main
10
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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14f8342cf8
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fix(core): followers stream from the transfer instead of waiting it out
Spec §7 says concurrent requests for the same uncached blob must produce exactly one upstream fetch, and that "subsequent callers subscribe to the same broadcast". Subscribing was the part that did not exist. A follower called `Flight::wait` and blocked -- no timeout, nothing on the wire -- until the leader's entire transfer finished. For a 3.3GB shard at 8MB/s that is 400+ seconds before the response headers are written, against a client that allows 10. Indistinguishable from a hung server, while the leader logs that it stored the blob. It could not be fixed by handing over the live stream: the bytes that already passed are gone from it, and the multipart upload is not readable until it completes. So add the missing buffer. The leader writes every chunk to `server.spool_dir` as it passes and publishes how much is safe to read; a follower opens that file and streams it from byte zero, following it as it grows, with the last chunk withheld until the flight reports the blob stored -- the same rule the tee follows, for the same reason. The spool is not state, and the bucket remains the whole of it. Losing the spool loses nothing: a blob is not recorded until it is durable, so a crash mid-transfer leaves an unreferenced blob and the next request refetches. It is the role the in-memory buffer already plays for small files, on disk so it can hold a large one. Every transfer is spooled rather than only large ones, because size-dependent behaviour is what this service has already been bitten by once. With `spool_dir` unset there is nothing to read and a follower is answered 503 rather than left hanging, which is the honest fallback. The new test asserts the thing that actually distinguishes streaming from waiting -- that the follower's first bytes arrive while the leader is still transferring -- because chunked delivery alone proves nothing: the old path returned chunks too, just all of them after the transfer had ended. It fails with spooling disabled. The eight-concurrent-clients test still sees exactly one upstream fetch, now through the spool. Closes #2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqNtYNhov3fukx46KS9R7L |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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9b35dfdc09
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fix(core): a cold range that stops short of the end no longer stalls
Since #1 a ranged GET on a file the bucket does not hold streams its slice from the tee instead of waiting for the whole transfer. For a range that runs to the end of the file -- what a resumed `hf download` sends -- that is exactly right, and it stays. For a range that stops short of the end it is not enough. The slice arrives quickly and then the *last chunk* is withheld until the manifest write lands, which waits on every remaining byte, because the digest is verified only once the whole file has passed. Measured against the live service, asking for the first 1MiB of a 3.3GB shard: http=206 ttfb=1.040851s total=120.001638s bytes=1048169 1,048,169 of 1,048,576 bytes in about a second, then an idle connection for the rest of the transfer. The client's read timeout ends it long before, so in practice the request fails anyway -- slowly and with no explanation. The holdback is not the thing to change: releasing that tail early would signal "durable and recorded" over bytes that are neither, which is precisely what it exists to prevent. So answer 503 with Retry-After instead, and let the fetch run on detached; the retry is served from the bucket. `hf_transfer` splits every download into bounded ranged chunks, so this shape is not hypothetical wherever it is enabled. The existing ranged test now asserts the two-step behaviour and keeps its guarantee that the bucket holds the whole file and never a fragment. A new test pins that a resume to EOF is still served from the tee, so the fix for #1 cannot be undone by this one. Closes #4 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqNtYNhov3fukx46KS9R7L |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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5f91032e6f
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fix(core): a ranged fetch of a cold file left the client in silence
A ranged GET on a file the bucket does not hold used to fetch and store the whole thing before sending a single byte. Asking for the first megabyte of a 3.3GB shard therefore held the connection open, silent, for the length of the entire transfer: 93 seconds measured against the live service at 28MB/s, and 400-800s at the 8MB/s a GPU host gets. No client waits that long for a first byte. What makes it unrecoverable rather than merely slow is that `huggingface_hub` resumes with a Range header. So the first failure leaves an `.incomplete` file, and *every retry from then on* takes this path and is answered with silence. The partial file never grows, its mtime goes stale, and the retry loop cannot converge -- while the server logs nothing but `stored blob and recorded manifest entry`, because from its side the fetch succeeded. The whole file must still be fetched and stored, since a fragment must never reach the bucket. What must not happen is the client waiting on that in silence. So narrow the tee instead of blocking on it: the client is sent its slice as those bytes pass, one chunk behind as before, with the last piece still withheld until the manifest write lands. For the open-ended `bytes=N-` a resume actually asks for, that is a continuous stream to the end of the file. `blocking` and `LeadResult::Completed` go with it; nothing else used them. The test asserting a ranged cold request stores the whole file and never a fragment is unchanged and still passes. Refs #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqNtYNhov3fukx46KS9R7L |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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cfa53e14bd
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fix(data): a hidden 30s body timeout capped every proxied blob
`object_store` puts a 30-second `reqwest` timeout on the whole request, body included. On a proxied blob that is not a timeout at all: the bucket is read at the pace the client drains it, so it is a maximum servable file size. The reason it never looked like one is that object_store hides its own consequences. It catches every response-body error and silently retries with a resumed Range, so a large read does not fail at 30s -- it reconnects every 30s and keeps going, until RetryConfig's 180s retry_timeout is spent. Then the body simply ends, with a 200 already on the wire and nothing logged anywhere. The ceiling is 180s x bandwidth: at the 8MB/s a GPU host gets to caveman, no file over ~1.4GB can ever be served, and no client retry converges because the next attempt is no faster. Measured against the live bucket, 500MiB at 1MB/s: cut at 184.1s, 193,340,351 of 524,288,000 bytes. With the timeout disabled, 499.6s and complete -- the same wall time curl takes reading the same object straight from MinIO. Disable it, and guard the stream the way a stream should be guarded: `storage.connect_timeout` and an idle `storage.read_timeout` that bounds silence rather than progress. A test asserts the total cap stays off. Issue #1 named `server.request_timeout` as the cause. It was not -- that key was parsed and then read by nothing, which is its own problem and is why the hunt started 300 seconds away from a 180-second bug. Remove it. Also log when a blob response ends before its Content-Length. Once the headers are out the bytes leave through hyper, so a cut mid-body was invisible on this side: the service logged a clean 200 while the client saw a short read and retried forever. Refs #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqNtYNhov3fukx46KS9R7L |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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3790f2589c
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fix(core): the per-key manifest lock did not actually exclude
The lock added alongside compare-and-set removed its map entry inside the critical section. A queued waiter still held that mutex, so the next arrival found no entry, created a fresh one, and the two then ran concurrently -- defeating the lock exactly when there was contention, which is the only time it does anything. I previously reported this fix as working on the strength of ten clean release-mode runs. That was wrong: in debug, where the timing differs, the guarding test fails 3 times in 12. Retiring the entry only after dropping our own reference, under the same shard lock `entry` takes, gives 0 failures in 25 -- and restoring the old behaviour reproduces 3 in 12, so the test really does catch it. The consequence was the one the test names: a file served to a client but never recorded, and so invisible the moment the instance is sealed. Real against the local filesystem store, which has no conditional put and relies on the verify-after-write retry; MinIO's compare-and-set covers the same race, which is why the deployed path never showed it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64 |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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5a94d90b79
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fix(ci): restore the format gate and match the runner's package policy
Run 12 failed both build jobs, for two unrelated reasons of mine. cargo fmt: the previous commit ran clippy and the test suite but not the formatter, and inventory.rs was written by hand. Formatted. pnpm: the runner enforces a minimum release age on lockfile entries -- a supply-chain safeguard against a package published minutes ago -- and rejected electron-to-chromium@1.5.417 and ignore@7.0.7, both published inside its 24h cutoff. My local install had no such policy, so the lockfile resolved to them and the failure only surfaced on the runner. Adds web/.npmrc pinning the same 1440-minute policy locally, so a lockfile resolved here is one CI will accept, and re-resolves against it (1.5.416 and 7.0.6). Setting it in the repo rather than fixing the two versions by hand is what stops this recurring on the next dependency change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64 |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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acd47a31c8
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feat(web): add the operator UI and the /v1 inventory API it reads
Three routes, per architecture/generic.md §4 (Vite + React + SWC + TS,
static, served by nginx): / renders the repository readme, /models is a
paged and filterable listing of what the bucket holds, and
/{namespace}/{name} shows one repository -- its pinned refs, the files
actually stored, and its model card.
The API it reads is /v1/, deliberately not /api/. That surface is the
Hub's, recorded and replayed verbatim, and adding routes of our own to
it risks a client mistaking one for the real thing. /v1/ answers a
question the Hub has no equivalent for -- what is in this bucket --
which is inventory, not the model search the spec rules out.
The listing shows only what has actually been fetched, never upstream's
siblings. A repository pulled one file at a time shows one file, which
is the honest answer to "what can I get from here offline".
Model cards are third-party content, so their HTML is parsed and then
sanitised against GitHub's allowlist. The plugin order is load-bearing
and commented as such. Verified against a card crafted with <script>,
onerror, a javascript: href, an <iframe>, an SVG-embedded script and an
inline handler: none execute and ordinary markdown still renders. Card
images are not loaded at all -- fetching them would leak the viewer's
address to a third party and make an offline registry's pages depend on
the internet.
Routing: rustingface's URL space is the Hub's, so /Qwen/Qwen3-0.6B is
both a page and the prefix of a file. The vhost splits them the way the
Hub does -- /resolve/ anywhere in the path, plus /api/ and /v1/, go to
the service; everything else is the app. A repo legitimately named
v1/repos is handed back to the resolve path by the router, and there is
a test for it. The /resolve/ test is on the repo type rather than the
path substring, because a repo may contain a directory called resolve
and /api/models/a/b/tree/main/resolve/f must stay a tree request.
Deployment: the frontend ships to hanzalova:/var/www/rustingface, so
that host now gets its own scoped gitea_ci drop-in -- narrower than the
service host's: a webroot rsync, a relabel, nginx -t and a reload. The
health check probes rf.internal from the proxy rather than from the
runner, because a runner is a plain Fedora container with no internal
root CA (verified: fedora:43 gets 000, the proxy gets 200).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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aafe132779
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fix(core): hold the last chunk until the blob and manifest are durable
Guarantee 1 is "durably stored in the configured bucket before the response completes". The tee sent every chunk straight through, so the client saw the last byte before the multipart upload was completed and well before the manifest referenced it. A client that read a file and immediately failed over to a sealed instance could be told the file had never been seen -- and if either storage phase failed, it had already received a clean 200 over bytes nothing recorded. The tee now runs one chunk behind and releases the final chunk only after the upload completes and the manifest write lands. Content-Length is already on the wire, so a client cannot treat the transfer as complete without those bytes; a storage or manifest failure now ends the body short instead, which is what the client detects and retries on. Costs one chunk of extra latency at the end of a transfer and nothing else: the withheld chunk is bounded by the upstream chunk size, and a disconnected client still has its transfer finished without it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64 |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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d461d466c2
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fix(core): stop concurrent manifest writes from losing a served file
A snapshot_download fans out across a repo's files, so several transfers finish at once and each rewrites the same manifest document. The read-merge-write had no conditional put behind it: two writers that read the same document both wrote their own version, and the second silently dropped the first's entry. The verify-after-write retry caught most of that, but the write happens in the detached transfer task -- after the client already has its bytes -- so a lost entry surfaced only later, as a sealed instance claiming never to have seen a file it had served. That breaks the fetch-once retention guarantee. Adds a compare-and-set pair to the Store port (get_versioned / put_if_version, conditional on the etag last read) and uses it for manifest updates, so a racing write is refused and retried rather than merged away. The local filesystem store cannot do conditional updates, so it reports supports_compare_and_set() = false and the caller keeps the verify-after-write path for it. Also serialises manifest writes per key within the process. CAS alone is correct but turns eight parallel workers into eight writers contending for one document, burning the retry budget on self-inflicted collisions; the lock makes the common case uncontended and leaves the retry loop for genuinely concurrent writers -- another instance, or the CLI against the same bucket. Regression test fetches twelve files of one repo concurrently and asserts every one survives into the manifest and replays when sealed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64 |
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grenadeandClaude Opus 5
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cb1ca8b6af
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feat(rustingface): implement the registry, admin CLI and deployment
Scaffolds the workspace per architecture/generic.md §1 and implements
phases 0-3 of doc/spec.md §12.
Crates:
entities manifest/ref/repo schemas, bucket key layout, config, the
X-Error-Code taxonomy. No I/O.
core resolver, freeze pinning, single-flight, the streaming tee,
policy, gc/verify/refresh. Defines the Store and Upstream
ports.
data object_store (S3 + local) and reqwest Hub adapters.
api the axum surface: resolve, model/dataset info, tree, refs,
whoami, metrics, bearer auth, range handling.
bin one binary: serve plus fetch/pin/refresh/list/show/rm/gc/
verify/doctor.
Deployment targets bob.hanzalova.internal:20482 (port derived per
architecture/port-allocations.md §3), storing to the MinIO on
caveman.kosherinata.internal, fronted by hanzalova at rf.internal.
Ships the sysusers drop-in, hardened unit, firewalld service, nginx
vhost, config template, infra-setup.sh and the Gitea Actions
ci/deploy/conformance workflows.
Testing: 112 unit and integration tests, including the sovereignty
suite (cold fetch, sealed replay, single-flight, client disconnect,
range resume, freeze stability, gc-after-rm, digest mismatch), plus a
conformance suite driving a pinned huggingface_hub against a real Hub.
Deviations from the spec, all deliberate:
- one binary with subcommands (spec §9) rather than generic.md's
separate -api and -cli binaries; the library split is unchanged.
- a dedicated sysusers account and hardened unit (generic.md §8)
rather than the spec's illustrative DynamicUser unit.
- manifests carry an optional repo_tree recorded verbatim, resolving
spec §13's "record whole, filter on read" question for the tree
endpoint as well as model-info.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
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