Sets allow_new_repos true in the deployed configuration, so an
authenticated request for a repository the bucket does not hold fetches
it from upstream and stores it on the way past.
This is what makes the registry useful as a drop-in HF_ENDPOINT for a
consumer: helexa's neurons resolve eight catalogued models, none of
which were in the bucket, and pre-seeding each one by hand before it can
be served defeats the purpose of putting a mirror in front of the Hub at
all. With the flag off the service answered exactly as designed --
"forbidden by policy: Qwen/Qwen3-1.7B is not already stored and
policy.allow_new_repos is false" -- which is correct behaviour and the
wrong deployment for this use.
The trade is real and now stated where it will be read rather than
buried: the bucket becomes bounded by auth rather than by policy, so
every issued client token is a licence to store arbitrary upstream
repositories. policy.allowlist is the middle setting that keeps
on-demand mirroring while confining it to expected namespaces, and it
stays empty here only because the consumer's catalogue is expected to
grow.
The agent notes previously asserted that the deployment relied on the
flag being false; that claim would have been quietly wrong from this
commit onward, so it is rewritten rather than left to mislead.
The lock added alongside compare-and-set removed its map entry inside
the critical section. A queued waiter still held that mutex, so the next
arrival found no entry, created a fresh one, and the two then ran
concurrently -- defeating the lock exactly when there was contention,
which is the only time it does anything.
I previously reported this fix as working on the strength of ten clean
release-mode runs. That was wrong: in debug, where the timing differs,
the guarding test fails 3 times in 12. Retiring the entry only after
dropping our own reference, under the same shard lock `entry` takes,
gives 0 failures in 25 -- and restoring the old behaviour reproduces 3
in 12, so the test really does catch it.
The consequence was the one the test names: a file served to a client
but never recorded, and so invisible the moment the instance is sealed.
Real against the local filesystem store, which has no conditional put
and relies on the verify-after-write retry; MinIO's compare-and-set
covers the same race, which is why the deployed path never showed it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
Three routes, per architecture/generic.md §4 (Vite + React + SWC + TS,
static, served by nginx): / renders the repository readme, /models is a
paged and filterable listing of what the bucket holds, and
/{namespace}/{name} shows one repository -- its pinned refs, the files
actually stored, and its model card.
The API it reads is /v1/, deliberately not /api/. That surface is the
Hub's, recorded and replayed verbatim, and adding routes of our own to
it risks a client mistaking one for the real thing. /v1/ answers a
question the Hub has no equivalent for -- what is in this bucket --
which is inventory, not the model search the spec rules out.
The listing shows only what has actually been fetched, never upstream's
siblings. A repository pulled one file at a time shows one file, which
is the honest answer to "what can I get from here offline".
Model cards are third-party content, so their HTML is parsed and then
sanitised against GitHub's allowlist. The plugin order is load-bearing
and commented as such. Verified against a card crafted with <script>,
onerror, a javascript: href, an <iframe>, an SVG-embedded script and an
inline handler: none execute and ordinary markdown still renders. Card
images are not loaded at all -- fetching them would leak the viewer's
address to a third party and make an offline registry's pages depend on
the internet.
Routing: rustingface's URL space is the Hub's, so /Qwen/Qwen3-0.6B is
both a page and the prefix of a file. The vhost splits them the way the
Hub does -- /resolve/ anywhere in the path, plus /api/ and /v1/, go to
the service; everything else is the app. A repo legitimately named
v1/repos is handed back to the resolve path by the router, and there is
a test for it. The /resolve/ test is on the repo type rather than the
path substring, because a repo may contain a directory called resolve
and /api/models/a/b/tree/main/resolve/f must stay a tree request.
Deployment: the frontend ships to hanzalova:/var/www/rustingface, so
that host now gets its own scoped gitea_ci drop-in -- narrower than the
service host's: a webroot rsync, a relabel, nginx -t and a reload. The
health check probes rf.internal from the proxy rather than from the
runner, because a runner is a plain Fedora container with no internal
root CA (verified: fedora:43 gets 000, the proxy gets 200).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
Covers what the guarantees mean in practice, the two deliberate
departures from architecture/generic.md §1, how to run it locally, the
deployment topology, and how to run both test suites.
CLAUDE.md records the invariants that are easy to break silently --
header replay, redirect handling, write ordering, and completing a
response before its manifest write lands -- since each of those was a
real bug rather than a hypothetical one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
grenade
