no-show economics without bonds: short deadlines, auto-refund, maker exposure limits #62

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grenade · 2026-09-15T14:42:03Z

grenade commented

2026-09-15 14:42:03 +00:00

Parent: #54. Replaces the bond design; see the correction on #54 dated 2026-09-15.

Why no bonds

Buyers do not hold QTC; only miners and the team do. A QTC bond is a barrier to entry for exactly the people the swap exists to bring in, and a seller bond protects nothing, because the judge already denies a seller any gain from walking away after BTC is paid. So the only real no-show cost is the seller's capital locked while an unpaid trade waits, and that is bounded by design rather than by deposits.

Scope

Short payment deadline, measured in minutes. A trade the buyer has not paid within the payment window expires; the deadline is the refund proposal's expiry, so it is enforced by the chain, not by anyone's goodwill.
Auto-refund on deadline. The judge treats "deadline passed, no payment seen" as a refund decision, and the arbiter approves the seller's standing refund proposal without a human. The seller's cost of a no-show is the payment window plus one Quantus block, plus the proposal fee.
Mempool acceptance extends the deadline. A BTC transaction to the seller's address seen in our node's mempool for at least the agreed amount switches the trade from the payment window to the confirmation window (N confirmations, tiered by amount). A buyer who pays late but pays is not refunded out from under them; a buyer who never broadcasts costs the seller minutes.
Maker exposure limits. Each maker's daemon sets a maximum open exposure and a per-taker cap, so a griefer can lock at most that much of one maker's inventory for one payment window. The coordinator enforces the maker's declared limits before creating a trade.
Proposal fees are the anti-spam cost. Opening a trade costs the seller the multisig creation and refund proposal fees; the buyer's only cost is on Bitcoin. Makers price the expected no-show rate into their spread, which is theirs to set.
Nothing here is enforced by identity, reputation or deposits. If griefing turns out to exceed what limits and deadlines contain, that is the moment to design something more, with evidence.

Operator decision to record here before starting

Default payment window and confirmation tiers, and the maker-limit defaults the daemon ships with.

Acceptance

A buyer who never pays costs the maker the payment window and the proposal fee and nothing else, measured on Planck plus signet. A buyer whose BTC is in the mempool at the deadline is not refunded. A second taker cannot open a trade against a maker whose declared exposure is already committed.

Depends on

The protocol document; the arbiter; the coordinator.

Parent: #54. Replaces the bond design; see the correction on #54 dated 2026-09-15. ## Why no bonds Buyers do not hold QTC; only miners and the team do. A QTC bond is a barrier to entry for exactly the people the swap exists to bring in, and a seller bond protects nothing, because the judge already denies a seller any gain from walking away after BTC is paid. So the only real no-show cost is the seller's capital locked while an unpaid trade waits, and that is bounded by design rather than by deposits. ## Scope - **Short payment deadline, measured in minutes.** A trade the buyer has not paid within the payment window expires; the deadline is the refund proposal's expiry, so it is enforced by the chain, not by anyone's goodwill. - **Auto-refund on deadline.** The judge treats "deadline passed, no payment seen" as a refund decision, and the arbiter approves the seller's standing refund proposal without a human. The seller's cost of a no-show is the payment window plus one Quantus block, plus the proposal fee. - **Mempool acceptance extends the deadline.** A BTC transaction to the seller's address seen in our node's mempool for at least the agreed amount switches the trade from the payment window to the confirmation window (N confirmations, tiered by amount). A buyer who pays late but pays is not refunded out from under them; a buyer who never broadcasts costs the seller minutes. - **Maker exposure limits.** Each maker's daemon sets a maximum open exposure and a per-taker cap, so a griefer can lock at most that much of one maker's inventory for one payment window. The coordinator enforces the maker's declared limits before creating a trade. - **Proposal fees are the anti-spam cost.** Opening a trade costs the seller the multisig creation and refund proposal fees; the buyer's only cost is on Bitcoin. Makers price the expected no-show rate into their spread, which is theirs to set. - Nothing here is enforced by identity, reputation or deposits. If griefing turns out to exceed what limits and deadlines contain, that is the moment to design something more, with evidence. ## Operator decision to record here before starting Default payment window and confirmation tiers, and the maker-limit defaults the daemon ships with. ## Acceptance A buyer who never pays costs the maker the payment window and the proposal fee and nothing else, measured on Planck plus signet. A buyer whose BTC is in the mempool at the deadline is not refunded. A second taker cannot open a trade against a maker whose declared exposure is already committed. ## Depends on The protocol document; the arbiter; the coordinator.

grenade added the child label 2026-09-15 14:42:23 +00:00

grenade referenced this issue

2026-09-15 14:42:30 +00:00

epic: btc/qtc swaps through arbitrated multisig escrow #54

grenade changed title from ~~bonds and limits: make walking away expensive, cap what an unbonded party can do~~ to no-show economics without bonds: short deadlines, auto-refund, maker exposure limits

2026-09-15 14:54:37 +00:00

grenade referenced this issue

2026-09-15 14:54:42 +00:00

coordinator: offers, matching and trade records, holding nothing #59

grenade referenced this issue

2026-09-15 14:54:48 +00:00

epic: btc/qtc swaps through arbitrated multisig escrow #54

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