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helexa/crates/helexa-router/src/dispatch.rs
rob thijssen 1115bb0942
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feat(#74): verify downstream cortex TLS certs (outbound pinning)
The router is a TLS client to cortexes; the router->cortex hop crosses
the helexa->operator boundary carrying the client's bearer. This pins
that hop to an enrolled cert.

Trust mechanism (the open question): per-cortex enrolled trust anchor.
Each [[cortexes]] entry gets an optional `tls_ca` — a PEM CA (or
self-signed cert) the cortex's TLS cert must chain to. When set, the
router builds a client that trusts ONLY that anchor (platform roots
disabled), so the cortex must present the expected cert and a rogue
endpoint with any other (even publicly-valid) cert is rejected at the
handshake. Enrolment = the operator hands helexa the cortex's cert,
referenced by path in router config. This is the natural model for
self-hosted operators behind their own nginx/private CA, and reuses the
reqwest public API (no custom rustls verifier, no new TLS backend).

- `RouterState` now holds a per-cortex `reqwest::Client` map
  (`client_for`), replacing the single shared client; poller and dispatch
  use the per-cortex client. `build_client(tls_ca)` is the builder.
- Fail closed: a `tls_ca` that can't load omits the cortex from the
  client map — it's never polled or routed to, rather than silently
  degrading to unpinned TLS. The poller treats a missing client (and a
  rejected handshake) as a failed poll, so #72's existing reachability
  debounce excludes it.

Tests (`tls.rs`, 4): a live tokio-rustls HTTPS server proves a client
enrolled with the server's cert is accepted (200) while clients pinned to
a different cert — or using default roots — are rejected; the poller
marks a wrong-cert cortex unreachable while a correctly-enrolled one is
reachable; a missing pin file disables the cortex (fail closed); garbage
PEM is rejected at build. Existing suites updated for the per-cortex
client + new config field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F6o3ddqmYNh9kzdwq6eowh
2026-06-21 21:23:20 +03:00

222 lines
7.5 KiB
Rust

//! Capacity-aware dispatch (#73) — the router's data path.
//!
//! Given an inbound request's `model`, pick a reachable cortex that can
//! serve it (preferring warm/loaded, region-affine, higher-headroom),
//! forward the client's bearer **unchanged** (auth stays at cortex), and
//! stream the response back verbatim via the shared [`helexa_stream`]
//! module. Cortex's #63-shaped rejections (`429 rate_limit_exceeded`,
//! `400 context_length_exceeded`, …) pass through untouched. Transport
//! failures fail over to the next feasible cortex; a genuine HTTP response —
//! any status — is returned as-is and never retried away.
//!
//! The router holds **no entitlement logic**: it routes on capacity, not
//! budget.
use crate::config::CortexEndpoint;
use crate::error::envelope_response;
use crate::state::RouterState;
use axum::body::Bytes;
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
use axum::response::Response;
use cortex_core::error_envelope::OpenAiError;
use helexa_stream::{ChunkObserver, StreamError};
use std::cmp::Reverse;
use std::collections::HashMap;
/// Retry-After hint (seconds) on the router's own transient rejections.
const RETRY_AFTER_SECS: u64 = 5;
/// Outcome of choosing where to send a request.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Selection {
/// Feasible reachable cortexes, best-first (failover order).
Candidates(Vec<CortexEndpoint>),
/// Some cortex knows the model but none are reachable right now → 503.
NoReachableCapacity,
/// No configured cortex serves the model at all → 404.
UnknownModel,
}
/// Rank the reachable cortexes that can serve `model`, best-first.
///
/// Ordering (each a tie-break for the next): loaded/warm before cold-loadable
/// · region match before not · more healthy nodes before fewer · name for
/// determinism.
pub async fn select_cortexes(state: &RouterState, model: &str) -> Selection {
let topo = state.topology.read().await;
let by_name: HashMap<&str, &CortexEndpoint> = state
.cortexes
.iter()
.map(|c| (c.name.as_str(), c))
.collect();
let mut ranked: Vec<Ranked> = Vec::new();
let mut known_anywhere = false;
for (name, t) in topo.iter() {
let Some(entry) = t.models.get(model) else {
continue;
};
if !crate::state::entry_feasible(entry) {
continue;
}
// Known even via an unreachable cortex's last-good poll — lets us
// tell "temporarily down" (503) from "nobody serves it" (404).
known_anywhere = true;
if !t.reachable {
continue;
}
let Some(ep) = by_name.get(name.as_str()) else {
continue;
};
let region_match = match (&state.region, &ep.region) {
(Some(r), Some(cr)) => r == cr,
_ => false,
};
ranked.push(Ranked {
loaded: entry.loaded,
region_match,
healthy_nodes: t.healthy_nodes,
endpoint: (*ep).clone(),
});
}
if ranked.is_empty() {
return if known_anywhere {
Selection::NoReachableCapacity
} else {
Selection::UnknownModel
};
}
ranked.sort_by(|a, b| {
// false < true, so negate the "good" booleans to sort good first.
(
!a.loaded,
!a.region_match,
Reverse(a.healthy_nodes),
&a.endpoint.name,
)
.cmp(&(
!b.loaded,
!b.region_match,
Reverse(b.healthy_nodes),
&b.endpoint.name,
))
});
Selection::Candidates(ranked.into_iter().map(|r| r.endpoint).collect())
}
struct Ranked {
loaded: bool,
region_match: bool,
healthy_nodes: u32,
endpoint: CortexEndpoint,
}
/// Proxy an inbound inference request to a capacity-bearing cortex.
///
/// `path` is the inference path to forward to (same on the cortex, e.g.
/// `/v1/chat/completions`). The body is parsed only to extract `model`.
pub async fn dispatch(
state: &RouterState,
path: &str,
headers: HeaderMap,
body: Bytes,
) -> Response {
let Some(model) = extract_model(&body) else {
return envelope_response(OpenAiError::new(
400,
"invalid_request_error",
"missing_model_field",
"missing 'model' field in request body",
));
};
let candidates = match select_cortexes(state, &model).await {
Selection::Candidates(c) => c,
Selection::UnknownModel => {
return envelope_response(
OpenAiError::new(
404,
"invalid_request_error",
"model_not_found",
format!("no operator serves model '{model}'"),
)
.with_param("model"),
);
}
Selection::NoReachableCapacity => {
return envelope_response(OpenAiError::service_unavailable(
format!("model '{model}' is temporarily unavailable on all operators"),
Some(RETRY_AFTER_SECS),
));
}
};
// Try candidates in order, failing over only on transport errors. A
// genuine HTTP response (any status — including cortex's #63 429/400)
// is returned verbatim and never retried away.
for ep in &candidates {
// A candidate whose pinned TLS client failed to build (#74) is
// disabled — skip it and fail over, same as an unreachable cortex.
let Some(client) = state.client_for(&ep.name) else {
tracing::warn!(cortex = %ep.name, "no TLS client (disabled); skipping candidate");
continue;
};
let url = format!("{}{}", ep.endpoint, path);
tracing::info!(cortex = %ep.name, url = %url, model = %model, "dispatching");
match helexa_stream::forward_streaming(
client,
&url,
headers.clone(),
body.clone(),
NoopObserver,
)
.await
{
Ok(resp) => return resp,
Err(StreamError::Upstream(e)) => {
tracing::warn!(
cortex = %ep.name,
url = %url,
error = %e,
"cortex unreachable; failing over"
);
continue;
}
Err(StreamError::ResponseBuild(msg)) => {
tracing::error!(cortex = %ep.name, error = %msg, "failed to build proxied response");
return envelope_response(OpenAiError::without_code(
500,
"api_error",
"failed to build proxied response",
));
}
}
}
// Every feasible cortex failed to connect.
tracing::warn!(model = %model, tried = candidates.len(), "all feasible operators unreachable");
envelope_response(OpenAiError::service_unavailable(
format!("all operators able to serve '{model}' are unreachable"),
Some(RETRY_AFTER_SECS),
))
}
/// Pull the `model` field out of a request body without re-serialising it.
fn extract_model(body: &Bytes) -> Option<String> {
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(body).ok()?;
v.get("model")?.as_str().map(str::to_string)
}
/// The router proxies bytes verbatim and keeps no per-request policy, so it
/// needs no observation hooks. (Token metrics/metering stay at cortex.)
struct NoopObserver;
impl ChunkObserver for NoopObserver {
fn observe(&mut self, _chunk: &[u8]) {}
fn finish(&mut self) {}
}