The reward preimage is static and published in every block header, so two
nodes sharing one are publicly and permanently identifiable as the same
operator. That silently defeats the point of running nodes at separate
sites, so the inner_hash moves out of a single env: value and into the
deploy-node matrix, one per host, alongside the miners each node serves.
doc/wormhole-rewards.md records the derivation chain
(secret -> Poseidon2(salt|secret) = inner_hash -> Poseidon2(inner_hash) =
address) with source citations, and the analysis: publishing the
inner_hash is not a theft risk because spending needs a plonky2 proof of
knowledge of the secret, but it does make mining income permanently
attributable. The privacy in this design is at the exit, not at receipt,
which is not what MINING.md's wording suggests.
It also records the operational flaw: the inner_hash cannot be derived
from any public material and the Android wallet does not expose it, so a
seed phrase must reach some machine to produce a value that is public
anyway. Mitigation is a dedicated mining wallet, not carefulness.
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