Merge origin/main into codex/workspace-owner-usage-nudge

Resolve the TUI and config schema conflicts between the workspace owner usage nudge work and the latest main changes without rewriting branch history.

Made-with: Cursor

codex-rs/protocol/Cargo.toml

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ codex-utils-image = { workspace = true }
 codex-utils-string = { workspace = true }
 codex-utils-template = { workspace = true }
 encoding_rs = { workspace = true }
+globset = { workspace = true }
 icu_decimal = { workspace = true }
 icu_locale_core = { workspace = true }
 icu_provider = { workspace = true, features = ["sync"] }

codex-rs/protocol/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ pub mod account;
 mod agent_path;
 pub mod auth;
 mod thread_id;
+mod tool_name;
 pub use agent_path::AgentPath;
 pub use thread_id::ThreadId;
+pub use tool_name::ToolName;
 pub mod approvals;
 pub mod config_types;
 pub mod dynamic_tools;

codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs

@@ -1362,6 +1362,8 @@ impl CallToolResult {
 fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
     contents: &[serde_json::Value],
 ) -> Option<Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>> {
+    const CODEX_IMAGE_DETAIL_META_KEY: &str = "codex/imageDetail";
+
     #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
     #[serde(tag = "type")]
     enum McpContent {
@@ -1372,6 +1374,8 @@ fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
             data: String,
             #[serde(rename = "mimeType", alias = "mime_type")]
             mime_type: Option<String>,
+            #[serde(rename = "_meta", default)]
+            meta: Option<serde_json::Value>,
         },
         #[serde(other)]
         Unknown,
@@ -1383,7 +1387,11 @@ fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
     for content in contents {
         let item = match serde_json::from_value::<McpContent>(content.clone()) {
             Ok(McpContent::Text { text }) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text },
-            Ok(McpContent::Image { data, mime_type }) => {
+            Ok(McpContent::Image {
+                data,
+                mime_type,
+                meta,
+            }) => {
                 saw_image = true;
                 let image_url = if data.starts_with("data:") {
                     data
@@ -1393,7 +1401,15 @@ fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
                 };
                 FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
                     image_url,
-                    detail: None,
+                    detail: meta
+                        .as_ref()
+                        .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_object)
+                        .and_then(|meta| meta.get(CODEX_IMAGE_DETAIL_META_KEY))
+                        .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
+                        .and_then(|detail| match detail {
+                            "original" => Some(ImageDetail::Original),
+                            _ => None,
+                        }),
                 }
             }
             Ok(McpContent::Unknown) | Err(_) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
@@ -2264,6 +2280,70 @@ mod tests {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn preserves_original_detail_metadata_on_mcp_images() -> Result<()> {
+        let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
+            content: vec![serde_json::json!({
+                "type": "image",
+                "data": "BASE64",
+                "mimeType": "image/png",
+                "_meta": {
+                    "codex/imageDetail": "original",
+                },
+            })],
+            structured_content: None,
+            is_error: Some(false),
+            meta: None,
+        };
+
+        let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
+        let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
+            panic!("expected content items");
+        };
+        let items = items.to_vec();
+        assert_eq!(
+            items,
+            vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
+                image_url: "".into(),
+                detail: Some(ImageDetail::Original),
+            }]
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ignores_unknown_mcp_image_detail_metadata() -> Result<()> {
+        let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
+            content: vec![serde_json::json!({
+                "type": "image",
+                "data": "BASE64",
+                "mimeType": "image/png",
+                "_meta": {
+                    "codex/imageDetail": "high",
+                },
+            })],
+            structured_content: None,
+            is_error: Some(false),
+            meta: None,
+        };
+
+        let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
+        let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
+            panic!("expected content items");
+        };
+        let items = items.to_vec();
+        assert_eq!(
+            items,
+            vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
+                image_url: "".into(),
+                detail: None,
+            }]
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn deserializes_array_payload_into_items() -> Result<()> {
         let json = r#"[

codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::canonicalize_preserving_symlinks;
+use globset::GlobBuilder;
+use globset::GlobMatcher;
 use schemars::JsonSchema;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde::Serialize;
@@ -154,14 +156,101 @@ struct FileSystemSemanticSignature {
     readable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
     writable_roots: Vec<WritableRoot>,
     unreadable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+    unreadable_globs: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// Runtime matcher for read-deny entries in a filesystem sandbox policy.
+pub struct ReadDenyMatcher {
+    denied_candidates: Vec<Vec<PathBuf>>,
+    deny_read_matchers: Vec<GlobMatcher>,
+    invalid_pattern: bool,
+}
+
+impl ReadDenyMatcher {
+    /// Builds a matcher from exact deny-read roots and deny-read glob entries.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `None` when the policy has no deny-read restrictions, so callers
+    /// can skip read-deny checks without allocating matcher state. The `cwd`
+    /// resolves cwd-relative policy paths and special paths before matching.
+    pub fn new(file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Option<Self> {
+        if !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_denied_read_restrictions() {
+            return None;
+        }
+
+        // Exact roots are stored as all meaningful path spellings we can derive
+        // cheaply. This lets direct tool checks catch both a symlink path and
+        // its canonical target without changing the policy entries themselves.
+        let denied_candidates = file_system_sandbox_policy
+            .get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|path| normalized_and_canonical_candidates(path.as_path()))
+            .collect();
+        // Pattern entries stay as policy-level globs. They are matched at read
+        // time here instead of being snapshotted to startup filesystem state.
+        let mut invalid_pattern = false;
+        let deny_read_matchers = file_system_sandbox_policy
+            .get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(cwd)
+            .into_iter()
+            .filter_map(|pattern| match build_glob_matcher(&pattern) {
+                Some(matcher) => Some(matcher),
+                None => {
+                    invalid_pattern = true;
+                    None
+                }
+            })
+            .collect();
+        Some(Self {
+            denied_candidates,
+            deny_read_matchers,
+            invalid_pattern,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns whether `path` is denied by the policy used to build this matcher.
+    pub fn is_read_denied(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
+        if self.invalid_pattern {
+            // Direct tool reads fail closed on malformed deny patterns. Silent
+            // allow would turn a config typo into a policy bypass.
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Check exact roots against each candidate spelling before evaluating
+        // glob matchers. Exact entries are subtree denies; glob entries match
+        // according to the pattern compiler's path-separator rules.
+        let path_candidates = normalized_and_canonical_candidates(path);
+        if self.denied_candidates.iter().any(|denied_candidates| {
+            path_candidates.iter().any(|candidate| {
+                denied_candidates.iter().any(|denied_candidate| {
+                    candidate == denied_candidate || candidate.starts_with(denied_candidate)
+                })
+            })
+        }) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        self.deny_read_matchers.iter().any(|matcher| {
+            path_candidates
+                .iter()
+                .any(|candidate| matcher.is_match(candidate))
+        })
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
 #[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
 #[ts(tag = "type")]
 pub enum FileSystemPath {
-    Path { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
-    Special { value: FileSystemSpecialPath },
+    Path {
+        path: AbsolutePathBuf,
+    },
+    /// A git-style glob pattern. Pattern entries currently support
+    /// FileSystemAccessMode::None only.
+    GlobPattern {
+        pattern: String,
+    },
+    Special {
+        value: FileSystemSpecialPath,
+    },
 }
 
 impl Default for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
@@ -179,62 +268,6 @@ impl Default for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
 }
 
 impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
-    fn has_root_access(&self, predicate: impl Fn(FileSystemAccessMode) -> bool) -> bool {
-        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
-            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
-                matches!(
-                    &entry.path,
-                    FileSystemPath::Special { value }
-                        if matches!(value, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root) && predicate(entry.access)
-                )
-            })
-    }
-
-    fn has_explicit_deny_entries(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
-            && self
-                .entries
-                .iter()
-                .any(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
-    }
-
-    /// Returns true when a restricted policy contains any entry that really
-    /// reduces a broader `:root = write` grant.
-    ///
-    /// Raw entry presence is not enough here: an equally specific `write`
-    /// entry for the same target wins under the normal precedence rules, so a
-    /// shadowed `read` entry must not downgrade the policy out of full-disk
-    /// write mode.
-    fn has_write_narrowing_entries(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
-            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
-                if entry.access.can_write() {
-                    return false;
-                }
-
-                match &entry.path {
-                    FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
-                    FileSystemPath::Special { value } => match value {
-                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None,
-                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal | FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => {
-                            false
-                        }
-                        _ => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
-                    },
-                }
-            })
-    }
-
-    /// Returns true when a higher-priority `write` entry targets the same
-    /// location as `entry`, so `entry` cannot narrow effective write access.
-    fn has_same_target_write_override(&self, entry: &FileSystemSandboxEntry) -> bool {
-        self.entries.iter().any(|candidate| {
-            candidate.access.can_write()
-                && candidate.access > entry.access
-                && file_system_paths_share_target(&candidate.path, &entry.path)
-        })
-    }
-
     pub fn unrestricted() -> Self {
         Self {
             kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted,
@@ -256,6 +289,86 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
         }
     }
 
+    fn has_root_access(&self, predicate: impl Fn(FileSystemAccessMode) -> bool) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
+            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
+                matches!(
+                    &entry.path,
+                    FileSystemPath::Special { value }
+                        if matches!(value, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root) && predicate(entry.access)
+                )
+            })
+    }
+
+    pub fn has_denied_read_restrictions(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
+            && self
+                .entries
+                .iter()
+                .any(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy_preserving_deny_entries(
+        sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+        cwd: &Path,
+        existing: &Self,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let mut rebuilt = Self::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, cwd);
+        if !matches!(rebuilt.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
+            return rebuilt;
+        }
+
+        for deny_entry in existing
+            .entries
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
+        {
+            if !rebuilt.entries.iter().any(|entry| entry == deny_entry) {
+                rebuilt.entries.push(deny_entry.clone());
+            }
+        }
+
+        rebuilt
+    }
+
+    /// Returns true when a restricted policy contains any entry that really
+    /// reduces a broader `:root = write` grant.
+    ///
+    /// Raw entry presence is not enough here: an equally specific `write`
+    /// entry for the same target wins under the normal precedence rules, so a
+    /// shadowed `read` entry must not downgrade the policy out of full-disk
+    /// write mode.
+    fn has_write_narrowing_entries(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
+            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
+                if entry.access.can_write() {
+                    return false;
+                }
+
+                match &entry.path {
+                    FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
+                    FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. } => true,
+                    FileSystemPath::Special { value } => match value {
+                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal | FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => {
+                            false
+                        }
+                        _ => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
+                    },
+                }
+            })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns true when a higher-priority `write` entry targets the same
+    /// location as `entry`, so `entry` cannot narrow effective write access.
+    fn has_same_target_write_override(&self, entry: &FileSystemSandboxEntry) -> bool {
+        self.entries.iter().any(|candidate| {
+            candidate.access.can_write()
+                && candidate.access > entry.access
+                && file_system_paths_share_target(&candidate.path, &entry.path)
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Converts a legacy sandbox policy into an equivalent filesystem policy
     /// for the provided cwd.
     ///
@@ -276,6 +389,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
                     FileSystemPath::Path { path } => !legacy_writable_roots
                         .iter()
                         .any(|root| root.is_path_writable(path.as_path())),
+                    FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. } => true,
                     FileSystemPath::Special { .. } => true,
                 }
             });
@@ -312,7 +426,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
             FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => true,
             FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {
                 self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_read)
-                    && !self.has_explicit_deny_entries()
+                    && !self.has_denied_read_restrictions()
             }
         }
     }
@@ -585,6 +699,29 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
         )
     }
 
+    /// Returns unreadable glob patterns resolved against the provided cwd.
+    pub fn get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<String> {
+        if !matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
+            return Vec::new();
+        }
+
+        let mut patterns = self
+            .entries
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
+            .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.path {
+                FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern } => {
+                    Some(AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(pattern, cwd))
+                }
+                FileSystemPath::Path { .. } | FileSystemPath::Special { .. } => None,
+            })
+            .map(|pattern| pattern.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        patterns.sort();
+        patterns.dedup();
+        patterns
+    }
+
     pub fn to_legacy_sandbox_policy(
         &self,
         network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
@@ -620,6 +757,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
 
                 for entry in &self.entries {
                     match &entry.path {
+                        FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. } => {}
                         FileSystemPath::Path { path } => {
                             if entry.access.can_write() {
                                 if cwd_absolute.as_ref().is_some_and(|cwd| cwd == path) {
@@ -770,6 +908,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
             readable_roots: self.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
             writable_roots: self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
             unreadable_roots: self.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
+            unreadable_globs: self.get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(cwd),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -905,6 +1044,7 @@ fn resolve_file_system_path(
 ) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
     match path {
         FileSystemPath::Path { path } => Some(path.clone()),
+        FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. } => None,
         FileSystemPath::Special { value } => resolve_file_system_special_path(value, cwd),
     }
 }
@@ -947,6 +1087,11 @@ fn file_system_paths_share_target(left: &FileSystemPath, right: &FileSystemPath)
         | (FileSystemPath::Special { value }, FileSystemPath::Path { path }) => {
             special_path_matches_absolute_path(value, path)
         }
+        (
+            FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern: left },
+            FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern: right },
+        ) => left == right,
+        (FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. }, _) | (_, FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. }) => false,
     }
 }
 
@@ -1021,6 +1166,44 @@ fn absolute_root_path_for_cwd(cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
         .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("cwd root must be an absolute path: {err}"))
 }
 
+fn normalized_and_canonical_candidates(path: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    // Compare the lexical absolute form plus the canonical target when it
+    // exists. Missing paths still need the lexical candidate so future-created
+    // denied paths remain blocked by direct tool checks.
+    let mut candidates = Vec::new();
+
+    if let Ok(normalized) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path) {
+        push_unique(&mut candidates, normalized.to_path_buf());
+    } else {
+        push_unique(&mut candidates, path.to_path_buf());
+    }
+
+    if let Ok(canonical) = path.canonicalize()
+        && let Ok(canonical_absolute) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(canonical)
+    {
+        push_unique(&mut candidates, canonical_absolute.to_path_buf());
+    }
+
+    candidates
+}
+
+fn push_unique(candidates: &mut Vec<PathBuf>, candidate: PathBuf) {
+    if !candidates.iter().any(|existing| existing == &candidate) {
+        candidates.push(candidate);
+    }
+}
+
+fn build_glob_matcher(pattern: &str) -> Option<GlobMatcher> {
+    // Keep `*` and `?` within a single path component and preserve an unclosed
+    // `[` as a literal so matcher behavior stays aligned with config parsing.
+    GlobBuilder::new(pattern)
+        .literal_separator(true)
+        .allow_unclosed_class(true)
+        .build()
+        .ok()
+        .map(|glob| glob.compile_matcher())
+}
+
 fn resolve_file_system_special_path(
     value: &FileSystemSpecialPath,
     cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -2061,4 +2244,187 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::Write > FileSystemAccessMode::Read);
         assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::None > FileSystemAccessMode::Write);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_bridge_preserves_explicit_deny_entries() {
+        let denied = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from("/tmp/private").expect("absolute path");
+        let existing = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path {
+                path: denied.clone(),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+        }]);
+
+        let rebuilt = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_preserving_deny_entries(
+            &SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
+            Path::new("/tmp/workspace"),
+            &existing,
+        );
+
+        assert!(
+            rebuilt.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
+                entry.path
+                    == FileSystemPath::Path {
+                        path: denied.clone(),
+                    }
+                    && entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None
+            }),
+            "expected explicit deny entry to be preserved"
+        );
+    }
+
+    fn deny_policy(path: &Path) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
+        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path {
+                path: AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path).expect("absolute deny path"),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+        }])
+    }
+
+    fn unreadable_glob_entry(pattern: String) -> FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn default_policy_with_unreadable_glob(pattern: String) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
+        let mut policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::default();
+        policy.entries.push(unreadable_glob_entry(pattern));
+        policy
+    }
+
+    fn is_read_denied(
+        path: &Path,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+        cwd: &Path,
+    ) -> bool {
+        ReadDenyMatcher::new(file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd)
+            .is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_read_denied(path))
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn exact_path_and_descendants_are_denied() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let denied_dir = temp.path().join("denied");
+        let nested = denied_dir.join("nested.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&denied_dir).expect("create denied dir");
+        std::fs::write(&nested, "secret").expect("write secret");
+
+        let policy = deny_policy(&denied_dir);
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&denied_dir, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&nested, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(
+            &temp.path().join("other.txt"),
+            &policy,
+            temp.path()
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_target_matches_denied_symlink_alias() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let real_dir = temp.path().join("real");
+        let alias_dir = temp.path().join("alias");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&real_dir).expect("create real dir");
+        symlink_dir(&real_dir, &alias_dir).expect("symlink alias");
+
+        let secret = real_dir.join("secret.txt");
+        std::fs::write(&secret, "secret").expect("write secret");
+        let alias_secret = alias_dir.join("secret.txt");
+
+        let policy = deny_policy(&real_dir);
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&alias_secret, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn literal_patterns_and_globs_are_denied() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let literal = temp.path().join("private");
+        let other = temp.path().join("notes.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&literal).expect("create literal dir");
+        std::fs::write(&other, "notes").expect("write notes");
+
+        let mut policy = deny_policy(&literal);
+        policy.entries.push(unreadable_glob_entry(format!(
+            "{}/**/*.txt",
+            temp.path().display()
+        )));
+
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&literal, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&other, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn glob_patterns_deny_matching_paths() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let denied = temp.path().join("private").join("secret1.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(denied.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
+        std::fs::write(&denied, "secret").expect("write secret");
+
+        let policy = default_policy_with_unreadable_glob(format!(
+            "{}/private/secret?.txt",
+            temp.path().display()
+        ));
+
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&denied, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn glob_patterns_do_not_cross_path_separators() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let matching = temp.path().join("app").join("file42.txt");
+        let nested = temp.path().join("app").join("nested").join("file42.txt");
+        let short = temp.path().join("app").join("file4.txt");
+        let letters = temp.path().join("app").join("fileab.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(nested.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
+        std::fs::write(&matching, "secret").expect("write matching");
+        std::fs::write(&nested, "secret").expect("write nested");
+        std::fs::write(&short, "secret").expect("write short");
+        std::fs::write(&letters, "secret").expect("write letters");
+
+        let policy = default_policy_with_unreadable_glob(format!(
+            "{}/*/file[0-9]?.txt",
+            temp.path().display()
+        ));
+
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&matching, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(&nested, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(&short, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(&letters, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn globstar_patterns_deny_root_and_nested_matches() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let root_env = temp.path().join(".env");
+        let nested_env = temp.path().join("app").join(".env");
+        let other = temp.path().join("app").join("notes.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(nested_env.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
+        std::fs::write(&root_env, "secret").expect("write root env");
+        std::fs::write(&nested_env, "secret").expect("write nested env");
+        std::fs::write(&other, "notes").expect("write notes");
+
+        let policy =
+            default_policy_with_unreadable_glob(format!("{}/**/*.env", temp.path().display()));
+
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&root_env, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&nested_env, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(&other, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unclosed_character_classes_match_literal_brackets() {
+        let temp = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let bracket_file = temp.path().join("[");
+        let other = temp.path().join("notes.txt");
+        std::fs::write(&bracket_file, "secret").expect("write bracket file");
+        std::fs::write(&other, "notes").expect("write notes");
+        let policy = default_policy_with_unreadable_glob(format!("{}/[", temp.path().display()));
+
+        assert!(is_read_denied(&bracket_file, &policy, temp.path()));
+        assert!(!is_read_denied(&other, &policy, temp.path()));
+    }
 }

codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs

@@ -1223,11 +1223,15 @@ impl SandboxPolicy {
 
                 // Include /tmp on Unix unless explicitly excluded.
                 if cfg!(unix) && !exclude_slash_tmp {
-                    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-                    let slash_tmp =
-                        AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path("/tmp").expect("/tmp is absolute");
-                    if slash_tmp.as_path().is_dir() {
-                        roots.push(slash_tmp);
+                    match AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path("/tmp") {
+                        Ok(slash_tmp) => {
+                            if slash_tmp.as_path().is_dir() {
+                                roots.push(slash_tmp);
+                            }
+                        }
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            error!("Ignoring invalid /tmp for sandbox writable root: {e}");
+                        }
                     }
                 }
 
@@ -2374,6 +2378,9 @@ pub struct McpToolCallBeginEvent {
     /// Identifier so this can be paired with the McpToolCallEnd event.
     pub call_id: String,
     pub invocation: McpInvocation,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    #[ts(optional)]
+    pub mcp_app_resource_uri: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS, PartialEq)]
@@ -2381,6 +2388,9 @@ pub struct McpToolCallEndEvent {
     /// Identifier for the corresponding McpToolCallBegin that finished.
     pub call_id: String,
     pub invocation: McpInvocation,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    #[ts(optional)]
+    pub mcp_app_resource_uri: Option<String>,
     #[ts(type = "string")]
     pub duration: Duration,
     /// Result of the tool call. Note this could be an error.
@@ -2846,6 +2856,8 @@ pub struct TurnContextItem {
     pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub network: Option<TurnContextNetworkItem>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
     pub model: String,
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub personality: Option<Personality>,
@@ -4976,6 +4988,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         assert_eq!(item.trace_id, None);
         assert_eq!(item.network, None);
+        assert_eq!(item.file_system_sandbox_policy, None);
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -4993,6 +5006,14 @@ mod tests {
                 allowed_domains: vec!["api.example.com".to_string()],
                 denied_domains: vec!["blocked.example.com".to_string()],
             }),
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+                FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+                    path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
+                        pattern: "/tmp/private/**/*.txt".to_string(),
+                    },
+                    access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+                },
+            ])),
             model: "gpt-5".to_string(),
             personality: None,
             collaboration_mode: None,
@@ -5013,6 +5034,19 @@ mod tests {
                 "denied_domains": ["blocked.example.com"],
             })
         );
+        assert_eq!(
+            value["file_system_sandbox_policy"],
+            json!({
+                "kind": "restricted",
+                "entries": [{
+                    "path": {
+                        "type": "glob_pattern",
+                        "pattern": "/tmp/private/**/*.txt"
+                    },
+                    "access": "none"
+                }]
+            })
+        );
         Ok(())
     }
 

codex-rs/protocol/src/tool_name.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde::Serialize;
+use std::fmt;
+
+/// Identifies a callable tool, preserving the namespace split when the model
+/// provides one.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize)]
+pub struct ToolName {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub namespace: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl ToolName {
+    pub fn new(namespace: Option<String>, name: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            name: name.into(),
+            namespace,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn plain(name: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            name: name.into(),
+            namespace: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn namespaced(namespace: impl Into<String>, name: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            name: name.into(),
+            namespace: Some(namespace.into()),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn display(&self) -> String {
+        match &self.namespace {
+            Some(namespace) => format!("{namespace}{}", self.name),
+            None => self.name.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ToolName {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match &self.namespace {
+            Some(namespace) => write!(f, "{namespace}{}", self.name),
+            None => f.write_str(&self.name),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<String> for ToolName {
+    fn from(name: String) -> Self {
+        Self::plain(name)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&str> for ToolName {
+    fn from(name: &str) -> Self {
+        Self::plain(name)
+    }
+}