_command_environment(&mut command);
let output = command
.arg("git_command::tests::runner_binds_config_environment_across_ambient_mutation")
.arg("--exact")
.arg("--nocapture")
.env(CHILD, "1")
.env("RUST_TEST_THREADS", "1")
.env("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_ROOT", &repo)
.env("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_MALICIOUS", &malicious_global)
.env("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_MALICIOUS_HOME", &malicious_home)
.env("HOME", &safe_home)
.env("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT", "1")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0", "codex.count")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0", "safe-count")
.env_remove("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL")
.env_remove("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM")
.env_remove("GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS")
.output()
.expect("isolated config binding test");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"isolated config binding test failed:\nstdout:\n{}\nstderr:\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
return;
}
let root = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_ROOT").expect("root"));
let malicious =
std::env::var_os("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_MALICIOUS").expect("malicious config");
let malicious_home =
std::env::var_os("CODEX_GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_MALICIOUS_HOME").expect("malicious home");
let runner = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&root).expect("runner with captured config environment");
// SAFETY: the parent starts an isolated test process that runs only this
// exact test with one harness thread. No other application thread reads or
// writes these variables, and the process exits after the assertions.
unsafe {
std::env::set_var("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", malicious);
std::env::set_var("HOME", malicious_home);
std::env::set_var("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0", "malicious-count");
std::env::set_var(
"GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS",
"'codex.count'='malicious-parameter'",
);
}
for (key, expected) in [("codex.bound", "safe-home"), ("codex.count", "safe-count")] {
let mut command = runner.command_for_cwd(&root).expect("bound command");
command.args(["config", "--get", key]);
let output = runner.output(command).expect("bound config read");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"{key}: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim(), expected);
}
}
fn commit_all(cwd: &Path, message: &str) {
run_git(
cwd,
@@ -505,6 +594,12 @@ fn git_read_error_io_kind_table_is_exhaustive() {
},
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
),
(
GitReadError::InvalidConfigEnvironment {
reason: "malformed GIT_CONFIG_COUNT".to_string(),
},
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
),
] {
assert_eq!(error.io_kind(), expected, "{error}");
assert_eq!(error.into_io_error().kind(), expected);
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::ffi::OsString;
use std::io;
use std::process::Command;
const FIXED_CONFIG_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL",
"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM",
"GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM",
"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
"GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS",
"HOME",
"XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
#[cfg(windows)]
"APPDATA",
#[cfg(windows)]
"PROGRAMDATA",
#[cfg(windows)]
"USERPROFILE",
#[cfg(windows)]
"HOMEDRIVE",
#[cfg(windows)]
"HOMEPATH",
];
// Git config command entries are an untrusted process input. Keep capture
// bounded rather than allocating attacker-selected amounts of memory before
// Git gets a chance to reject an unreasonable count.
const MAX_CONFIG_ENVIRONMENT_ENTRIES: usize = 1024;
/// Exact config-relevant process environment bound to one
/// [`GitRunner`](crate::git_command::GitRunner).
///
/// Every ordinary Git child receives these captured values (including explicit
/// removals for variables that were absent). Commands that intentionally
/// isolate a config source may override them after command construction.
pub(crate) struct GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot {
entries: Box<[(OsString, Option<OsString>)]>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot {
fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
formatter
.debug_struct("GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot")
.field("captured_entries", &self.entries.len())
.finish()
}
}
impl GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot {
pub(crate) fn capture() -> io::Result<Self> {
let environment = std::env::vars_os().collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();
Self::capture_from(|name| captured_environment_value(&environment, name))
}
fn capture_from(mut value_for: impl FnMut(&OsStr) -> Option<OsString>) -> io::Result<Self> {
let mut entries = FIXED_CONFIG_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS
.iter()
.map(|name| (OsString::from(name), value_for(OsStr::new(name))))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if let Some(raw_count) = value_for(OsStr::new("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT")) {
let count = raw_count
.to_str()
.ok_or_else(|| invalid_environment("non-UTF-8 GIT_CONFIG_COUNT"))?
.parse::<usize>()
.map_err(|_| invalid_environment("invalid GIT_CONFIG_COUNT"))?;
if count > MAX_CONFIG_ENVIRONMENT_ENTRIES {
return Err(invalid_environment(
"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT exceeds the supported safety bound",
));
}
for index in 0..count {
for prefix in ["GIT_CONFIG_KEY_", "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_"] {
let name = OsString::from(format!("{prefix}{index}"));
let value = value_for(&name);
entries.push((name, value));
}
}
}
Ok(Self {
entries: entries.into_boxed_slice(),
})
}
pub(crate) fn apply_to(&self, command: &mut Command) {
for (name, value) in &self.entries {
match value {
Some(value) => {
command.env(name, value);
}
None => {
command.env_remove(name);
}
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn value(&self, name: &str) -> Option<&OsStr> {
self.entries
.iter()
.find_map(|(candidate, value)| (candidate == name).then_some(value.as_deref()))
.flatten()
}
}
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fn captured_environment_value(
environment: &BTreeMap<OsString, OsString>,
name: &OsStr,
) -> Option<OsString> {
environment.get(name).cloned()
}
#[cfg(windows)]
fn captured_environment_value(
environment: &BTreeMap<OsString, OsString>,
name: &OsStr,
) -> Option<OsString> {
environment.iter().find_map(|(candidate, value)| {
candidate
.to_string_lossy()
.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&name.to_string_lossy())
.then(|| value.clone())
})
}
fn invalid_environment(message: &str) -> io::Error {
io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, message)
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "git_config_environment_tests.rs"]
mod tests;
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
use super::*;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn snapshot_binds_present_empty_and_absent_fixed_and_indexed_values() {
let values = BTreeMap::from([
(OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"), OsString::from("")),
(
OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS"),
OsString::from("'safe.parameter'='present'"),
),
(OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM"), OsString::from("1")),
(OsString::from("HOME"), OsString::from("/safe/home")),
(
OsString::from("XDG_CONFIG_HOME"),
OsString::from("/safe/xdg"),
),
(OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT"), OsString::from("2")),
(
OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0"),
OsString::from("safe.one"),
),
(
OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0"),
OsString::from("present"),
),
(
OsString::from("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1"),
OsString::from("safe.two"),
),
]);
let snapshot = GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot::capture_from(|name| values.get(name).cloned())
.expect("capture environment");
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"), Some(OsStr::new("")));
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("HOME"), Some(OsStr::new("/safe/home")));
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM"), None);
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM"), Some(OsStr::new("1")));
assert_eq!(
snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS"),
Some(OsStr::new("'safe.parameter'='present'"))
);
assert_eq!(
snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0"),
Some(OsStr::new("safe.one"))
);
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1"), None);
let mut command = Command::new("git");
command
.env("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM", "/later/system")
.env("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1", "later");
snapshot.apply_to(&mut command);
let child_environment = command
.get_envs()
.map(|(name, value)| (name.to_owned(), value.map(OsStr::to_owned)))
.collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();
assert_eq!(
child_environment.get(OsStr::new("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM")),
Some(&None)
);
assert_eq!(
child_environment.get(OsStr::new("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1")),
Some(&None)
);
assert_eq!(
child_environment.get(OsStr::new("HOME")),
Some(&Some(OsString::from("/safe/home")))
);
}
#[test]
fn snapshot_rejects_malformed_or_unbounded_command_config_count() {
for count in [OsString::from("invalid"), OsString::from("1025")] {
let error = GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot::capture_from(|name| {
(name == "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT").then(|| count.clone())
})
.expect_err("reject count");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn snapshot_preserves_non_utf8_config_path_bytes() {
use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
let raw = OsString::from_vec(vec![b'/', b't', b'm', b'p', b'/', 0xff]);
let snapshot = GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot::capture_from(|name| {
(name == "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL").then(|| raw.clone())
})
.expect("capture non-UTF-8 path");
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"), Some(raw.as_os_str()));
}
#[cfg(windows)]
#[test]
fn snapshot_matches_mixed_case_windows_environment_names() {
let environment = BTreeMap::from([
(OsString::from("git_config_count"), OsString::from("1")),
(
OsString::from("Git_Config_Key_0"),
OsString::from("safe.key"),
),
(
OsString::from("gIt_CoNfIg_VaLuE_0"),
OsString::from("safe-value"),
),
(OsString::from("Home"), OsString::from(r"C:\safe-home")),
]);
let snapshot = GitConfigEnvironmentSnapshot::capture_from(|name| {
captured_environment_value(&environment, name)
})
.expect("capture mixed-case Windows environment");
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT"), Some(OsStr::new("1")));
assert_eq!(
snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0"),
Some(OsStr::new("safe.key"))
);
assert_eq!(
snapshot.value("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0"),
Some(OsStr::new("safe-value"))
);
assert_eq!(snapshot.value("HOME"), Some(OsStr::new(r"C:\safe-home")));
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pub(crate) fn ensure_no_worktree_config_sources(
// Environment, HOME, and XDG paths are attacker-controlled byte strings.
// Classify their exact OsString spelling before `git var` can open or
// newline-delimit one of them.
for (description, candidate) in legacy_primary_config_source_candidates()? {
for (description, candidate) in legacy_primary_config_source_candidates(git)? {
if !is_disabled_primary_config_path(&candidate) {
reject_source(git, &git_root, &candidate, description)?;
}
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::io;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -11,7 +12,9 @@ pub(super) fn default_system_config_source_candidates(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
) -> io::Result<Vec<(&'static str, PathBuf)>> {
if git_env_bool("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")? || std::env::var_os("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM").is_some() {
if git_env_bool(git, "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")?
|| git.config_environment_value("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM").is_some()
{
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
// `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` was added to `git var` in Git 2.42. The PSEC-4394
@@ -33,16 +36,19 @@ pub(super) fn selected_git_home_config_candidates(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
) -> io::Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
if std::env::var_os("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL").is_some() {
if git.config_environment_value("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL").is_some() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
#[cfg(not(windows))]
if std::env::var_os("HOME").is_none() {
if git.config_environment_value("HOME").is_none() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let dot_gitconfig = selected_git_path_candidate(git, cwd, "~/.gitconfig")?;
let mut candidates = vec![dot_gitconfig.clone()];
if std::env::var_os("XDG_CONFIG_HOME").is_none_or(|path| path.is_empty()) {
if git
.config_environment_value("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")
.is_none_or(OsStr::is_empty)
{
let home = dot_gitconfig
.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| invalid_config_source("selected Git HOME has no parent"))?;
@@ -55,7 +61,9 @@ pub(super) fn selected_git_prefix_system_candidate(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
) -> io::Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
if git_env_bool("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")? || std::env::var_os("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM").is_some() {
if git_env_bool(git, "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")?
|| git.config_environment_value("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM").is_some()
{
return Ok(None);
}
selected_git_path_candidate(git, cwd, "%(prefix)/etc/gitconfig").map(Some)
@@ -149,24 +157,25 @@ fn parse_git_var_paths(output: &[u8]) -> io::Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
.collect()
}
pub(super) fn legacy_primary_config_source_candidates() -> io::Result<Vec<(&'static str, PathBuf)>>
{
pub(super) fn legacy_primary_config_source_candidates(
git: &GitRunner,
) -> io::Result<Vec<(&'static str, PathBuf)>> {
let mut candidates = Vec::new();
match std::env::var_os("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL") {
match git.config_environment_value("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL") {
Some(path) if !path.is_empty() => {
candidates.push(("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", PathBuf::from(path)));
}
Some(_) => {}
None => {
let homes = git_home_directories();
match std::env::var_os("XDG_CONFIG_HOME") {
let homes = git_home_directories(git);
match git.config_environment_value("XDG_CONFIG_HOME") {
Some(xdg) if !xdg.is_empty() => candidates.push((
"XDG_CONFIG_HOME Git config",
PathBuf::from(xdg).join("git/config"),
)),
_ => {
#[cfg(windows)]
if let Some(app_data) = std::env::var_os("APPDATA")
if let Some(app_data) = git.config_environment_value("APPDATA")
&& !app_data.is_empty()
{
candidates.push((
@@ -187,15 +196,15 @@ pub(super) fn legacy_primary_config_source_candidates() -> io::Result<Vec<(&'sta
}
}
}
if !git_env_bool("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")? {
match std::env::var_os("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM") {
if !git_env_bool(git, "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM")? {
match git.config_environment_value("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM") {
Some(path) if !path.is_empty() => {
candidates.push(("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM", PathBuf::from(path)));
}
Some(_) => {}
None => {
#[cfg(windows)]
if let Some(program_data) = std::env::var_os("PROGRAMDATA")
if let Some(program_data) = git.config_environment_value("PROGRAMDATA")
&& !program_data.is_empty()
{
candidates.push((
@@ -209,24 +218,25 @@ pub(super) fn legacy_primary_config_source_candidates() -> io::Result<Vec<(&'sta
Ok(candidates)
}
fn git_home_directories() -> Vec<std::ffi::OsString> {
if let Some(home) = std::env::var_os("HOME") {
return vec![home];
fn git_home_directories(git: &GitRunner) -> Vec<std::ffi::OsString> {
if let Some(home) = git.config_environment_value("HOME") {
return vec![home.to_owned()];
}
#[cfg(windows)]
{
let mut homes = Vec::new();
if let (Some(drive), Some(path)) =
(std::env::var_os("HOMEDRIVE"), std::env::var_os("HOMEPATH"))
{
let mut home = drive;
if let (Some(drive), Some(path)) = (
git.config_environment_value("HOMEDRIVE"),
git.config_environment_value("HOMEPATH"),
) {
let mut home = drive.to_owned();
home.push(path);
homes.push(home);
}
if let Some(profile) = std::env::var_os("USERPROFILE")
&& !homes.contains(&profile)
if let Some(profile) = git.config_environment_value("USERPROFILE")
&& !homes.iter().any(|home| home == profile)
{
homes.push(profile);
homes.push(profile.to_owned());
}
homes
}
@@ -242,8 +252,8 @@ fn home_config_path(home: &std::ffi::OsStr, suffix: &str) -> PathBuf {
}
}
fn git_env_bool(name: &str) -> io::Result<bool> {
let Some(value) = std::env::var_os(name) else {
fn git_env_bool(git: &GitRunner, name: &str) -> io::Result<bool> {
let Some(value) = git.config_environment_value(name) else {
return Ok(false);
};
let value = value
+434
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::io;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::FsmonitorOverride;
use crate::git_command::GitCommand;
use crate::git_command::GitRunner;
use crate::git_config::GitConfigEntry;
use crate::git_config::read_effective_config_with_fallback;
use crate::git_config_sources::ensure_no_worktree_config_sources;
use crate::safe_git::DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH;
use crate::safe_git::ExecutableFilterDrivers;
use crate::safe_git::FilterPolicySnapshot;
use crate::safe_git::build_filter_policy_snapshot;
/// Proof that one exact Git config invocation has no worktree-controlled
/// source routes for one runner and canonical repository root.
///
/// The capability deliberately owns the ordered base arguments and cannot be
/// cloned or rebound to another runner, root, or command environment.
pub(crate) struct ValidatedConfigSources<'git> {
git: &'git GitRunner,
canonical_root: PathBuf,
base_config_args: Box<[String]>,
}
impl<'git> ValidatedConfigSources<'git> {
fn authorize(
git: &'git GitRunner,
canonical_root: &Path,
base_config_args: Vec<String>,
) -> io::Result<Self> {
#[cfg(test)]
CONFIG_SOURCE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNT.with(|count| count.set(count.get() + 1));
validate_base_config_args(&base_config_args)?;
let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(canonical_root)?;
git.ensure_active_worktree_root(&canonical_root)?;
ensure_no_worktree_config_sources(git, &canonical_root, &base_config_args)?;
Ok(Self {
git,
canonical_root,
base_config_args: base_config_args.into_boxed_slice(),
})
}
fn read_effective(
&self,
pattern: &str,
probe: &str,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>> {
read_effective_config_with_fallback(
self.git,
&self.canonical_root,
&self.base_config_args,
pattern,
probe,
)
}
}
fn validate_base_config_args(args: &[String]) -> io::Result<()> {
let mut pairs = args.chunks_exact(2);
for pair in &mut pairs {
let Some((key, _value)) = pair[1].split_once('=') else {
return Err(invalid_base_config_args());
};
if pair[0] != "-c" || key.is_empty() {
return Err(invalid_base_config_args());
}
}
if !pairs.remainder().is_empty() {
return Err(invalid_base_config_args());
}
Ok(())
}
fn invalid_base_config_args() -> io::Error {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"guarded Git base config must contain only ordered -c key=value pairs",
)
}
/// Operation-owned Git configuration capability.
///
/// All operation children are rooted at the authorized repository, inherit
/// the exact frozen base invocation, receive fixed library safety scalars, and
/// retain any sealed filter override for the capability lifetime.
pub(crate) struct GuardedGitConfig<'git> {
sources: ValidatedConfigSources<'git>,
identity: Arc<CapabilityIdentity>,
// Ordered, typed snapshots keep each sealed filter overlay alive through
// every later child. Downstream staging may attach a fresh Git-add policy
// without rebuilding or weakening the source authorization.
filters: Vec<FilterPolicySnapshot>,
}
struct CapabilityIdentity;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum BoundSubcommand {
AddLiteralPathspecs,
Apply,
CheckAttr,
HashObject,
RevParse,
}
impl BoundSubcommand {
fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::AddLiteralPathspecs => "add",
Self::Apply => "apply",
Self::CheckAttr => "check-attr",
Self::HashObject => "hash-object",
Self::RevParse => "rev-parse",
}
}
fn append_to(self, command: &mut GitCommand) {
if matches!(self, Self::AddLiteralPathspecs) {
command.arg("--literal-pathspecs");
}
command.arg(self.as_str());
}
}
/// A sealed filter-only include owned for the complete capability lifetime.
/// Its fields and include argument are intentionally inaccessible outside this
/// module; callers can neither forge one nor append it to another command.
pub(crate) struct SealedFilterConfigOverride {
owner: Arc<CapabilityIdentity>,
include_arg: String,
_config_dir: tempfile::TempDir,
}
impl SealedFilterConfigOverride {
fn append_to(
&self,
owner: &Arc<CapabilityIdentity>,
command: &mut GitCommand,
) -> io::Result<()> {
self.ensure_owner(owner)?;
command.args(["-c", &self.include_arg]);
Ok(())
}
fn append_rendered_args(
&self,
owner: &Arc<CapabilityIdentity>,
args: &mut Vec<String>,
) -> io::Result<()> {
self.ensure_owner(owner)?;
args.push("-c".to_string());
args.push(self.include_arg.clone());
Ok(())
}
fn ensure_owner(&self, owner: &Arc<CapabilityIdentity>) -> io::Result<()> {
if !Arc::ptr_eq(&self.owner, owner) {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"sealed Git filter override belongs to another operation",
));
}
Ok(())
}
}
/// A command whose runner, root, config invocation, overlay lifetime, and
/// fixed subcommand are inseparably bound to one operation capability.
pub(crate) struct GuardedGitCommand<'operation, 'git> {
operation: &'operation GuardedGitConfig<'git>,
inner: GitCommand,
}
impl GuardedGitCommand<'_, '_> {
pub(crate) fn arg(&mut self, arg: impl AsRef<OsStr>) -> &mut Self {
self.inner.arg(arg);
self
}
pub(crate) fn args<I, S>(&mut self, args: I) -> &mut Self
where
I: IntoIterator<Item = S>,
S: AsRef<OsStr>,
{
self.inner.args(args);
self
}
pub(crate) fn disable_optional_locks(&mut self) -> &mut Self {
self.inner.env("GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS", "0");
self
}
pub(crate) fn stdin(&mut self, config: impl Into<Stdio>) -> &mut Self {
self.inner.stdin(config);
self
}
pub(crate) fn output(self) -> io::Result<std::process::Output> {
self.operation.sources.git.output(self.inner)
}
}
impl<'git> GuardedGitConfig<'git> {
pub(crate) fn authorize(
git: &'git GitRunner,
canonical_root: &Path,
base_config_args: Vec<String>,
) -> io::Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
sources: ValidatedConfigSources::authorize(git, canonical_root, base_config_args)?,
identity: Arc::new(CapabilityIdentity),
filters: Vec::new(),
})
}
pub(crate) fn canonical_root(&self) -> &Path {
&self.sources.canonical_root
}
pub(crate) fn apply_command(&self) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'_, 'git>> {
self.guarded_command(BoundSubcommand::Apply)
}
pub(crate) fn literal_add_command(&self) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'_, 'git>> {
self.guarded_command(BoundSubcommand::AddLiteralPathspecs)
}
pub(crate) fn rev_parse_command(&self) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'_, 'git>> {
self.guarded_command(BoundSubcommand::RevParse)
}
pub(crate) fn filter_attribute_command(&self) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'_, 'git>> {
self.guarded_command(BoundSubcommand::CheckAttr)
}
fn guarded_command(
&self,
subcommand: BoundSubcommand,
) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'_, 'git>> {
let mut command = self
.sources
.git
.command_for_cwd(&self.sources.canonical_root)?;
command.args(&self.sources.base_config_args);
append_safe_scalar_overrides(&mut command);
for filter in &self.filters {
if let Some(neutralizer) = filter.neutralizer() {
neutralizer.append_to(&self.identity, &mut command)?;
}
}
subcommand.append_to(&mut command);
Ok(GuardedGitCommand {
operation: self,
inner: command,
})
}
pub(crate) fn command_for_sentinel_filter_probe<'operation>(
&'operation self,
neutralizer: &'operation SealedFilterConfigOverride,
driver: &str,
required: bool,
) -> io::Result<GuardedGitCommand<'operation, 'git>> {
if !matches!(driver, "set" | "unset" | "unspecified") {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"Git filter sentinel probe requested for a non-sentinel driver",
));
}
let mut command = self
.sources
.git
.command_for_cwd(&self.sources.canonical_root)?;
command.args(&self.sources.base_config_args);
append_safe_scalar_overrides(&mut command);
for filter in &self.filters {
if let Some(attached) = filter.neutralizer() {
attached.append_to(&self.identity, &mut command)?;
}
}
neutralizer.append_to(&self.identity, &mut command)?;
command.args(["-c", &format!("filter.{driver}.required={required}")]);
BoundSubcommand::HashObject.append_to(&mut command);
Ok(GuardedGitCommand {
operation: self,
inner: command,
})
}
pub(crate) fn read_effective(
&self,
pattern: &str,
probe: &str,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>> {
self.sources.read_effective(pattern, probe)
}
fn ensure_owned_config_path(&self, path: &Path, description: &str) -> io::Result<()> {
self.sources
.git
.ensure_config_source_is_not_worktree_controlled(path, description)
}
pub(crate) fn build_filter_override(
&self,
executable_drivers: &ExecutableFilterDrivers,
) -> io::Result<SealedFilterConfigOverride> {
let config_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let config_path = config_dir.path().join("filter-neutralization.gitconfig");
self.ensure_owned_config_path(&config_path, "owned Git filter neutralization")?;
std::fs::write(&config_path, [])?;
for driver in executable_drivers.iter() {
for name in ["clean", "smudge", "process"] {
self.write_filter_override_value(&config_path, driver, name, "")?;
}
self.write_filter_override_value(&config_path, driver, "required", "false")?;
}
let config_path = config_path.to_str().ok_or_else(|| {
io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "non-UTF-8 filter guard path")
})?;
Ok(SealedFilterConfigOverride {
owner: Arc::clone(&self.identity),
include_arg: format!("include.path={config_path}"),
_config_dir: config_dir,
})
}
fn write_filter_override_value(
&self,
config_path: &Path,
driver: &str,
name: &str,
value: &str,
) -> io::Result<()> {
debug_assert!(matches!(name, "clean" | "smudge" | "process" | "required"));
let mut command = self
.sources
.git
.command_for_cwd(&self.sources.canonical_root)?;
command
.args(&self.sources.base_config_args)
.args(["config", "--file"])
.arg(config_path)
.args(["--add", &format!("filter.{driver}.{name}"), value]);
let output = self.sources.git.output(command)?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
"failed to write Git filter neutralization for {driver:?} (status {}): {}",
output.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim()
)));
}
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn authorize_filter_paths(&mut self, paths: &[String]) -> io::Result<()> {
let filter = build_filter_policy_snapshot(self, paths)?;
self.filters.push(filter);
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn render_command_for_log(&self, args: &[String]) -> io::Result<String> {
let mut parts = vec!["git".to_string()];
parts.extend(self.sources.base_config_args.iter().cloned());
parts.extend(safe_scalar_override_args());
for filter in &self.filters {
if let Some(neutralizer) = filter.neutralizer() {
neutralizer.append_rendered_args(&self.identity, &mut parts)?;
}
}
parts.extend(args.iter().cloned());
Ok(format!(
"(cd {} && {})",
quote_shell(&self.sources.canonical_root.display().to_string()),
parts
.into_iter()
.map(|part| quote_shell(&part))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ")
))
}
}
fn append_safe_scalar_overrides(command: &mut GitCommand) {
command.args(safe_scalar_override_args());
}
fn safe_scalar_override_args() -> [String; 4] {
[
"-c".to_string(),
format!("core.hooksPath={DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH}"),
"-c".to_string(),
FsmonitorOverride::Disabled.git_config_arg().to_string(),
]
}
fn quote_shell(value: &str) -> String {
let simple = value
.chars()
.all(|character| character.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || "-_.:/@%+".contains(character));
if simple {
value.to_string()
} else {
format!("'{}'", value.replace('\'', "'\\''"))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
thread_local! {
static CONFIG_SOURCE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNT: std::cell::Cell<usize> = const { std::cell::Cell::new(0) };
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn reset_config_source_authorization_count() {
CONFIG_SOURCE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNT.with(|count| count.set(0));
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn config_source_authorization_count() -> usize {
CONFIG_SOURCE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNT.with(std::cell::Cell::get)
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "guarded_config_tests.rs"]
mod tests;
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
use super::*;
use crate::safe_git::isolate_git_command_environment;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
fn run_git(cwd: &Path, args: &[&str]) {
let mut command = std::process::Command::new("git");
isolate_git_command_environment(&mut command);
let output = command.current_dir(cwd).args(args).output().expect("Git");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"git {args:?}: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn attached_filter_snapshots_retain_multiple_owned_overrides() {
let repo = tempfile::tempdir().expect("repo");
run_git(repo.path(), &["init", "-q"]);
run_git(
repo.path(),
&["config", "filter.demo.clean", "git hash-object --stdin"],
);
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(repo.path()).expect("runner");
let mut config =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, repo.path(), Vec::new()).expect("authorized config");
config
.authorize_filter_paths(&["first.txt".to_string()])
.expect("first filter snapshot");
config
.authorize_filter_paths(&["second.txt".to_string()])
.expect("second filter snapshot");
assert_eq!(config.filters.len(), 2);
assert!(
config
.filters
.iter()
.all(|filter| filter.neutralizer().is_some())
);
}
#[test]
fn authorization_rejects_untyped_global_config_arguments() {
let repo = tempfile::tempdir().expect("repo");
run_git(repo.path(), &["init", "-q"]);
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(repo.path()).expect("runner");
for args in [
vec!["--config-env=include.path=UNSNAPSHOTTED".to_string()],
vec!["--git-dir=elsewhere".to_string()],
vec!["-c".to_string(), "missing-value".to_string()],
vec!["-c".to_string()],
] {
let error = match GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, repo.path(), args) {
Ok(_) => panic!("accepted untyped base config arguments"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
}
}
#[test]
fn authorization_rejects_another_runner_repository_and_nested_or_prefix_roots() {
let fixture = tempfile::tempdir().expect("fixture");
let outer = fixture.path().join("repo");
let nested = outer.join("nested");
let prefix = fixture.path().join("repo-evil");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("nested");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&prefix).expect("prefix");
run_git(&outer, &["init", "-q"]);
run_git(&nested, &["init", "-q"]);
run_git(&prefix, &["init", "-q"]);
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&outer).expect("outer runner");
for wrong_root in [&nested, &prefix] {
let error = match GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, wrong_root, Vec::new()) {
Ok(_) => panic!("accepted another repository root"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
}
}
#[test]
fn sealed_filter_override_cannot_cross_operation_capabilities() {
let fixture = tempfile::tempdir().expect("fixture");
let first_root = fixture.path().join("first");
let second_root = fixture.path().join("second");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&first_root).expect("first");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&second_root).expect("second");
run_git(&first_root, &["init", "-q"]);
run_git(&second_root, &["init", "-q"]);
run_git(
&first_root,
&["config", "filter.demo.clean", "git hash-object --stdin"],
);
let first_git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&first_root).expect("first runner");
let second_git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(&second_root).expect("second runner");
let mut first =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&first_git, &first_root, Vec::new()).expect("first capability");
let second = GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&second_git, &second_root, Vec::new())
.expect("second capability");
first
.authorize_filter_paths(&["unselected.txt".to_string()])
.expect("first filter policy");
let sealed = first.filters[0].neutralizer().expect("first override");
let error =
match second.command_for_sentinel_filter_probe(sealed, "set", /*required*/ true) {
Ok(_) => panic!("accepted another operation's sealed override"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
}
+2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ mod errors;
mod fsmonitor;
mod git_command;
mod git_config;
mod git_config_environment;
mod git_config_sources;
mod git_executable;
mod guarded_config;
mod info;
mod local_only;
mod operations;
+131 -4
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@ use crate::apply::write_temp_patch;
use crate::git_command::GitRunner;
use crate::git_config::path_is_within;
use crate::git_config_sources::ensure_no_worktree_config_sources;
use crate::guarded_config::GuardedGitConfig;
/// Extract effective patch paths through a bound operation configuration.
pub(crate) fn extract_effective_paths_from_patch_guarded(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
patch_path: &Path,
revert: bool,
) -> io::Result<Vec<String>> {
let forward_paths = git_apply_numstat_paths_guarded(config, patch_path, revert)?;
let reverse_paths = git_apply_numstat_paths_guarded(config, patch_path, !revert)?;
normalize_effective_patch_paths(forward_paths, reverse_paths)
}
/// Extract paths with Git from a cwd whose config sources have already been
/// authorized for `git_config_args`.
@@ -26,6 +38,13 @@ pub(crate) fn extract_effective_paths_from_patch(
// opposite orientation too so both endpoints are included in the result.
let reverse_paths =
git_apply_numstat_paths(git, authorized_cwd, patch_path, !revert, git_config_args)?;
normalize_effective_patch_paths(forward_paths, reverse_paths)
}
fn normalize_effective_patch_paths(
forward_paths: Vec<String>,
reverse_paths: Vec<String>,
) -> io::Result<Vec<String>> {
if forward_paths.len() != reverse_paths.len() {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
@@ -46,6 +65,30 @@ pub(crate) fn extract_effective_paths_from_patch(
.collect()
}
fn git_apply_numstat_paths_guarded(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
patch_path: &Path,
revert: bool,
) -> io::Result<Vec<String>> {
let mut command = config.apply_command()?;
command.args(["--numstat", "-z"]);
if revert {
command.arg("-R");
}
command.arg("--").arg(patch_path);
let output = command.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
format!(
"failed to parse patch paths: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim()
),
));
}
parse_numstat_paths(&output.stdout)
}
/// Best-effort extraction of the paths Git would apply.
///
/// Security-sensitive callers must use the fallible internal extractor so an
@@ -291,6 +334,37 @@ pub(crate) fn stage_effective_paths(
Ok(())
}
/// Preserve the existing reverse staging behavior while constructing every
/// Git child from the operation-owned configuration capability.
pub(crate) fn stage_effective_paths_guarded(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
paths: &[String],
) -> io::Result<()> {
let confined = confine_patch_paths_guarded(config, paths)?;
let mut existing = Vec::new();
for path in confined.into_exact_leaves()? {
let joined = config.canonical_root().join(&path);
if let Ok(metadata) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&joined) {
if leaf_is_traversable_directory(metadata.file_type()) {
return Err(containment_error(
"refusing to recursively stage a directory patch path",
));
}
existing.push(path);
}
}
if existing.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
let mut args = vec!["--".to_string()];
args.extend(existing);
let mut command = config.literal_add_command()?;
command.args(&args);
let _output = command.output()?;
// Preserve the existing best-effort staging contract on non-zero status.
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fn leaf_is_traversable_directory(file_type: std::fs::FileType) -> bool {
file_type.is_dir()
@@ -379,6 +453,25 @@ pub(crate) fn confine_patch_paths(
git: &GitRunner,
git_root: &Path,
paths: &[String],
) -> io::Result<ConfinedPatchPaths> {
let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(git_root)?;
let metadata_dirs = canonical_git_metadata_dirs(git, &canonical_root)?;
confine_patch_paths_with_metadata(&canonical_root, paths, &metadata_dirs)
}
fn confine_patch_paths_guarded(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
paths: &[String],
) -> io::Result<ConfinedPatchPaths> {
let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(config.canonical_root())?;
let metadata_dirs = canonical_git_metadata_dirs_guarded(config)?;
confine_patch_paths_with_metadata(&canonical_root, paths, &metadata_dirs)
}
fn confine_patch_paths_with_metadata(
canonical_root: &Path,
paths: &[String],
metadata_dirs: &[PathBuf],
) -> io::Result<ConfinedPatchPaths> {
if paths.is_empty() {
return Ok(ConfinedPatchPaths {
@@ -401,8 +494,6 @@ pub(crate) fn confine_patch_paths(
});
}
let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(git_root)?;
let metadata_dirs = canonical_git_metadata_dirs(git, &canonical_root)?;
let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(paths.len());
let mut prefix_cache = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
@@ -416,9 +507,9 @@ pub(crate) fn confine_patch_paths(
);
let (existing_len, mut projected) = longest_existing_strict_prefix(
&canonical_root,
canonical_root,
&components,
&metadata_dirs,
metadata_dirs,
&mut prefix_cache,
)?;
projected.extend(
@@ -546,6 +637,42 @@ fn canonical_git_metadata_dirs(git: &GitRunner, git_root: &Path) -> io::Result<V
Ok(metadata_dirs.into_iter().collect())
}
fn canonical_git_metadata_dirs_guarded(config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>) -> io::Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
let queries = [
["rev-parse", "--absolute-git-dir"],
["rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"],
];
let mut metadata_dirs = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
for args in queries {
let mut command = config.rev_parse_command()?;
command.args(&args[1..]);
let output = command.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
"failed to resolve Git repository metadata (status {}): {}",
output.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim()
)));
}
let path = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
let path = path.trim_end_matches(['\r', '\n']);
if path.is_empty() {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"Git returned an empty repository metadata path",
));
}
let path = PathBuf::from(path);
let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
path
} else {
config.canonical_root().join(path)
};
metadata_dirs.insert(std::fs::canonicalize(absolute)?);
}
Ok(metadata_dirs.into_iter().collect())
}
fn insert_candidate_prefixes<'a>(
components: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a str>,
origin: ConfinedPathOrigin,
@@ -148,6 +148,23 @@ impl RepositoryAuthority {
})
}
pub(crate) fn ensure_active_worktree_root(&self, root: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(root)?;
let same_root = canonical_root == self.active_worktree_root
|| same_file::is_same_file(&canonical_root, &self.active_worktree_root)?;
if !same_root {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
format!(
"guarded Git repository root {} does not match runner repository {}",
canonical_root.display(),
self.active_worktree_root.display()
),
));
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn from_test_locations(
roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
+71 -187
View File
@@ -3,20 +3,19 @@ use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::io;
use std::io::Seek;
use std::io::Write;
use std::path::Path;
use std::process::Command;
use std::process::Stdio;
use crate::git_command::GitRunner;
use crate::git_config::GitConfigEntry;
use crate::git_config::read_effective_config_with_fallback as read_effective_config_unchecked;
use crate::git_config_sources::ensure_no_worktree_config_sources;
use crate::guarded_config::GuardedGitConfig;
use crate::guarded_config::SealedFilterConfigOverride;
#[path = "filter_sentinel.rs"]
mod filter_sentinel;
pub(crate) use filter_sentinel::SentinelFilterProbeBudget;
pub(crate) use filter_sentinel::SentinelFilterProbeResolution;
pub(crate) use filter_sentinel::classify_sentinel_filter_probes;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use filter_sentinel::sentinel_filter_probe_config_args;
pub(crate) const DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH: &str = if cfg!(windows) { "NUL" } else { "/dev/null" };
pub(crate) const EXECUTABLE_FILTER_CONFIG_PATTERN: &str =
@@ -28,21 +27,32 @@ pub(crate) enum FilterAttributeValue {
AmbiguousSentinel(String),
}
pub(crate) struct GitFilterNeutralization {
git_config_args: Vec<String>,
_config_dir: Option<tempfile::TempDir>,
filter_config: BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>,
}
/// Complete executable-filter inventory derived from one authorized effective
/// config read. The private field prevents a caller from minting an incomplete
/// inventory and treating its neutralizer as complete.
pub(crate) struct ExecutableFilterDrivers(BTreeSet<String>);
impl GitFilterNeutralization {
pub(crate) fn git_config_args(&self) -> &[String] {
&self.git_config_args
impl ExecutableFilterDrivers {
pub(crate) fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &String> {
self.0.iter()
}
pub(crate) fn filter_value(&self, driver: &str, name: &str) -> Option<&str> {
self.filter_config
.get(&format!("filter.{driver}.{name}"))
.map(|entry| entry.value.as_str())
fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.0.is_empty()
}
fn contains(&self, driver: &str) -> bool {
self.0.contains(driver)
}
}
pub(crate) struct FilterPolicySnapshot {
neutralizer: Option<SealedFilterConfigOverride>,
}
impl FilterPolicySnapshot {
pub(crate) fn neutralizer(&self) -> Option<&SealedFilterConfigOverride> {
self.neutralizer.as_ref()
}
}
@@ -73,35 +83,22 @@ pub(crate) fn isolate_git_command_environment(command: &mut Command) {
}
}
pub(crate) fn ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
pub(crate) fn build_filter_policy_snapshot(
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
paths: &[String],
git_config_args: &[String],
) -> io::Result<GitFilterNeutralization> {
let entries = read_filter_config(git, cwd, git_config_args)?;
) -> io::Result<FilterPolicySnapshot> {
let entries = read_filter_config(config)?;
let executable_drivers = executable_filter_drivers(&entries)?;
if executable_drivers.is_empty() {
return Ok(GitFilterNeutralization {
git_config_args: Vec::new(),
_config_dir: None,
filter_config: entries,
});
return Ok(FilterPolicySnapshot { neutralizer: None });
}
let guard = executable_filter_guard(git, cwd, entries, &executable_drivers)?;
let neutralizer = config.build_filter_override(&executable_drivers)?;
let paths = paths
.iter()
.map(|path| path.as_bytes().to_vec())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let attributes = read_filter_attributes(
git,
cwd,
&paths,
git_config_args,
&executable_drivers,
&guard,
)?;
if let Some((driver, path)) = selected_executable_filter(&guard.filter_config, &attributes)? {
let attributes = read_filter_attributes(config, &paths, &executable_drivers, &neutralizer)?;
if let Some((driver, path)) = selected_executable_filter(&entries, &attributes)? {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
format!(
@@ -110,105 +107,22 @@ pub(crate) fn ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters(
),
));
}
Ok(guard)
}
fn executable_filter_guard(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
filter_config: BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>,
executable_drivers: &BTreeSet<String>,
) -> io::Result<GitFilterNeutralization> {
let config_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let config_path = config_dir.path().join("filter-neutralization.gitconfig");
std::fs::write(&config_path, [])?;
let guard = GitFilterNeutralization {
git_config_args: vec![
"-c".to_string(),
format!(
"include.path={}",
config_path
.to_str()
.ok_or_else(|| invalid_filter_output("non-UTF-8 filter guard path"))?
),
],
_config_dir: Some(config_dir),
filter_config,
};
for driver in executable_drivers {
debug_assert!(["clean", "smudge", "process"].into_iter().any(|name| {
guard
.filter_value(driver, name)
.is_some_and(|value| !value.is_empty())
}));
for command in ["clean", "smudge", "process"] {
guard.write_config_value(git, cwd, &config_path, driver, command, "")?;
}
guard.write_config_value(git, cwd, &config_path, driver, "required", "false")?;
}
Ok(guard)
}
impl GitFilterNeutralization {
fn write_config_value(
&self,
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
config_path: &Path,
driver: &str,
name: &str,
value: &str,
) -> io::Result<()> {
let mut command = git.command_for_cwd(cwd)?;
command.args(["config", "--file"]).arg(config_path).args([
"--add",
&format!("filter.{driver}.{name}"),
value,
]);
let output = git.output(command)?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
"failed to write Git filter neutralization for {driver:?} (status {}): {}",
output.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim()
)));
}
Ok(())
}
Ok(FilterPolicySnapshot {
neutralizer: Some(neutralizer),
})
}
fn read_filter_config(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
git_config_args: &[String],
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>> {
read_effective_config_with_fallback(
git,
cwd,
git_config_args,
EXECUTABLE_FILTER_CONFIG_PATTERN,
"filter",
)
}
pub(crate) fn read_effective_config_with_fallback(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
git_config_args: &[String],
pattern: &str,
probe: &str,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>> {
ensure_no_worktree_config_sources(git, cwd, git_config_args)?;
read_effective_config_unchecked(git, cwd, git_config_args, pattern, probe)
config.read_effective(EXECUTABLE_FILTER_CONFIG_PATTERN, "filter")
}
fn read_filter_attributes(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
paths: &[Vec<u8>],
git_config_args: &[String],
executable_drivers: &BTreeSet<String>,
neutralization: &GitFilterNeutralization,
executable_drivers: &ExecutableFilterDrivers,
neutralization: &SealedFilterConfigOverride,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<Vec<u8>, String>> {
if paths.is_empty() {
return Ok(BTreeMap::new());
@@ -217,22 +131,12 @@ fn read_filter_attributes(
write_nul_paths(&mut input, paths)?;
input.rewind()?;
let mut command = git.command_for_cwd(cwd)?;
let mut command = config.filter_attribute_command()?;
command
.env("GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS", "0")
.args(git_config_args)
.args([
"-c",
&format!("core.hooksPath={DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH}"),
"-c",
"core.fsmonitor=false",
"check-attr",
"--stdin",
"-z",
"filter",
])
.disable_optional_locks()
.args(["--stdin", "-z", "filter"])
.stdin(Stdio::from(input));
let output = git.output(command)?;
let output = command.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
"git filter attribute probe failed with status {}: {}",
@@ -241,23 +145,14 @@ fn read_filter_attributes(
)));
}
let attributes = parse_filter_attributes(&output.stdout, paths)?;
resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
git,
cwd,
attributes,
git_config_args,
executable_drivers,
neutralization,
)
resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(config, attributes, executable_drivers, neutralization)
}
fn resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
attributes: BTreeMap<Vec<u8>, FilterAttributeValue>,
git_config_args: &[String],
executable_drivers: &BTreeSet<String>,
neutralization: &GitFilterNeutralization,
executable_drivers: &ExecutableFilterDrivers,
neutralization: &SealedFilterConfigOverride,
) -> io::Result<BTreeMap<Vec<u8>, String>> {
let mut resolved = BTreeMap::new();
let mut probe_budget = SentinelFilterProbeBudget::default();
@@ -269,11 +164,9 @@ fn resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
FilterAttributeValue::AmbiguousSentinel(driver) => {
if executable_drivers.contains(&driver)
&& sentinel_spelling_selects_filter_driver(
git,
cwd,
config,
&path,
&driver,
git_config_args,
neutralization,
&mut probe_budget,
)?
@@ -289,20 +182,16 @@ fn resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
/// Disambiguate Git's sentinel spellings with required/optional probes. The
/// shared guard blanks every known executable driver before either probe.
fn sentinel_spelling_selects_filter_driver(
git: &GitRunner,
cwd: &Path,
config: &GuardedGitConfig<'_>,
path: &[u8],
driver: &str,
git_config_args: &[String],
neutralization: &GitFilterNeutralization,
neutralization: &SealedFilterConfigOverride,
probe_budget: &mut SentinelFilterProbeBudget,
) -> io::Result<bool> {
let probe = SentinelSelectionProbe {
git,
cwd,
config,
path,
driver,
git_config_args,
neutralization,
};
let required = probe.run(/*required*/ true, probe_budget)?;
@@ -328,12 +217,10 @@ fn sentinel_spelling_selects_filter_driver(
}
struct SentinelSelectionProbe<'a> {
git: &'a GitRunner,
cwd: &'a Path,
config: &'a GuardedGitConfig<'a>,
path: &'a [u8],
driver: &'a str,
git_config_args: &'a [String],
neutralization: &'a GitFilterNeutralization,
neutralization: &'a SealedFilterConfigOverride,
}
impl SentinelSelectionProbe<'_> {
@@ -342,29 +229,26 @@ impl SentinelSelectionProbe<'_> {
required: bool,
probe_budget: &mut SentinelFilterProbeBudget,
) -> io::Result<std::process::Output> {
let probe_config_args = sentinel_filter_probe_config_args(
self.neutralization.git_config_args(),
if !matches!(self.driver, "set" | "unset" | "unspecified") {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"Git filter sentinel probe requested for a non-sentinel driver",
));
}
let path = git_path_argument(self.path)?;
let mut command = self.config.command_for_sentinel_filter_probe(
self.neutralization,
self.driver,
required,
)?;
let path = git_path_argument(self.path)?;
let mut command = self.git.command_for_cwd(self.cwd)?;
command
.env("GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS", "0")
.args(self.git_config_args)
.args([
"-c",
&format!("core.hooksPath={DISABLED_HOOKS_PATH}"),
"-c",
"core.fsmonitor=false",
])
.args(&probe_config_args)
.args(["hash-object", "--stdin"])
.disable_optional_locks()
.arg("--stdin")
.arg("--path")
.arg(path)
.stdin(Stdio::null());
probe_budget.ensure_probe_available()?;
let output = self.git.output(command)?;
let output = command.output()?;
probe_budget.record_completed_probe();
Ok(output)
}
@@ -397,9 +281,9 @@ fn selected_executable_filter(
Ok(None)
}
pub(crate) fn executable_filter_drivers(
fn executable_filter_drivers(
entries: &BTreeMap<String, GitConfigEntry>,
) -> io::Result<BTreeSet<String>> {
) -> io::Result<ExecutableFilterDrivers> {
let mut executable_drivers = BTreeSet::new();
for entry in entries.values() {
if entry.key.ends_with(".required") {
@@ -410,7 +294,7 @@ pub(crate) fn executable_filter_drivers(
executable_drivers.insert(driver);
}
}
Ok(executable_drivers)
Ok(ExecutableFilterDrivers(executable_drivers))
}
fn filter_driver_name(key: &str) -> io::Result<String> {
+37 -37
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
use super::*;
use crate::git_command::GitRunner;
use crate::git_config::GitConfigScope;
use crate::guarded_config::GuardedGitConfig;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ fn selected_filter_policy_allows_effective_empty_value() {
}
#[test]
fn filter_snapshot_retains_required_without_treating_it_as_executable() {
fn filter_config_retains_required_without_treating_it_as_executable() {
let mut entries = filter_entries(
GitConfigScope::Local,
Path::new("config"),
@@ -123,17 +125,16 @@ fn filter_snapshot_retains_required_without_treating_it_as_executable() {
"true",
));
assert_eq!(
executable_filter_drivers(&entries).expect("executable drivers"),
executable_filter_drivers(&entries)
.expect("executable drivers")
.0,
BTreeSet::from(["demo".to_string()])
);
let neutralization = GitFilterNeutralization {
git_config_args: Vec::new(),
_config_dir: None,
filter_config: entries,
};
assert_eq!(
neutralization.filter_value("demo", "required"),
Some("true")
entries
.get("filter.demo.required")
.map(|entry| entry.value.as_str()),
Some("true"),
);
let required_only = filter_entries(
@@ -263,9 +264,12 @@ fn sentinel_special_states_and_literal_driver_names_remain_distinct() {
let root = repo.path();
configure_marker_filter(root, driver);
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(root).expect("trusted Git");
let mut config =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, root, Vec::new()).expect("authorized config sources");
std::fs::write(root.join(".gitattributes"), special_rule).expect("write special attribute");
ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters(&git, root, &["file.txt".to_string()], &[])
config
.authorize_filter_paths(&["file.txt".to_string()])
.expect("allow special attribute state");
assert!(!marker_filter_ran(root), "special {driver}");
@@ -274,8 +278,7 @@ fn sentinel_special_states_and_literal_driver_names_remain_distinct() {
format!("file.txt filter={driver}\n"),
)
.expect("write literal attribute");
let result =
ensure_no_selected_executable_git_filters(&git, root, &["file.txt".to_string()], &[]);
let result = config.authorize_filter_paths(&["file.txt".to_string()]);
let error = match result {
Ok(_) => panic!("accepted literal sentinel-named driver {driver}"),
Err(error) => error,
@@ -296,9 +299,12 @@ fn sentinel_probe_neutralizes_every_known_driver_after_attribute_swap() {
.expect("write initial attribute");
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(root).expect("trusted Git");
let entries = read_filter_config(&git, root, &[]).expect("filter config");
let config =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, root, Vec::new()).expect("authorized config sources");
let entries = read_filter_config(&config).expect("filter config");
let executable_drivers = executable_filter_drivers(&entries).expect("executable drivers");
let neutralization = executable_filter_guard(&git, root, entries, &executable_drivers)
let neutralization = config
.build_filter_override(&executable_drivers)
.expect("filter neutralization");
let output = run_git_success(root, &["check-attr", "-z", "filter", "--", "file.txt"]);
let attributes = parse_filter_attributes(&output.stdout, &[b"file.txt".to_vec()])
@@ -310,10 +316,8 @@ fn sentinel_probe_neutralizes_every_known_driver_after_attribute_swap() {
)
.expect("swap attribute after snapshot");
let resolved = resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
&git,
root,
&config,
attributes,
&[],
&executable_drivers,
&neutralization,
)
@@ -329,9 +333,12 @@ fn high_cardinality_ordinary_sentinels_stop_at_hard_child_probe_budget() {
let root = repo.path();
configure_marker_filter(root, "unspecified");
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(root).expect("trusted Git");
let entries = read_filter_config(&git, root, &[]).expect("filter config");
let config =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, root, Vec::new()).expect("authorized config sources");
let entries = read_filter_config(&config).expect("filter config");
let executable_drivers = executable_filter_drivers(&entries).expect("executable drivers");
let neutralization = executable_filter_guard(&git, root, entries, &executable_drivers)
let neutralization = config
.build_filter_override(&executable_drivers)
.expect("filter neutralization");
let attributes = (0..=SentinelFilterProbeBudget::max_probes())
.map(|index| {
@@ -343,10 +350,8 @@ fn high_cardinality_ordinary_sentinels_stop_at_hard_child_probe_budget() {
.collect();
let error = resolve_filter_attribute_sentinels(
&git,
root,
&config,
attributes,
&[],
&executable_drivers,
&neutralization,
)
@@ -359,36 +364,31 @@ fn high_cardinality_ordinary_sentinels_stop_at_hard_child_probe_budget() {
}
#[test]
fn unrelated_sentinel_probe_failures_remain_generic_and_fail_closed() {
fn sentinel_probe_rejects_non_sentinel_driver_before_launch() {
let repo = init_filter_repo();
let root = repo.path();
configure_marker_filter(root, "set");
std::fs::write(root.join(".gitattributes"), "file.txt filter\n")
.expect("write special attribute");
let git = GitRunner::for_cwd_io(root).expect("trusted Git");
let entries = read_filter_config(&git, root, &[]).expect("filter config");
let config =
GuardedGitConfig::authorize(&git, root, Vec::new()).expect("authorized config sources");
let entries = read_filter_config(&config).expect("filter config");
let executable_drivers = executable_filter_drivers(&entries).expect("executable drivers");
let neutralization = executable_filter_guard(&git, root, entries, &executable_drivers)
let neutralization = config
.build_filter_override(&executable_drivers)
.expect("filter neutralization");
let mut budget = SentinelFilterProbeBudget::default();
let malformed_config = ["-c".to_string(), "=".to_string()];
let error = sentinel_spelling_selects_filter_driver(
&git,
root,
&config,
b"file.txt",
"set",
&malformed_config,
"ordinary",
&neutralization,
&mut budget,
)
.expect_err("malformed config must fail both probes");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::Other);
assert!(
error
.to_string()
.starts_with("git filter attribute selection probe failed with required status")
);
.expect_err("reject non-sentinel probe");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
assert!(!marker_filter_ran(root));
}